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1. Introduction: Violence, the State and Statebuilding 
1.1. Context and Research Question 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, liberal statebuilding interventions have become an important 
practice in international politics. In statebuilding interventions, a liberal model of statehood is 
exported to societies governed by weak states. Among policy-makers and scholars alike, the 
dominant view of the state is still shaped by Max Weber’s (Weber 1972: 824) classic definition 
of the state as the “[..] organization which successfully claims the monopoly on legitimate 
physical violence as means of political rule within a territory [..]”1. Although the modern state 
has many more characteristics, the regulation of violence is a core element of statehood (Pierson 
2011). Thus, by definition building states entails the monopolization of the means of violence. 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine why some statebuilding interventions succeed in 
building a monopoly on violence while others fail. Before I provide an answer to this question, it 
is necessary to get a basic understanding of the issue at hand: Why do states and international 
organizations intervene militarily to export specific types of institutions of violence regulation? 
Across developed states, it is taken for granted that the state controls violence. Violence 
has become a rare phenomenon in Europe and North America. While homicide and violent crime 
rates have reached historically low levels across the ‘Western World’ (Eisner 2001, 2003), war 
within or between Western states has become unthinkable (Dafoe 2011; UCDP 2014b). In an 
increasing number of these countries, the state has prohibited violence not just in public places 
such as schools but also in the private sphere of the family (Bussmann et al. 2009: 2-3). Scholars 
have argued that this demise of violence is not just a snapshot of recent developments but part of 
a long-term process that has unfolded over centuries. They have described the pacification of 
Western societies in emphatic terms as a ‘Civilizing Process’ (Elias 1939[2000]) that enables us 
to free ‘The Better Angels of our Nature’ (Pinker 2011). In contrast, civil wars and violent crime 
are much more prevalent in many parts of Africa, Asia and the Americas (UCDP 2014b; UNODC 
                                                             
1 ‘[..]daß der moderne Staat ein anstaltsmäßiger Herrschaftsverband ist, der innerhalb eines Gebietes die 
legitime physische Gewaltsamkeit als Mittel der Herrschaft zu monopolisieren mit Erfolg getrachtet hat 
[..] ‘ 
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2013: 22-27)
2. In short, from the perspective of developed countries the world appears to be 
divided into violent and non-violent areas. 
Against the backdrop of this gap between pacified societies in the West and a perceived 
omnipresence of violence in large parts of the rest of the world, the idea of liberal statebuilding 
has gained traction in foreign policy circles since the end of the Cold War (Wesley 2008: 376-
379). The logic behind statebuilding is simple: If the liberal, Western state has managed to clear 
society from the evils of war and violent crime, then exporting this institutional model could 
solve the violence problem in other countries, too (Richmond 2005). Since 1989, developed 
states and international organizations have increasingly identified state weakness as a key cause 
of poverty and violence. To address the problem, these actors have developed a set of strategies 
that can be broadly subsumed under the label external statebuilding: External support for “[..] the 
creation of new government institutions and strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama 2005: 
xvii). Statebuilding measures can be placed on a continuum ranging from minimal interference to 
highly intrusive policies. On the one side of the spectrum are instruments such as conditional 
loans by the International Monetary Fund that are meant to provide political elites with incentives 
for ‘good governance’ reforms. On the other side, there are large-scale military interventions that 
aim at the complete overhaul of state-society relations. This dissertation deals with the latter 
phenomenon: Liberal statebuilding interventions.  
I define liberal statebuilding interventions as substantial military transgressions of a 
state’s jurisdictions by other states or international organizations with the goal to establish a 
liberal state3 (Berdal and Zaum 2012; Call and Wyeth 2008; Reus-Smit 2013; Richmond 2005). 
Liberal statehood is characterized by a monopoly on violence, democracy, the rule of law, and a  
market-based economy. This model of statehood has the backing of Western ministries, 
international organizations, and a great number of social scientists alike (Wesley 2008: 376-379). 
The theory behind liberal statebuilding is that there are several ways in which liberal statehood 
                                                             
2 In fact, the self-perception of Western societies is biased. A look at different world regions shows that 
Eastern Asia has also achieve comparatively low levels of both civil war and violent crime. What North 
America, Europe and parts of Asia have in common are strong states that have monopolized violence to 
historically unprecedented levels. 
3 The definition is a reformulation of Reus-Smit’s definition of intervention: “International intervention is 
the transgression of a unit’s realm of jurisdiction, conducted by other units in an order, acting singly or 
collectively. Interventions are always transformative; they are transgressions to reconﬁgure identities, 
institutions, and practices. And they are always justiﬁed. Interventions violate established principles of 
differentiation, and their legitimacy requires a normative defence” (Reus-Smit 2013: 1058). 
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promotes peace and wealth (Paris 2004: 41-42 ; Richmond 2006: 291-293). First and foremost, 
the actors who intervene in weak state societies are usually liberal states. Policymakers have been 
socialized in this type of state, and they are accountable to an electorate that would hardly tolerate 
the export of illiberal institutions. In a nutshell, the rational-legal, liberal type of institution is the 
only one that is seen as legitimate in Europe and North America (Lake 2010b: 33-35). 
Furthermore, this ideology is underpinned mainly by two causal arguments of how weak and 
illiberal statehood leads to war. Scholars of civil war have found that weak governments and non-
inclusive institutions make violent conflict more likely (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goldstone et al. 
2010; Hegre et al. 2001). More indirectly, economists have emphasized the importance of ‘good 
governance’ (i.e. liberal institutions) for economic development (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; 
North 1990; North et al. 2009). Since poverty is one of the strongest predictors of civil war 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), the logical conclusion is that liberal 
statehood will prevent a recurrence of war not only directly through strong and fair institutions, 
but also indirectly through economic development. Consequently, policymakers have accepted 
the creation of liberal institutions as the appropriate response to situations of ‘state fragility’. The 
statebuilding consensus of the post-Cold War era is reflected by documents released by 
international institutions such as the UN (UN 2008b: 25-29), OECD (OECD 2007b), or the 
European Union (EC 2007: 8) as well as many governments4. A representative example of the 
view of European and North American governments is offered by the OECD that argues for a 
Focus on state-building as the central objective. States are fragile when state structures 
lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty 
reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their 
populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused 
on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main 
areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues 
of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. 
Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in 
order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; 
                                                             
4 See for example the British Department for International Development (DFID 2010: 24-27), or the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID 2005: 7-8). 
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mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, 
strong economic performance and employment generation. (OECD 2007b: 2) 
While the paragraph exemplifies the highly ambitious nature of liberal statebuilding, none of 
these ambitions can be achieved without the establishment of a monopoly on violence. A state 
monopoly on violence is a necessary condition for the more elaborate goals of liberal 
statebuilding. As long as non-state actors can use force to achieve their aims, democracy and the 
rule of law cannot properly function (Møller and Skaaning 2011). The official focus on the 
creation of ‘security first’ in post-war societies testifies to the importance of the monopoly on 
violence for statebuilding mission (BMZ 2012; DFID 2010: 28-29 ; USAID 2005: 3). A 
monopoly on violence is thus the most basic element of what statebuilding is supposed to 
achieve, yet a brief look at the outcomes (table 1) of interventions reveals great variation. Some 
interventions have resulted in a robust monopolization of force, while others seem to have no 
(positive) effect at all.  This disparity of outcomes poses the major puzzle that my dissertation 
tries to solve. 
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Country Intervening 
Actors 
Peak Troop 
Deployment (per 
1,000 capita) 
Duration5 BTI 2014 
Monopoly on 
Violence 
Score (1-10) 
Afghanistan NATO 150,000 (5.9) 2001 – 2014 3 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
UN, NATO, EU 60,000 (15.9) 1995 – 2007 8 
Central African 
Republic 
AU, UN 10,000 (2.3) 2014 – ongoing 1 
Côte d'Ivoire UN 6,900 (0.3) 2004 – ongoing 6 
DR Congo UN 22,000 (0.3) 2004 – ongoing 2 
East Timor UN, Australia/NZ 11,000 (10.3) 1999 – 2012 n/a 
Iraq US-led coalition 176,000 (5.2) 2003 – 2011 4 
Kosovo NATO, EU 50,000 (27.5) 1999 – ongoing 6 
Liberia UN, ECOWAS 15,000 (3.5) 2003 – ongoing 8 
Mali UN 9,132 (0.6) 2013 – ongoing 3 
Sierra Leone UN, UK, 
ECOWAS 
17,500 (2.8) 1999 – 2005  8  
Somalia AU, UN 22,126 (2.1) 2007 – ongoing  1 
South Sudan UN 12,500 (1.5) 2011 – ongoing 5 
Table 1: Complete list of l iberal statebuilding interventions. 
 
Given the importance of violence regulation for statebuilding, my goal is to narrow down my 
analysis and focus on how liberal statebuilding interventions affect the regulation of violence in a 
given society. Hence, the main question this dissertation seeks to answer is: Under which 
conditions do statebuilding interventions succeed or fail to create a state monopoly on violence? 
There is a broad consensus among social scientists that the monopoly on violence is a core 
element of statehood (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 15 ; Pierson 2011: 7). Among scholars of 
statebuilding interventions, there is agreement that statebuilding aims at the creation of a 
                                                             
5 “Ongoing” marks cases that were ongoing as of writing the dissertation, i.e. at the end of 2014.  
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monopoly on violence 6. Yet, they have neither clarified the concept nor have they offered 
systematic explanations for the varying outcomes of international attempts at monopolizing the 
means of coercion. In order to provide both an analytical framework and an explanatory theory, 
this dissertation adopts a neo-institutionalist view on violence regulation in which institutions are 
sets of rules that constrain and enable human action (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 43 ; North 1990: 
3-6). Institutions are generally the outcome of bargaining between actors and therefore reflect the 
power relations at the time of institutional design. By locking in these power constellations, 
institutions create stability, but they can also preserve inefficient rules for long periods of times 
(Pierson 2004). Institutions that regulate violence are a core element of every social order. The 
natural urge to avoid becoming subject to violence gives violence a deterrence effect (Trotha 
1995: 130-131). This deterrence effect makes violence an important source of power for those 
actors who are better at organizing means violence. In order to tame these powerful actors and to 
make violence productive for society, the access to and application of violence need to be 
regulated by institutions.  
What do statebuilding interventions do to monopolize the means of coercion? In order to 
build liberal states with strong monopolies on violence, the ‘international community’ has 
developed a rather uniform set of statebuilding intervention strategies during the last two 
decades. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) have become the key strategies of monopolizing the use of force. Initially, interveners 
have experimented with different styles of intervention. In Namibia, complex peacekeeping 
meant that external actors would support a peace and democratization process that was 
implemented by local actors. This institution-building exercise proved highly successful (Paris 
2004: 135-141). A subsequent large-scale mission in Cambodia which monitored elections in the 
aftermath of civil war largely failed. After the UN had withdrawn, the conflict continued. During 
the trial and error phase in the 1990s, the interveners developed strategies of how to conduct their 
interventions, among them DDR and SSR. By making DDR a standard approach to statebuilding, 
the international community acknowledged that in order to achieve peace, armed groups needed 
to be disarmed and former combatants had to be reintegrated into society (Knight and Özerdem 
2004: 499-501 ; UN 2014: 1). Hence, DDR can be seen as the first step towards a monopoly on 
                                                             
6 The monopoly on violence is accepted by scholars of all stripes as a key feature of statebuilding 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 7 ; Lake 2010b: 31 ; Mac Ginty 2010b: 580-581 ; Paris and Sisk 2009: 1).  
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violence. SSR is a more complex concept and combines several elements that taken together are 
meant to create a liberal security architecture. Security sector reforms entail two core features. 
First, they endow governments with organizational capacities in the form professional armed 
forces and police forces. Second, SSR creates institutional frameworks that are meant to regulate 
the coercive apparatus and make it democratically accountable (Jackson 2011: 1085-1090). Since 
the mid-1990s, the combination of DDR and SSR has become the typical strategy for external 
statebuilders who seek to build a monopoly on the use of force.  
What answers does existing research on statebuilding offer us for explaining the variation 
in outcomes?7 The phenomenon of statebuilding has attracted a lot of scholarly attention, and 
there has been a first ‘great debate’ on statebuilding and peacebuilding in which ‘problem-solving 
scholars’ and ‘critical scholars’ were pitted against each other (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 2-
4). The problem-solvers have sought to produce scholarly work that is useful to practitioners. 
Hence, they have focused on the strategies and resources employed by intervening actors  to 
analyze statebuilding. Their arguments have thus focused on how to increase statebuilding 
effectiveness by improving these external factors (Chesterman 2004; Dobbins 2007; Paris 2004). 
If the problem-solvers were right, we should expect that statebuilding interventions have 
performed better where external actors have committed more resources and have conducted well-
planned DDR and SSR campaigns. Furthermore, statebuilding should become more successful 
over time as the actors learn from past mistakes and adjust their strategies. A brief glance at the 
cases reveals that the exclusive focus on external factors cannot account for the great variation in 
intervention outcomes. Well-resourced interventions have produced vastly different outcomes, as 
have interventions with sophisticated DDR and SSR strategies. Furthermore, failures in the latest 
statebuilding endeavors (e.g. South Sudan) indicate that the (actually occurring) learning process 
had little impact on the ability of intervening actors to establish monopolies on violence. 
‘Critical scholars’ have questioned the very assumptions behind interventions and have 
criticized the problem-solvers for ignoring the social structures in the countries where 
statebuilding took place (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007; Pugh 2004; Richmond 2005). The 
introduction of local actors and structures into the debate was important as these factors help 
understand why statebuilding is much more difficult than policymakers and scholars had 
                                                             
7 For a detailed literature review, see chapters 3.1 and 3.2. 
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anticipated in the 1990s. However, the literature focused largely on failure. If strong local actors 
prevent the monopolization of violence, how can variance across cases with strong local actors be 
explained? In sum, while this first debate was extremely fruitful and serves as a foundation for 
any further research on peacebuilding, both sides have largely failed to provide systematic 
explanations for the outcomes of statebuilding interventions (Zuercher et al. 2013: 4-5). In recent 
years, a new generation of scholarship has put a stronger focus on explaining statebuilding 
outcomes by adopting a more comparative perspective8. My dissertation aims at contributing to 
this new generation of comparative statebuilding research. 
 
1.2. The Argument 
 
This dissertation offers one conceptual innovation and makes one major causal argument. First, I 
offer a theoretical clarification of the concept of ‘monopoly on violence’, arguing that the modern 
state has monopolized two different types of violence: Large-scale violence and small-scale 
violence. A state has a monopoly on violence when it has monopolized large-scale violence and 
small-scale violence regulation. Second, based on this distinction I develop an explanation for 
why statebuilding interventions succeed or fail at monopolizing the means of violence. My 
argument is that liberal statebuilding interventions lead to a state monopoly on violence when the 
intervention is supported by key regional actors and when the target society had a history of 
strong statehood prior to civil war. The following paragraphs will briefly summarize my 
argument. 
Large-scale violence denotes organized violence. The means of large-scale violence thus 
consist of any type of organization that is able to wage war. A state has a monopoly on large-
scale violence when the government is the only actor on the territory of the state that controls 
organizations capable of waging war (i.e. armed forces). As the literature on state formation 
shows, the modern state has developed within a regional state system. Statehood as an institution 
of large-scale violence divides a region into clearly demarcated territories in which only one actor 
(i.e. the government) is allowed to control the means of warfare. Therefore, I argue that liberal 
statebuilding interventions are highly likely to succeed in establishing a state monopoly on large-
                                                             
8 For a detailed discussion of the literature, see chapter 3. 
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scale violence when key regional actors support the intervention. Statebuilding interventions 
supply the government of a state with organizational capacities of large-scale violence for a 
limited period of time: They provide troops as long as the state is too weak, they train and equip 
armed forces, and they provide the government with the money to fund this coercive apparatus. 
However, their ability to eventually monopolize the means of warfare depends on whether they 
succeed at disarming non-state armed groups. Where these armed groups have access to 
sanctuaries across borders, they can sustain their operations, evade disarmament, and drive up the 
costs of statebuilding. Given the time constraints of interveners, a withdrawal without 
monopolization becomes highly likely.  
Small-scale violence describes the application of violence at the inter-personal level. 
Every human being can be violent, and applying small-scale violence requires only minimal 
organizational capacities at the local level. Small-scale violence can never be fully monopolized, 
but actors can have a monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. A state has a monopoly on 
small-scale violence regulation when it is the only actor with the ability to make and enforce 
collectively binding rules. In order to fulfill this function, the modern state has developed an 
institutional framework of legal monism and a bureaucratic police to enforce rules. The 
alternative to state order are self-help communities, i.e. local non-state institutions which provide 
a set of rules (such as customary or religious laws) and (violent and non-violent) enforcement 
mechanisms. Since self-help communities are highly resilient institutions, this dissertation argues 
that liberal statebuilding interventions will only lead to a state monopoly on small-scale violence 
regulation in countries which had a history of strong statehood prior to civil war. The rationale 
behind this line of argument is that the monopolization of small-scale violence is a complex 
bargaining process between the central government and local elites. Governments have to build 
bureaucratic institutions of local government (administration, police, etc.), but they also have to 
deal with the local elites that owe their power to self-help communities. Often times, the central 
government depends on the support of these local elites for maintenance of order. As a result, 
many interventions create para states in which both self-help communities and state institutions 
regulate small-scale violence. In contrast, interventions in societies that have experienced a 
history of strong statehood are likely to succeed in monopolizing small-scale violence regulation 
because the state does not have to compete with self-help communities.   
10 
 
 After having presented my argument in a nutshell, the following section discusses the 
methods I applied in my dissertation and elaborate on the case selection. 
 
1.3. Methods and Case Selection 
 
Methods 
In order to increase transparency, it is necessary to make my basic social scientific assumptions 
explicit before discussing specific methods. When I put my explanations to the test, I am 
following a Bayesian view of truth. Unlike Popper’s logic of falsification where a hypothesis can 
only be refuted (i.e. falsified) through empirical tests, “[..] Bayesian logic posits that we can both 
confirm and disconfirm our confidence in the validity of a theory -  although given the uncertain 
nature of empirical observation, we can never be 100 percent confident about either confirmation 
or disconfirmation” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 83).  Both my explanation and other explanations 
might be plausible. The question is how likely it is to find certain evidence given that either my 
explanation or rivalling explanations are correct (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 83-85). One could 
thus liken a specific explanation (i.e. a model) to a map: It is useful because it helps us navigate 
the world through simplifications even though it leaves out large parts of reality. Some maps are 
better suited than others for specific purposes (Clarke and Primo 2012: 12-14). Therefore, the 
strongest possible conclusion I can reach is that my explanation is better suited than existing 
theories to understand and to explain the effects of statebuilding interventions on violence 
regulation. 
The dissertation is conceptualized as a comparative historical analysis, a type of research 
that is “[..] defined by a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and 
the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 6). I 
assess my theoretical explanations within and across three case studies. Comparing several cases 
in a most similar systems design increases the confidence with which I can rule out alternative 
explanations before entering the case studies (Rohlfing 2012: 133-136). In order to conduct 
causal analysis within the case studies, I make use of the latest advances in qualitative social 
scientific methods (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Rohlfing 2012). 
Within each case I apply process-tracing, a method that entails the formulation of causal 
11 
 
mechanisms which are then put to the test in case studies. Process-tracing allows researchers to 
make stronger claims about the causal connection within single case studies, because they can 
show how the initial cause translated into the observed outcome step by step (Beach and Pedersen 
2013). Throughout my research, I have combined deductive and inductive elements: I have 
constructed basic theoretical expectations about the relation of violence, actors and institutions by 
deducing them from the state formation literature and research on statebuilding. These 
expectations (or priors) were then combined with empirical material from the cases and updated 
accordingly. Through this theory-building process-tracing, I was able to develop a novel 
theoretical explanation for the effect of statebuilding interventions on violence regulation (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013: 60-61). Additionally, each case study (as well as this introductory chapter) 
further incorporates congruence analysis. In congruence analysis, the researcher compares the 
explanatory power of his own hypothesis to rivalling (or complementary) explanations (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013: 4-5). In the case studies, I especially look at case specific explanations that 
have been advanced by other scholars. 
The data I analyze in both the comparison and process-tracing is a combination of official 
documents, leaked documents, datasets, newspaper articles, and a large body of secondary 
literature that has been conducted on the specific cases at hand. As the types of data indicate, the 
goal of this dissertation is not to provide new data or insights from the field, but to develop a 
theory that can explain phenomena in a strictly limited population. 
 
Universe of Cases – What is a liberal statebuilding intervention? 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I narrow down the focus to interventions with wide-ranging 
statebuilding goals and a strong military component. By doing so, my research design takes only 
those cases into account in which external actors were strongly committed to intervention and 
liberal statebuilding. Most peacebuilding activities are conducted by the UN, EU, NATO or any 
OECD member state are conducting contain some elements of liberal statebuilding. With respect 
to peacebuilding, Berdal and Zaum (Berdal and Zaum 2012: 2) argue that “[out] of a total of 49 
UN-led peacekeeping operations established between 1989 and 2011, 29 had some form of 
statebuilding mandate”. However, the great variance of these statebuilding activities, from 
monitoring elections to all-out institution-building, makes comparisons across cases difficult. 
12 
 
Therefore, I only classify missions as a statebuilding interventions when they meet certain criteria 
with regard to resource input (troops), strategy (liberal institution-building) and duration (in 
years). In table 1, I have summarized all cases that qualify as statebuilding interventions (SBIs). 
In order to be counted as an SBI, the intervention has to aim at building a liberal state through 
institution- and capacity-building (SSR), and there needs to be a military deployment of at least 
5,000 troops9. Furthermore, interventions should at least last three years in order to have an 
impact (and as a further signal for serious external commitment).  
While these thresholds are somewhat arbitrary, they are useful to distinguish statebuilding 
interventions from less intrusive forms of external state support (like conditional aid, 
peacekeeping, or election monitoring). For example, the UN mission in Cambodia encompassed a 
military component of 15,900 troops, but it only monitored elections and was not geared towards 
building a stronger state. UNSOM II in Somalia was a 28,000-strong intervention with 
statebuilding goals, but it was aborted after only two years due to the premature withdrawal of 
US forces. Similarly, UNMIH in Haiti (6,000 troops, SSR-component) was too short-lived to 
count as a genuine statebuilding intervention, and its successor mission MINUSTAH does not 
seek to build a monopoly on large-scale violence10. In contrast, the newly established missions in 
the Central African Republic (~10,000 troops) and Mali (~9,000 troops) are highly likely to 
become part of the universe of cases as they fit the pattern of long-term peacekeeping 
commitment in Africa. However, as of 2014 it is too soon to count them as cases. Nevertheless, I 
have chosen to include ongoing missions. While it could be argued that it is inappropriate to 
assess inconclusive interventions, excluding them would lead to a massive selection bias. 
Unsuccessful missions tend to last longer as interveners face a sunk cost problem and therefore 
often postpone withdrawal. However, only by including them is it possible to get a realistic 
picture of success and failure in statebuilding interventions. 
Table 1 lists all relevant cases and reveals several important aspects. First, the set of 
actors is rather homogenous. Most interventions were UN peacekeeping missions that entailed a 
strong statebuilding component. While most other interventions were conducted by NATO states 
or the US (often in cooperation with the UN), the AU has established itself as a major player in 
                                                             
9 As brigades have become the largest operational unit of many armed forces, the approximate size of one 
brigade could be seen as a minimum threshold for meaningful military operations. 
10 The Haitian army has been abandoned. 
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peace- and statebuilding. Second, many interventions did not start out as statebuilding 
interventions but actually developed into such through a series of UN mandates. For example, 
UNOCI, the UN mission in Côte I’Ivoire, had been initially tasked with monitoring the 
implementation of a 2003 peace agreement. After the 2010 Presidential elections, however, DDR 
and SSR components were added. Thus, statebuilding interventions are often the result of 
‘mission creep’. Third, a strong troop presence or SSR programs are apparently not sufficient to 
guarantee a monopolization of violence. Fourth, despite debates about the demise of the 
statebuilding paradigm and an increasing reluctance of Western states to directly participate in 
statebuilding, several missions have only commenced in recent years. Statebuilding seems to 
continue to be a viable policy option, especially for UN missions. Fifth and finally, the outcome 
varies widely, from cases where immense external commitment fails to create minimal statehood 
to cases where weak states are provided with solid coercive capacities. How can we explain the 
wide disparities in outcomes? The next section presents the case selection criteria and probes into 
some of the more general explanations that are offered in the literature. 
 
Case Selection 
My case selection seeks to include similar cases with varying outcomes on both large-scale 
violence and small-scale violence. Furthermore, my argument will be strengthened by selecting 
cases where the statebuilding intervention has officially ended. I select Afghanistan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Sierra Leone for my case studies. These three cases are all cases of liberal 
statebuilding interventions, but their outcomes differ. The creation of a monopoly on large-scale 
violence succeeded in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone. The monopolization of small-scale 
violence regulation has succeeded only in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to clarify my choice, the 
following paragraphs briefly compare the cases. However, it is difficult to find quantitative data 
that measures the two concepts of violence I develop in this dissertation. As George and Bennett 
remind us, “[c]ase studies allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to 
identify and measure the indicators that best represents the theoretical concepts the researcher 
intends to measure.  Many of the variables that interest social scientists, such as democracy, 
power, political culture, state strength, and so on are notoriously difficult to measure” (George 
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and Bennett 2005: 19). With that caveat in mind, I present rough proxies of my two outcomes for 
illustrative purposes. 
 
Figure 1
11
: Battle-related deaths, Uppsala Conflict Data Set (UCDP 2014a). 
 
The number of battle-related deaths could be used as a rough proxy for the existence or absence 
of a monopoly on violence (see figure 2). At first glance, the figure seems to confirm my 
assessment of the cases. However, the measure is problematic as it conceals the fact that Bosnia-
Herzegovina was divided among two major armed actors. There was no open conflict, but also no 
state monopoly on large-scale violence. Similarly, the number of armed actors can be misleading 
as the case of Afghanistan shows. At the beginning of the statebuilding exercise, the Afghan state 
relied on the Afghan Military Force. While formally the AMF was one military organization 
under state control, it consisted of an alliance of several militias and their political control was 
questionable. Nevertheless, the number of battle-related deaths reflects the degree of 
institutionalization of violence control to a certain extent. As the case studies show in detail, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina acquired a monopoly on large-scale violence in 2005 when the armed forces 
of the two constitutive entities were merged into a new Bosnian army. In Sierra Leone, the defeat 
                                                             
11 As the starting year, I chose the year in which the international mission officially started (ISAF 2002; 
IFOR 1995; UNAMSIL 1999).  
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of the RUF paved the way for a reconstruction of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces, enabling 
them to control the territory and deter the formation of new armed groups. In contrast, 
Afghanistan was mired in civil war throughout the twelve years of statebuilding. 
This great variation cannot be fully accounted for by existing explanations. The focus of 
‘problem-solvers’ on the intervening actors would suggest that the statebuilders had different 
goals or have used greatly differing sets of strategies across the three cases. As table 2 illustrates, 
a very similar set of actors was involved in the three interventions. The UN always played a role, 
although its involvement differed from case to case. Furthermore, in all cases Western-dominated 
institutions or Western states also played a major role. In terms of resources, all cases saw large 
troop deployments. However, both the biggest and smallest per capita deployment  were 
successful cases (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone) whereas the case in between was a 
failure (Afghanistan). The critical scholars’ emphasis on the misfit between liberal SSR policies 
and the local context also remains unsatisfactory. While Bosnia-Herzegovina is an industrialized 
society, both Afghanistan and Sierra Leone share factors that are commonly identified as 
problematic: Poverty, strong traditional and local institutions, long-term violent conflict and 
ethnic heterogeneity. Thus, existing explanations fail to account for the variation in outcome. 
Case Actors Resources 
(Peak troop 
deployment per 
1,000 capita) 
Strategies Outcome 
Afghanistan NATO, UN, 
USA 
5.9  
(150,000 in total) 
Delayed DDR 
program, long-
term SSR 
Dispersed 
Means of 
Large-Scale 
Violence 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
EU, NATO, 
UN 
 15.9 
(60,000 in total) 
 
Delayed DDR 
program, long-
term SSR 
Monopoly on 
Large-Scale 
Violence 
Sierra Leone UK, UN  2.8 
(17,500 in total) 
Immediate DDR 
program, long-
term SSR 
Monopoly on 
Large-Scale 
Violence 
Table 2: Actors, resources, strategies and outcomes of statebuilding interventions. 
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Finding a good proxy for the regulation of small-scale violence poses an even greater challenge. 
The number of police officers tells us nothing about the importance of non-state institutions for 
small-scale violence regulation, as both can co-exist. Furthermore, output data such as homicide 
rates could indicate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of both state and non-state institutions. A 
potentially helpful indicator is the capacity of a state to tax its population. In the study of state 
formation, ‘extractive capacity’ has often been used as a proxy for the capability of the state to 
police its population (Hendrix 2010; Thies 2010; Thies 2004; Tilly 1992). Where non-state 
institutions regulate small-scale violence, local elites are either officially tasked with collecting 
taxes or have many opportunities to use public offices for rent-seeking. Hence, taxation is highly 
inefficient in para states. In contrast, where the state has a monopoly on small-scale violence 
regulation it can tax its population directly. This allows for much more efficient taxation. A look 
at the three cases reveals that a decade after the onset of the statebuilding intervention, there is a 
clear divide between the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where no self-help communities existed 
compared to those cases with strong local elites. These values are also remarkably stable over 
time, indicating the stability of social order at the local level. 
 
Figure 2: Tax revenues as percentage of GDP ten years after the onset of statebuilding intervention 
(WorldBank 2014). 
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Assumptions about a power vacuum were false in all three cases. While the Bosnian policing 
institutions proved robust throughout the war (and were instrumental in ethnic cleansing), 
Afghanistan and Sierra Leone had strong self-help communities when the interventions began. As 
table 3 illustrates, the interventions all pursued similar trajectories in terms of institutional reform 
and capacity-building. Thus, the adopted strategies cannot fully explain the variation in 
outcomes. Nevertheless, existing research offers some helpful clues for explaining the effects of 
statebuilding interventions on the regulation of small-scale violence. As the case studies will 
show, the local institutions of small-scale violence and their relation to the central government 
are the crucial variable for explaining the outcomes. 
Case Institutional 
Reform 
Capacity-Building Outcome 
Afghanistan New constitution, 
reform of local 
government 
Newly established 
Afghan National Police 
(150,000) 
Dispersed 
Regulation of 
Small-Scale 
Violence 
Bosnia-Herzegovina New constitution, 
entity-based 
policing system 
Police reform, training 
for entity police forces 
(16,000) 
State Monopoly 
on Small-Scale 
Violence 
Regulation 
Sierra Leone Constitutional 
reform, reform of 
local government 
Reconstruction of Sierra 
Leone Police (9,300) 
Dispersed 
Regulation of 
Small-Scale 
Violence 
Table 3: Statebuilding intervention and measures of small-scale violence monopolization. 
 
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation consists of two major parts: The first part develops the theoretical argument in 
two chapters. The introduction is followed by a chapter that distills the core theoretical 
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assumption about the relations of social order, institutions and violence regulation from state 
formation theory. It examines what we know about the role of violence in politics and society and 
develops an institutionalist perspective on violence regulation, arguing that two types of violence 
exist: Large-scale violence and small-scale violence. It then proceeds to take stock of what we 
know about the monopoly on violence and its historical emergence. Eventually, it builds a 
typology of state types based on their institutions of violence regulation. 
Chapter three takes this basic theoretical framework and applies it to statebuilding 
interventions. The chapter both discusses existing theories and presents findings from my case 
studies. I examine common strategies of monopolization and review the literature in order to 
extract the knowledge we have about the effects of statebuilding interventions on both large-scale 
violence and small-scale violence regulation. By combining these inductively gained insights 
with my theoretical framework, I develop two causal mechanisms for each type of violence 
regulation.  
The second part of the dissertation focuses on the empirics of statebuilding and the 
monopolization of violence. It consists of three chapters, each of which contains a case study that  
will test the causal mechanisms. Afghanistan is the case in which the intervention failed on both 
outcomes, intervention in Sierra Leone has led to a monopoly on large-scale violence but not on 
small-scale violence regulation, and monopolization in Bosnia-Herzegovina succeeded entirely. 
The case studies broadly confirm the hypotheses but also highlight important differences between 
cases with similar outcomes. The dissertation concludes by probing the plausibility of the theory 
for other cases of statebuilding intervention and by putting the findings into its broader political 
and scientific context. 
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2. Regulating Violence: An Institutionalist Theory 
 
This chapter develops a theoretical perspective on the social regulation of violence. In order to 
explain why some statebuilding interventions fail or succeed to build a monopoly on violence, it 
is necessary to first clarify the basic concepts of my analysis. In particular, this chapter examines 
the relation of political institutions and violence. Based on the literature on state formation, I 
argue that there are two types of violence that larger societies need to regulate: Warfare (large-
scale violence) and violence at the inter-personal level (small-scale violence). The unique feature 
of the modern state is that it has monopolized the regulation of both types of violence. In the 
following sections, I develop a theoretical framework that shows which actors, institutions, and 
processes are involved in the regulation of violence at the macro and micro level.  
In the first part of the chapter, I argue that modern statehood is a regional institution 
which regulates large-scale violence. It regulates large-scale violence by limiting the means of 
warfare to governments, and by limiting each government’s monopolistic claims to a clearly 
defined territory. It is widely accepted that governments need to develop organizational capacities 
to maintain a monopoly on large-scale violence: a strong army, and the extraction of resources 
from society (Thies 2004; Tilly 1992). Where governments fail to monopolize large-scale 
violence, outcomes can range from power-sharing arrangements among warlords to outright civil 
war. It is often assumed that a government has achieved ‘statehood’ once it has established these 
coercive capacities. However, without territorial borders there could never be a monopoly on 
violence (except on a global scale). Political elites that control means of large-scale violence and 
rule over populations need to reach agreement over the rules of statehood, i.e. that borders are 
fixed, that the rule within these borders is exclusive, and that only states can legitimately enter 
‘inter-unit’ political relations. While the norm of sovereign statehood as defined by a monopoly 
on violence within a given territory has become globally accepted (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 
15-19), this has not translated into a world of strong states; state weakness tends to cluster in 
certain regions (Gleditsch 2007: 295). What sets the regional level apart from the global level is 
the spatial proximity: Political actors do not have to interact on the global level (although they 
increasingly do), but they necessarily interact at the regional level. Thus, the monopolization of 
large-scale violence necessitates both coercive organizational capacities and a regional 
institutional setting. 
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The second part of the chapter argues that there are two possibilities to regulate small -
scale violence: Self-help communities and state orders. I adopt the distinction between these two 
types of order from Trutz von Trotha (1995: 131)12. All societies have developed institutions that 
regulate small-scale violence at the local level. The state regulates small-scale violence through 
bureaucratic structures that are ultimately backed up by the enforcement capacities of the police. 
In state orders there is no room for non-state rules, and private actors are only allowed to enforce 
rule when the state delegates the task (Trotha 1995: 132-133). However, this form of state 
regulation is a fairly recent phenomenon. Self-help communities are the historic norm. These 
institutions can assume very different forms as they have developed in specific local contexts, but 
they always entail a system of rules as well as elites which guarantee rule enforcement. Today, 
many states are para states; these societies regulate small-scale violence through a combination 
of self-help institutions and state policing (Trotha 1995: 141-146). 
On a cautionary note, the application of existing state formation models to other world 
regions has to be conducted carefully because the literature is mostly based on the European 
experience. I reduce the potential bias in part by including the small but growing body of research 
on state formation in Africa, Asia and the Americas. However, I hope to convince the reader that 
the basic needs and challenges of violence regulation are universal, and that building the most 
successful institution of violence regulation (i.e. the modern state) is always accompanied by a 
basic set of problems. Thus, many insights from state formation scholars are of great value for the 
study of statebuilding interventions. The chapter will develop the argument by first discussing the 
role of violence regulation for society in general and politics in particular. Building on a neo-
institutionalist framework, it will then proceed to theorize first the issue of large-scale violence 
regulation followed by small scale violence regulation.  
 
2.1. Politics, Society and Violence 
 
This section argues that all societies seek to regulate violence because all humans are capable of 
being violent while also fearing to be subjected to violence. This dual nature is a distinguishing 
feature of violence: Violence itself is destructive while the threat of violence can be productive, 
                                                             
12 In contrast to von Trotha, I apply the distinction exclusively to small-scale violence regulation. 
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for example by deterring people from breaking the law. The second part of the section argues that 
the modern state has evolved as an institution that is highly successful in regulating violence. 
Finally, I introduce the distinction between large-scale and small-scale violence.  
 
Violence and Institutions 
All human societies have developed sets of rules that regulate under which circumstances specific 
actors are allowed to use violence. Violence is an important research object for social scientists, 
and there is no shortage of studies on violence. These range from explanations of domestic 
violence (Collins 2008) to explanations of inter-state war (Bremer 1992). With regard to 
intervention, scholars have analyzed whether interventions can end ongoing violence (Fortna 
2004), and why violence resumes during or after interventions (Berdal and Suhrke 2012). While 
this wide range of violence scholarship seems to be only loosely connected, there is a general 
tendency in the social sciences to treat violence as a phenomenon that is an exception from the 
norm and, thus, heeds explanation (Koloma Beck and Schlichte 2014: 22-25). Violence is rarely 
seen as an ubiquitous condition of human existence, and few contemporary authors have 
concerned themselves with the ordering effects of violence (North et al. 2009). What complicates 
the matter is that there is a variety of social scientific concepts of violence, and some of these 
conceptualizations are very broad and encompassing (Kalyvas 2008: 19). However, concepts 
such as ‘structural violence’ or ‘cultural violence’ (Galtung 1990) make it difficult to determine 
where violence ends and other related phenomena such as coercion, inequali ty, or power begin. 
Furthermore, these structuralist approaches leave only scant space for agency and, thus, change.  
This dissertation will adopt a very simple definition of violence as “[..] the deliberate 
infliction of harm on people” (Kalyvas 2008: 19). The effects of violence on the victim are 
immediate and irreversible (Popitz 2004: 43-46). Since people do not want to become subjected 
to violence, the threat of violence can have a strong impact on their behavior (Tilly 1992: 70-71). 
Because “[..] violence performs a communicative function with a clear deterrent dimension [..]” 
(Kalyvas 2008: 26), threatened individuals are likely to do what they would not do otherwise. 
The threat of violence with the goal to alter other actors’ behavior can be conceptualized as 
coercion. Thus, the fact that individuals or organizations can coerce others’ behavior into certain 
directions makes control over the means of violence one of the most potent sources of power 
22 
 
(Dahl 1957: 202-203 ; Weber 1972: 28-29). Since the ability to control means of violence is a 
primary source of power, the regulation of violence is essential to all societal orders. Without 
institutions that regulate violence, there could hardly be any stable social relations as all 
individuals would constantly live under the threat of being harmed by others (cf. North et al. 
2009). As Popitz (2004: 190) argues: “No encompassing social order is built on the premise of 
nonviolence. The power to kill and the powerlessness of the victim are latent or manifest 
determinants of social structures”13.  
The social regulation of violence necessitates the creation of institutions. Following North 
(North 1990: 3) “[institutions] are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction“. Institutions can fulfill their ordering 
function because they are stable; they “[..] reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to 
everyday life” (North 1990: 3). Importantly for this study of violence regulation in weak states, 
North’s definition encompasses informal institutions. Comparative politics has strongly favored 
the study of formal institutions over informal ones. While such a bias might have few distorting 
effects for the study of highly bureaucratized OECD politics, such an approach fails to grasp the 
workings of many weak states in which informal institutions dominate politics (Bratton 2007: 96-
97). In the context of state formation, it is clear that prior to the establishment of formal state 
institutions there must be informal institutions in place.  
By institutionalizing the control over means of violence, the power that flows from 
violence and coercion is stabilized. These stable power relations thus take on the form of political 
rule and, when they are perceived as legitimate, authority (Weber 1972). They provide both the 
ruler and the ruled with certainty about the exercise of violence as it is clear who controls means 
of violence and under what conditions these means are applied. By doing so, they structure the 
distribution of a great amount of political power among societal actors. However, the institutional 
stability that makes the use of force predictable also makes change even more difficult than in 
non-violence related institutions. Most institutional change in politics occurs ei ther incrementally 
over longer periods, or through exogenous shocks. Consequently, institutions do not always 
reflect optimal solutions to social problems, but rather the distribution of powers among those 
actors who create and reproduce them (Pierson 2004: 44-48). Institutions that regulate violence 
                                                             
13 My own translation from German. 
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create a strong lock-in effect. What distinguishes institutions of violence regulation from other 
institutions is that in order to tame violence, they need to have the capacity to apply violence 
(Popitz 2004: 62-64). Therefore, changing these institutions is very difficult for actors who do not 
have access to means of violence.  
To be clear, violence regulation is not the only foundation of social order and political 
rule: It is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. Other aspects of the social such as the 
distribution of wealth or control over symbolic meanings also have strong ordering effects (Earle 
1997: 6-10 ; Elias 1983). Nevertheless, the regulation of violence is at the heart of all political 
order. 
 
Statehood as an Institution of Violence Regulation 
The state is the most important political institution of contemporary world society (Schlichte 
2005a: 62-63). In many ways, states are defined by the fact that they are expected to regulate 
violence (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 15-16). Theories of political coercion and actual state 
practice developed hand-in-hand, and theories that see the state as the most important regulator of 
violence date back to early modern philosophers like Bodin and Hobbes (Krasner 2001: 20). 
Perhaps the most famous justification for the need to regulate violence by concentrating it in the 
hands of a sovereign is Hobbes’ claim that otherwise man’s life would be “[..] solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1991). Today’s conception of the state is strongly influenced 
by the works of Max Weber. According to Weber, although a state can perform all kinds of 
functions, what distinguishes it from other organizations is its ability to claim a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force (Weber 1972: 29-30). He therefore defined the state as “[..] a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory”. The state is an institutional solution to the problem of violence regulation. In 
order to fulfill this function, modern states have developed armies and police forces as 
organizations that have means of violence at their disposal. While armies defend the state against 
both other states as well as armed uprisings, the police enforces law at the level of individual 
citizens. 
If the goal of violence regulation is to reduce the occurrence of violence, the modern state 
has been a highly successful institution. Historically, the increased monopolization of means of 
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coercion in the hands of governments has been accompanied by a drastic reduction in societal 
violence (Pinker 2011). Within European societies, the incidents of homicide have drastically 
dropped during the process. Eisner shows that between the 13th century and the early 1990s, 
homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants have decreased in England from 23 to 1.2, in the 
Netherlands and Belgium from 47 to 1.2, and in Germany and Switzerland from 37 to 1.2 (Eisner 
2001). Violence has become a rare phenomenon in the developed state, and when it occurs it 
generates massive outrage. The state in the developed world has disarmed its competitors as well 
as (to a certain extent) its citizens, and it has also largely delegitimized the private use of 
violence. Internationally, the record is mixed. The state has initially created some of the most 
deadly wars in human history. However, since World War Two, the ever increasing destructive 
potential of states has not translated into increased global violence. For several decades now 
inter-state war has been in decline and large-scale violence erupts mostly where the state is weak 
or absent (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sarkees et al. 2003). The strongest reduction of 
inter-state war has been achieved through the combination of statehood with democratic regimes. 
Peace between democratic states has become a law-like regularity in international politics (Dafoe 
2011). Nevertheless, the monopoly on violence has enabled states to both wage some of the most 
brutal wars in human history as well as massive violence against its own citizens. The German 
genocide of the European Jews is but the starkest example of what states can do to (parts of) thei r 
populations with their coercive capacities. Given the immense capacity of monopolists of 
violence to harm their own citizens, how did developed states tame their governments? 
The access to control over means of violence needs to be regulated, and the exercise of 
state violence needs to be constrained. One source of recurring instability for states is the lack of 
a non-violent mechanism to dispose of incompetent rulers. States with a monopoly on violence 
might be stable for decades, but if the government is not responsive to popular dissatisfaction, 
civil war is a likely outcome. The disposition of government through elections has evolved as the 
default option in developed states and thereby mostly resolved the problem of large-scale internal 
violence (Przeworski 1991). In contrast, protection against government violence is a constant 
political struggle, but has been greatly furthered through the rule of law. Through institutions that 
create checks and balances, or veto points, state repression has been tamed in Western 
democracies. All of these regulations of state violence are, however, secondary to the 
establishment of a monopoly on violence. Where political parties are also armed groups, 
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accepting electoral defeat is dangerous for each actor and the resulting lack of trust will 
undermine democracy. Where people have the choice between different organizations of rule 
enforcement, the rule of law will not work properly. The monopoly on violence is the necessary 
condition for both democracy and the rule of law (Møller and Skaaning 2011).  
If a monopoly on violence can reduce outbreaks of violence and if it can also enable 
polities to develop democracy and the rule of law, one could expect it to be a highly successful 
model on the global level. Indeed Weber’s ideal type has shaped global expectations of what a 
state should look like (Migdal and Schlichte 2005). However, even this most basic feature of 
statehood seems to be missing in many sovereign states. A great number of internationally 
recognized states have either a weak monopoly on violence or none at all. These entities have 
received labels such as quasi-states or failed states (Jackson 1993). As the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI 2014a) dataset shows, in 2014 only half of the 129 countries in 
transformation had a full monopoly on violence 14. About 42% had a partial monopoly, while ten 
countries had no monopoly on violence at all (see table 4). 
 
Table 4: “Monopoly on Violence” score of 129 countries in transition (BTI 2014a). 
 
                                                             
14 The scale ranges from 1 to 10. I coded 8 and above as a full monopoly on violence, 3 and less as no 
monopoly on violence, and everything in between as a partial monopoly on violence.  
Monopoly on violence (BTI 2014) 
Full monopoly
Partial monopoly
No monopoly
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While such data is helpful to get an idea of broader global trends, it remains unclear what exactly 
a monopoly on violence entails. For example, to my knowledge the BTI data is the only data set 
that actually has a ‘monopoly on violence’ variable. Its coding is based on how much of the 
state’s territory is controlled by armed actors, ranging from rebels to organized crime (BTI 
2014a). However, many more constellations are conceivable in which the state regulates violence 
to different degrees. A government could be the only actor who controls means of warfare, while 
all other forms of violence might be controlled by non-state actors. In a more strict definition, a 
state would actually have to monopolize violence at all societal levels. Here, many questions do 
arise: Does it affect the monopoly on violence if individuals are allowed to own guns? Does it 
matter whether there is organized crime on the territory of the state? What does the federalization 
of policing tell us about the state’s monopoly on violence? 
 
Regulating violence, large and small.. 
In order to clarify the concept of monopoly on violence, I propose to distinguish between two 
forms of violence: Large-scale and small-scale violence (cf. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 2-3). 
A state with a monopoly on violence regulates both types of violence. Large-scale violence is 
organized violence, i.e. any type of warfare. Hence, a government with a monopoly on large-
scale violence is the only actor on the territory of the state that controls organizations capable of 
waging war (i.e. armed forces). In contrast, small-scale violence is the everyday inter-personal 
violence that ranges from domestic violence to rule enforcement. Governments have the 
monopoly on the regulation of small-scale violence when the state is the only actor to make and 
enforce collectively binding rules. Table 5 and table 6 provide overviews of the actors and 
institutions that typically regulate violence.  
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Actors State Non-State 
Large-Scale Violence Government  
(Military) 
Armed Groups  
(Rebels, Warlord Polities, etc.) 
Small-Scale Violence Government  
(Police) 
Local Elites  
(Tribal Leaders, Elders, 
Chiefs, etc.) 
Table 5: Actors of large-scale and small-scale violence regulation. 
 
 
Institution State Non-State 
Large-Scale Violence Regional Statehood 
(Monopoly on warfare in 
clearly delimited territory) 
Empire, City State, City 
League 
Small-Scale Violence Bureaucracy 
(Legal framework, local 
administration) 
Self-Help Community 
(Chiefdoms, Tribes, Villages, 
etc.) 
Table 6: Institutions of large-scale and small-scale violence regulation. 
 
The analytical distinction of these two kinds of violence is empirically reflected by the historical 
development of modern states in Europe. In the first centuries of monopolization, governments 
have centralized the means of warfare. The organizational tool to achieve this was the standing 
army. After this process was largely completed around 1800, states have monopolized the 
regulation of small-scale violence in the hands of another organizational innovation: Modern 
police forces. In Europe, this process was only completed in the 20th century, when local elites 
were deprived of their last privileges to use force against their constituent populations (Tilly 
1985: 173-175 ; 1992: 25). Having established the distinction between large-scale violence and 
small-scale violence, the next two sections will discuss the two forms of violence and their 
regulation through institutions in detail. 
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2.2. Regulating Large-Scale Violence 
 
This section provides a theoretical discussion of the regulation of large-scale violence. It presents 
the institutions and actors of large-scale violence, and briefly summarizes historical trends of 
monopolization. Subsequently I examine the state formation literature to find existing 
explanations for the rise of the state as a monopolist on large-scale violence. The section 
concludes by arguing that the modern state has developed as a regional institution of large-scale 
violence regulation.  
Large-scale violence denotes organized violence between at least two groups. It encompasses 
all types of war including inter-state war and civil war. Large-scale violence is not simply the 
result of a large number of individuals coordinating their actions in order to harm another group. 
In order to exercise large-scale violence effectively, it takes organizational capacities (Malešević 
2010: 4-7). Hence, the regulation of large-scale violence is always a regulation of armed 
organizations. Whether they are armies or rebel groups, armed organizations usually have a 
leadership, a certain hierarchy, and a (however loosely) defined membership (Lichbach 1998: 17 
; Schlichte 2009). Sustaining these types of organizations is very resource-intensive. Soldiers 
need to be fed, equipped, supplied with ammunition and fuel, and taken care of when they get 
injured (Hazen 2013: 22). At the same time, armed organizations absorb large numbers of young 
men (and increasingly women) who would otherwise be involved in productive economic 
activities (Levy and Thompson 2010: 1). Overall, the establishment and maintenance of means of 
large-scale violence is very costly; but it can pay off.  
Regulating large-scale violence offers great rewards for the elites who control armed forces as 
well as for society as a whole. The regulation of large-scale violence usually entails either a 
monopolization of the means of warfare, or power-sharing arrangements in which elites refrain 
from making use of their violent capacities (North et al. 2009: 59-61). In Olson’s (1993: 568) 
famous formulation, those who control the means of warfare become ‘stationary bandits’. 
Political actors who control the means of coercion in a certain area will extract resources from the 
population (Tilly 1992: 70-71). While the population is subjected to taxation and sometimes 
military service, the security generated by those who control the means of warfare makes 
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investment into a social order worthwhile for individuals (Lake 2010b). Thus, the establishment 
of a basic social order enhances both security and welfare, thereby generating benefits both for 
the elites as well as the population (Olson 1993: 567-570). This constellation is nevertheless one 
of power asymmetry where elites rule over a population not because of mutual consent or some 
prior social contract, but simply because they have the means to do so. There are several ways in 
which the control over the means of large-scale violence can be institutionalized, and the state 
has historically proven to be the most successful one. 
 
Institutions of Large-Scale Violence Regulation: The State and its Alternatives 
Statehood has become the dominant institution that regulates large-scale violence in society. 
Large-scale violence is regulated in modern states through a complete monopolization of the 
means of warfare by the government within a clearly delimited territory. It has accumulated an 
unprecedented capacity to exercise large-scale violence through the establishment of standing 
armies, but only its territoriality has enabled the state to monopolize the means of large-scale 
violence. A monopoly on violence only makes sense if it is spatially delimited. Thus, the 
monopolization of the means of warfare necessitated clearly defined borders. This combination of 
clearly defined territory and a monopoly on warfare distinguishes states from other historical 
forms of large-scale violence regulation.  
Prior to the emergence of the modern state, there was a variety of political orders that 
regulated large-scale violence. These included city states, city leagues, and empires, all of which 
had multiple actors who controlled the means of violence and/or lacked clearly defined borders 
(Ruggie 1993: 149-152 ; Spruyt 1994: 3-5). One of the most complex arrangements is arguably 
medieval Europe, where means of large-scale violence were controlled by the Empire, by kings, 
by dukes, and by the church in overlapping jurisdictions. Often times, elites did claim rule over a 
set of people instead of ruling within a certain territory (Spruyt 1994: 36-41). Other imperial 
orders such as the Chinese or Roman Empire were comparable to concentric circles of large-scale 
violence control. In these cases, there were no clear boundaries of empire but rather different 
frontiers and zones of control (Giddens 1985). What all empires had in common was their claim 
of universality; there were not two neighboring empires with clearly defined borders. Empires 
show that statehood is not the only viable answer to the problem of large-scale violence 
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regulation. The great achievements of the Roman and Chinese Empires in terms of economic and 
cultural development are a case in point. In the contemporary international system, quasi-imperial 
orderings still exist where governments of powerful states do not accept the borders of their 
weaker neighbors, but transgress the borders to establish further zones of control.  
While many states in current world society strive for a monopoly on large-scale violence, 
they often fail to achieve it. Their borders are formally fixed, but internally the government lacks 
the organizational capacity to monopolize means of warfare (Jackson 1993). In these cases, other 
actors also possess the means of large-scale violence. These armed groups can use their warfare 
capacities for varying goals. They can fight for control over the state, or they can strive for 
secession from the state. In such cases of civil war, large-scale violence regulation occurs only in 
zones exclusively controlled by one party of the conflict (Kalyvas 2008). Some armed groups 
might not strive for monopolization but rather seek power-sharing arrangements with the 
government, or they want to control a certain area and extract resources from the population 
(Staniland 2012: 253-254). Such orders could be described as oligopolies of violence. Given the 
incentives to resist central government’s efforts to monopolize the use of force, the next sections 
will deal with the question of how and why the state could triumph over its competitors. 
 
Actors of Large-Scale Violence: Organizing Means of Warfare  
For statebuilders, the process of monopolizing the means of large-scale violence is mainly an 
exercise in organizational capacity-building. Government needs to build armed forces, and it 
needs to disarm competitors. The key challenge with regard to the creation of a strong army is to 
fund the expensive organization. Taxing the population to extract the necessary resources has 
historically been one of the main challenges for rulers because too much ‘resource extraction’ 
could cripple the economic foundations of their realm (Olson 1993). In contemporary world 
society, these problems are still present but have been greatly reduced due to two contextual 
changes. First, the world market allows many governments to sell natural resources and use the 
revenues to fund their armed forces. Second, there are many international sources of funding 
from military assistance by Great Powers (e.g. the US Counterterrorism Partnership Fund) to 
multilateral development assistance (e.g. through UN institutions). While these sources have 
made it easier for central governments to build security forces, they have also decoupled 
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governments from their populations (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Ross 1999). Whatever their 
source of funding is, more resources make it easier to build means of large-scale violence. 
However, the same is true for any non-state actor controlling means of warfare. Armed non-state 
actors, or armed groups, have been able to capitalize on economic globalization. Access to global 
markets allows them to fund their activities by selling the same resources as the governments 
they fight (Le Billon 2001). Furthermore, these groups can make profits from drug trafficking or 
human trafficking (Ross 2004). World markets also offer the possibility to buy arms, although 
most armed groups are only able to acquire small arms. Many armed groups have received 
support from states that had an interest in disposing the incumbent government (Gleditsch 2007; 
Salehyan 2007). 
The stronger the central government becomes, the better is its bargaining position vis-à-
vis competitors. Armed groups competing with the government can be either co-opted or 
defeated (Tilly 1992: 84). Given the possibility that warlords or rebel groups can form alliances 
against the central government, monopolization efforts always pose risks for the ruler (Migdal 
1988: 24-32). “States and insurgents are not simple-minded maximizers of monopoly but instead 
are optimizers of authority in complex, often counterintuitive, interaction with other armed 
actors” (Staniland 2012: 244). As a result, state formation is a rather discontinuous, step-wise 
process in which periods of rapid monopolization can alternate with longer periods of 
accommodative strategies towards internal competitors.   
Monopolies on large-scale violence can be volatile arrangements. Even if they have lasted 
for decades, they can collapse within weeks. It is easy to imagine how a monopoly on violence 
can crumble once opposition groups manage to form hierarchical organizations and acquire 
weapons. However, not only can armed challengers appear quickly, governments can also defeat 
them in surprisingly short time periods. A monopoly on large-scale violence disappears when 
opponents of the existing order manage to create an armed group, i.e. when they establish the 
organizational means of large-scale violence. Setting up such an organization within an existing 
state is difficult, but once the armed group is established it can become very durable. Figure 3 
shows the monopoly scores of two extreme examples, Syria and Sri Lanka. In Syria, protests that 
were sparked after the Arab Spring Movement emerged across Arab states were countered with 
brute force by the ruling regime in 2011. As a consequence, the movement radicalized and turned 
into an insurgency. The resulting civil war has devastated vast parts of the country, leaving the 
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government with a small zone of control while various rebel groups have their own territories. At 
least two areas, the Sunni dominated East (controlled by the armed group Islamic State) and the 
Kurdish North now even threaten the territorial integrity of Syria (TheEconomist 2014). Thus, a 
seemingly stable state monopoly on violence has fallen apart within months. In contrast, the Sri 
Lankan government has established a nearly complete monopoly on violence. After decades of 
civil war, in which the LTTE rebels build a shadow government in their areas of control, the state 
resorted to massive violence in 2009. Although the military actions led to horrendous casualties 
among the civilian population, the outcome was the total defeat of the rebel movement and the 
monopolization of coercive means by the central government (Pinney 2014). As these examples 
show, monopolization processes can be extremely violent, and the state monopoly on large-scale 
violence itself is a volatile constellation that needs other institutional features to stabilize. 
  
 
Figure 3: Monopoly on violence in Sri Lanka and Syria. 
 
The Process of Monopolizing Large-Scale Violence: A brief history 
There have been many historical attempts at accumulating the means of large-scale violence, but 
only early modern Europe eventually experienced the emergence of the modern state system. 
Prior to the Neolithic Revolution, humans lived in groups too small to sustain a class of people 
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solely concerned with coercion. However, with the economic surplus produced through 
agriculture, elites could tax these surpluses and pay specialists for violence. There are two world 
regions in which monopolies on large-scale violence have endogenously emerged in history: 
China of the Warring States Era and Early Modern Europe. In China, the process of state 
formation ended with the victory of one unit over the others, eventually leading to a re-
emergence of an imperial order. In Europe, statehood was institutionalized. 
In China during the Warring States period (5th century BC), several political units have 
developed the trademarks of statehood. As Hui (2005: 3) notes, the regional system consisted of 
“[..] sovereign territorial states [..]”. They monopolized the means of large-scale violence, 
introduced conscription, and effectively taxed the population (Hui 2005: 180-184). Armed forces 
were expanded to the size of several hundred thousand soldiers, and the organization of large-
scale violence became more complex and bureaucratic. Especially the entity of Qin developed to 
an astonishing level of statehood. However, Qin succeeded in defeating the other states and 
unified China under one empire (Hui 2005: 170-177). Therefore, in China the state disappeared 
after a few hundred years of state formation. 
In Europe, the monopolization of large-scale violence was more sustainable. The region’s 
feudal order was highly fragmented, but this began to change at around 1500 AD. Certain rulers 
succeeded in slowly and steadily defeating their ‘internal’ competitors while also incorporating 
an increasing number of formerly independent dominions. In France, the king was initially a 
primus inter pares. However, since the 15h century the central government started to 
systematically weaken the nobility of the Estates General. Local elites were either incorporated 
into the central government (‘the court’) or defeated. Thus, by the late 17 th century the French 
monarchy had become ‘absolute’ (Ertman 1997: 125-139). Whereas France was the statebuilding 
entrepreneur, others followed suit. The British crown relied on mobilizing its nobility in times of 
war until the 17th century. Then, in 1661, it created a standing army for the first time, thereby 
beginning to monopolize large-scale violence (Ertman 1997: 187-207). As a third European 
example, Prussia managed to achieve a monopoly on large-scale violence around 1700. Despite 
being a rather poor and rural state, the Prussians effectively extracted resources and built armed 
forces. Thus, “[in] 1786, it was the thirteenth largest European state in population and the tenth 
largest in area, yet boasted the third largest army. With a population of 5.8 million, Prussia 
sustained an army of 195,000” (Clark 2007: 215). These processes of accumulation and the 
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diffusion of innovations in organizing large-scale violence were mostly finished around 1800, 
when Europe consisted of states with clearly defined borders and governments that had 
completely monopolized the means of large-scale violence. During the 20th century, this 
European model of statehood has developed into a global norm: The Correlates of War data set 
(CoW 2011) counts 42 states in 1900, whereas there were 195 states in 2011. Until 2014, South 
Sudan has joined the club of recognized states, and several entities such as Kurdistan in Iraq or 
Somaliland in Somalia had developed de facto state capabilities.  
 
State Formation Theory and Large-Scale Violence 
If the state has become a globally accepted model of large-scale violence regulation, then what 
are the conditions under which states could emerge? State formation scholars have developed two 
seemingly competing explanations: Some have argued that the state is the result of competition 
and warfare, while others see it as the result of cooperation. I argue that these approaches are 
complementary as both competition and cooperation were crucial for the development of states. 
In contrast, classical European state theory which has focused on the relation between rulers and 
ruled fails to explain the process of large-scale violence monopolization. It posited that the rules 
of state authority need to be established between elites who control the means of violence, and 
the population which is being disarmed. The people trade in their ability to use violence against 
the protection by the elites. Thus, a social contract is concluded that is based on reciprocity and 
mutual consent (Haldén 2013: 35-37 ; Olson 1993: 568-569). However, scholars of state 
formation have time and again pointed out that this contract has empirically never been 
concluded. They show that actors who were best at organizing violence became the rulers over a 
population (Olson 1993: 568). Only thereafter did the relation between the ruler and the 
population change as the subjects demanded citizen rights in return for ever increasing taxation 
and state interference with their lives (Tilly 1992: 115). The original institutionalization of state-
control over large-scale violence thus has preceded the ‘bargaining’ between government and 
population.  
The literature on state formation has offered several explanations for the emergence of 
states with monopolies on large-scale violence. While they all focus on certain explanatory 
variables, they are also mostly compatible with each other. The classical monopolization 
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mechanism has been drawn out by scholars such as Hintze (1906) and Elias (1939[2000]). In its 
most abstract version, rulers of political entities are in security competition with each other and 
each fears being eliminated by the others through war. Thus, the rulers begin building stronger 
armed forces and defeat ‘internal’ opponents. The theory has been further specified and 
popularized by Tilly, who put greater emphasis on the capability of states to extract resources 
from its population and, thereby, fund an ever more sophisticated war machinery (Tilly 1975, 
1985, 1992). Tilly (1975) famously remarked: “War made the state, and the state made war”. 
Several scholars have built on this war-centric explanation to show that a lack of inter-state 
competition has caused state weakness in Latin America and Africa (Centeno 2002; Herbst 2000; 
Thies 2005). Hui could show that the same mechanism was at work in ancient China. However, 
in China the competition ended when one state defeated all others. Thus, the re-establishment of 
Empire eventually ended this period of state formation (Hui 2005). Later, these explanations were 
amended as to explain why the competition has created different types of states, for example by 
highlighting the impact of pre-state institutions on the capacities of states (Ertman 1997).  
 Other authors have challenged the purely competition-based approach to state formation. 
They tried to show that constant warfare did not suffice to make the state. Instead, statehood itself 
is a set of rules that had to be accepted by those actors who controlled means of large-scale 
violence (Ruggie 1993; Spruyt 1994; Thomson 1995). Some authors have highlighted the 
importance of new social alliances between internal elites, in particular between central 
government and a bourgeoisie class that was spawned by capitalist development (Hechter and 
Brustein 1980; Spruyt 1994). However, arguably the most important elite cooperation has been 
the one between those actors who controlled the means of large-scale violence. Scholars of 
International Relations have shown that state formation had a strong regional dimension. The 
core elements of statehood (territoriality, control over means of warfare, law making) were 
combined in the legal norm of sovereignty (Thomson 1995), which emerged through a string of 
international treaties that are frequently cited by IR scholars as hallmarks of the international 
system: Augsburg 1555, Westphalian Peace 1648, Peace of Utrecht 1713, and the Vienna 
Congress 1815 (Ruggie 1993). “If institutions are defined as `persistent and connected sets of 
rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations' then sovereignty is an institution” (Sørensen 1999: 591). Furthermore, as Spruyt 
(1994: 6-7) has pointed out, the state enabled European political elites to credibly commit to 
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agreements because each ruler knew that the others ruled over a similar political system in which 
they were the final authority.  
 To sum up, state formation was driven by several factors: War, capitalism, social 
alliances, and regional developments. However, the two key features of state formation are the 
military capacities of political elites and the regional consensus on statehood as an institution. 
These two elements, organizations (governments, armies) and institutions (sovereignty, 
international law), are of central importance to understand the emergence and stability of 
statehood as the dominant form of large-scale violence regulation. 
 
Conclusion: Statehood as a Regional Institution 
What connects both competitive and cooperative approaches to state formation is their systemic 
dimension (Haldén 2013). States have not developed in isolation but as part of a broader 
European state system. Every accumulation of means of warfare could always threaten other 
political entities, and a lack of clear delimitation of these entities exacerbated thi s security 
dilemma. Without rules that regulate who is allowed to control means of large-scale violence, and 
where these means can be deployed, the order is likely to either fragment again or lead to 
imperial accumulation processes (Hui 2005).  
Thus, in order to explain the creation of monopolies on large-scale violence it is not sufficient 
to focus on the organizational capacities of governments, although they are a necessary condition 
for statehood. Only the establishment of territoriality transforms a strong coercive capability into 
a monopoly on large-scale violence because the zones of control need to be clearly specified 
through borders. In other words, statehood is a regional institution in which a multitude of 
spatially separated monopolies on large-scale violence exist. If institutions are defined as the 
rules of the game, then what is the game in the case of statehood? The rules governing the  
existence of states as monopolists of large-scale violence need to be accepted by the political 
elites of a region. It is elites who control the means of large-scale violence, and only their 
consensus makes statehood work as an institution. There needs to be a general agreement among 
regional elites on the principle of territoriality so that states can be clearly distinguished from 
each other. There also needs to be a norm that the means of large-scale violence can only be 
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legitimately controlled by state governments, whereas armed non-state actors are not legitimate 
participants in regional politics. Armed groups or individual governments may deviate from the 
norm, but as long as most key actors (regional hegemons, governments) are committed to a 
system of sovereign states, it can be seen as institutionalized. The need to have a basic agreement 
over the type of political entity that is allowed to control means of large-scale violence (i.e. the 
state), and the shared basic rules of interaction (i.e. norms and international law) have led some 
scholars to argue that what evolved in Europe was not just an international system but an 
international society (Bull 2002: 31-36). 
Does this mean that governments do not need to be legitimate in the eyes of the population? 
Tilly has argued that for the establishment of a monopoly on large-scale violence, the source of 
legitimacy is not primarily the population but that “[legitimacy] is the probability that other 
authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority” (Tilly 1985: 171). However, 
while regional acceptance is an important source of legitimacy, reducing it to this elite consensus 
would take the argument too far. Nevertheless, when combined with the basic legitimacy that 
governments receive from the population for ending large-scale violence, i.e. providing a 
minimum of security, the regional institutionalization is a strong source of a government’s 
authority (Lake 2010b: 36-39 ; Trotha 2000: 260). Therefore, statehood as the regional institution 
of large-scale violence regulation is based on an elite consensus where powerful actors agree on 
the unit and its basic polity characteristics.  
  
2.3. Regulating Small-Scale Violence 
 
This section argues that small-scale violence regulation is either conducted by the state or by self-
help communities. I will discuss both of these institutional arrangements as well as important 
actors of small-scale violence regulation in detail. Afterwards, I provide an overview of the 
historical monopolization process that has led to a state monopoly on small-scale violence 
regulation and investigate which explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. 
Eventually, I show that while a monopoly on small-scale violence regulation is highly beneficial 
for governments, the process of monopolization is very risky. As a result, many states accept the 
existence of self-help communities and cooperate with local non-state elites. Before going into 
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the details of institutions, actors and processes, the following paragraphs explicate the concept of 
small-scale violence. 
Small-scale violence is violence at the individual level. It can entail criminal violence as 
well as the use of violence to enforce rules. All societies in human history had to manage the 
potential of people to harm their fellow human beings (Trotha 1995: 131). Definitions of what 
constitutes criminal acts of violence vary across societies. Domestic violence might be accepted 
by many societies while murder is accepted almost nowhere. As most people put a high value to 
being secure from other people’s violence, they have sought ways to regulate these instances of 
small-scale violence. The result of this search for stability are institutions that included rules that 
prohibited certain types of inter-personal violence as well as enforcement mechanisms that would 
deter others from deviant behavior. With these institutions emerged elites that would interpret the 
rules, judge whether individuals had breached the law, and who would ultimately control means 
to punish deviant behavior. In contrast to large-scale violence, small-scale violence regulation 
does not depend on a single large and expensive organization. Instead, it requires a more constant 
process of policing, i.e. of “[..] the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of 
sanctions for discovered deviance – either immediately or by initiating penal processes” (Reiner 
2010: 5). Put differently, small-scale violence regulation requires knowledge about the 
community in which it operates as punishment for deviant behavior needs to be applied to 
individuals. As Kalyvas points out, the effectiveness of coercion against individuals depends on 
its selectivity. Indiscriminate violence fails to ensure compliance. In order to apply violence  
selectively, the ruler needs information about the population (Kalyvas 2008). Thus, there is a 
strong bottom-up element in small-scale violence institutions as the communities have to accept 
the rules and the authority claims of elites in order to make the institutions effective.  
The institutions and organizations that regulate large-scale violence cannot effectively 
regulate small-scale violence. Armed forces are not effective in monitoring the population as they 
are usually hierarchical organizations with weak ties into local communities, and their use of 
force is most likely disproportional. Civil wars in which armed forces have resorted to the 
collective punishment of villages in response to the attacks of individual insurge nts are a case in 
point. Instead of achieving their aims, those who use force indiscriminately produce (armed) 
resistance against their arbitrariness (Kalyvas 2008; Schlichte 2009). Thus, although standing 
armies were for a long time a tool of domestic order, they have been incrementally 
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complemented, and eventually replaced, by police forces (Giddens 1985). The next section will 
discuss the institutions that regulate small-scale violence. The regulation of small-scale violence 
always entails institutions that set and enforce rules. Two basic forms of regulating institutions 
have emerged historically: Self-help communities and states (Trotha 1995: 131).  
 
Institutions of small-scale violence regulation: Community or State? 
 
Self-Help Communities 
Self-help communities are social units that regulate small-scale violence among its members by 
setting rules and enforcing them. Self-help communities can take the form of villages, clans, 
chieftaincies, or similar small units (Elias 1978: 151 ; Gerdes 2013a: 14-15). While it is common 
to characterize these institutions as ‘traditional’ or ‘kind-based’, these attributes are not necessary 
for a self-help community to exist (Khoury and Kostiner 1990: 5-6). What they convey, however, 
is that the evolution of such an institutions takes time. Nevertheless, many of the so-called 
traditional institutions such as African chiefdoms have only been created by the colonial powers 
(Trotha 1996: 80-82). Accordingly, the rules regulating small-scale violence can be codified or 
informal, and their source can be religion as well as custom; however, their source is not the 
constitutional order of the state. Whatever their source, rules need to be enforced in order to be 
effective. Hence, every institutional setting has its elites which judge whether individuals have 
violated the rules, and these elites also control the means to punish misbehavior. Elites of self-
help communities can become very powerful, as the community is usually based on personal 
relations. “The term personal relations designates a structuring principles characterized by social 
organization around persons or personified forces [..]” (Gerdes 2013a: 15). Over time, these 
institutions can become deeply entrenched as the population internalizes the rules, and successful 
elites can become strong authorities. The legitimacy of these local institutions is not of a legal -
rational character. Instead, they derive basic legitimacy from the provision of everyday order. 
Further, these relations of authority are stabilized by legitimacy derived either from tradition or 
from the charismatic leadership of local elites. For example, Pashtun tribal leaders in 
Afghanistan’s East can invoke the centuries-old Pashtunwali codex as a traditional source of their 
legitimacy. In contrast, mujahedin commanders that came to power in North Afghan 
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communities during the 1980s often times base their rule more on coercion, but at the same time 
their history of fighting infidels (both Soviets and ISAF) can bestow them charismatic legitimacy.  
 States have become the globally dominant form of political order. Thus, local institutions 
that regulate violence will do so in a context of (weak) statehood. In many rural regions of the 
developing countries, self-help communities remain the dominant (or even sole) regulator of 
small-scale violence (Trotha 1996: 90-91). Where the government has a monopoly on large-scale 
violence, self-help communities can be either be ignored, co-opted, or suppressed by the state. 
Khoury and Kostiner note that “[..] as their level of stateness changes over time, states 
accommodate tribes in varying degrees of social integration and political participation” (Khoury 
and Kostiner 1990: 7). Local elites can exert power over the center by threatening to form 
alliances against the government. Indeed, many self-help communities form political platforms to 
further their interests. For example, in Afghanistan the former mujahedin parties and the Pashtun 
meta-tribes fulfill the function of connecting the local elites to the center. These ‘neopatrimonial’ 
networks may entail all sorts of exchanges, but at the heart of the matter is a basic deal: Local 
elites are granted autonomy, the right to use small-scale violence, and to tax the population. In 
return, they deliver stability to the central government by staying loyal and keeping in check 
potential rivals of the central government. As De Waal (De Waal 2009: 103-104) notes: 
“Provincial elite members seek to maximize the price they can obtain for their loyalty from 
metropolitan elites (mostly governments). They do this using the tools at their disposal, which 
include votes, extending or withdrawing economic cooperation, and the use of violence”. Police 
forces do exist in these countries, but they are scant outside the major urban agglomerations and  
co-exist with self-help communities. The simultaneity of self-help community and state generates 
a situation of legal pluralism in which great parts of the population can choose between different 
legal systems (Merry 1988: 875-882). 
Where the government has no monopoly on large-scale violence, self-help communities 
often times have to guarantee the security of their members in a context of armed conflict. In civil 
wars, governments and armed groups often try to secure their gains by arming loyal self-help 
communities (Ahram 2011: 8-11). However, it is also possible that a number of self-help 
communities join forces to overthrow a government, thereby transforming themselves into an 
armed group. One of the most recent examples of this phenomenon is the Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP) 
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in Pakistan, which was created in 2007 as “[..] an umbrella organization of dozens of Taliban 
groups throughout Pakistan [..]” (Mahsud 2013: 169).  
  
State Order 
In contrast, state-centered orders of violence are characterized by a monopoly on small-scale 
violence and legal monism. Small-scale violence is regulated through agencies such as 
bureaucracies, courts, and, most importantly, police. The rules that govern society are state law, 
while customary rules or religious law are either abandoned or integrated into the legal 
framework of the state (Griffiths 1986: 2). State-centered orders usually expand their claims to 
regulate inter-personal violence into all areas of life (Trotha 1995: 133-134). While the state can 
delegate the means of coercion to non-state actors, for example private security contractors, it 
reserves itself the right to withdraw these privileges at any time. The most important element of 
state regulation of small-scale violence is state policing. “The distinctiveness of the police lies not 
in their performance of a specific social function, but in being the specialist repositories for the 
state’s monopolization of legitimate force in its territory” (Reiner 2010: 8). Modern police are 
highly specialized organizations that embody the state monopoly on violence at the local level. 
Unlike soldiers in armed forces, even the lowest ranking police officers need a comparably high 
level of skills as they often act with a high degree of discretion. As Marenin (1982) has argued, 
policing always entails “parking tickets and class repression.” A well-functioning police provides 
security, but it also always stabilizes the political regime of a country. Where the government is 
still weak and struggles to control local populations through policing only, they have developed 
gendarmerie or paramilitary police organizations (Giustozzi 2011a: 9-10). Despite the often 
invoked strict separation of the tasks of armies and police forces, these organizations work at the 
intersection of small-scale violence and large-scale violence regulation.  
For central governments, the benefits of regulating small-scale violence are immense. 
Once the state controls violence at the local level, it can implement its rules instead of tolerating 
legal pluralism. When its local competitors are gone, the state can exercise what Mann (Mann 
1984: 189) has called infrastructural power: “[..] the capacity of the state to actually penetrate 
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm”. The greatest 
payoff in terms of actual violence is the ability of the state to replace local elites that could 
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organize rebellions, to constantly monitor local communities, and to act preventively to maintain 
order (Tilly 1992: 114-115). Direct rule over the population also improves the state’s capacity for 
taxation (Gerring et al. 2011: 383-384). However, as a brief discussion of the relevant actors 
shows, monopolizing small-scale violence is a risky endeavor for governments. 
 
Actors of Small-Scale Violence Regulation 
Every institutional setting produces elites that have privileged access to resources, better 
information about the rules, and sometimes even the possibility to foster or block institutional 
change. This power differential is even greater in institutions that regulate violence, as they 
always have an enforcement component. In the case of small-scale violence regulation, the main 
actors are the government of the state, and the elites of local self-help communities. 
 Local elites can occupy a wide range of specific positions within their insti tutional 
settings. In early modern Europe, these actors were the landed nobility that ruled over the 
countryside of the absolutist state. Today, local elites are chiefs in chiefdoms, elders in village 
communities, tribal leaders in tribes, ‘commanders’ in smaller warlord polities, or bosses of drug 
cartels. Their power is often derived from different sources that include the power to interpret and 
enforce ‘custom’ (non-state) rules and from their ability to tax the population and distribute 
resources (Earle 1997; Giustozzi 2011a: 25-28). In addition, the authority of local elites often 
follows from their adherence to traditional values or personal attributes ranging from age to 
combat experience (‘charismatic leadership’) (Schmeidl and Karokhail 2009: 329-331 ; Weber 
1972: 122-124). Finally, as self-help institutions are usually in some type of relation with both, 
each other and the central government, local elites can offer their communities access to 
resources from the state. Taken together, local elites have strong ties with their self-help 
communities and derive their power mostly (although not exclusively) from these local roots. 
Thus, the power asymmetry between local elites and their constituency is rather small (Abrutyn 
and Lawrence 2010: 421-422). This aspect is important but often overlooked by scholars who 
focus on local elites: Local elite are powerful not simply because they own certain resources, but 
because they have a position of authority in local institutions.  
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Any central government that expands its control into rural areas will face the dilemma of 
how violence regulation at the local level should occur. There are two options: The government 
can co-opt the local institutions, or it can attempt to replace them (Gerring et al. 2011: 377-378). 
Cooptation has several benefits: Coopting existing institutions into the state is cheaper, since they 
already provide governance at the local level. Additionally, coopting local institutions will buy 
the state the loyalty of local elites. However, there are also downsides to this approach. 
Cooptation means that the state cannot properly monitor local communities and, thus, might not 
be able to notice if local actors mobilize against the state. Furthermore, local elites will control 
resource extraction and demand a sizable share in form of patronage. This reduces the 
government’s revenues (De Waal 2009: 102-104). Overall, cooptation can be described as a form 
of indirect rule in which the means of small-scale violence remain in the hand of local non-state 
actors who deliver stability in exchange for autonomy. 
 Replacement is the second option, and it is the riskier one for central governments. The 
benefits are clear: Once a state controls society through police and justice, it can monitor the 
population and recognize potential threats early on. Furthermore, it can effectively tax the 
population and hugely increase its revenues (Tilly 1992: 114-116). However, local institutions 
are deeply entrenched and thus may not be easily removed. Since they often work informally, the 
local population might simply opt out of the state system and continue to seek informal security. 
Thus, it can be difficult for state agents to stop these practices. Additionally, the creation of 
professional police forces and efficient justice are demanding organizational tasks for any state  
(Giustozzi 2011a: 200-206). What makes replacement even more costly is the fact that there are 
usually dozens or hundreds local institutions across the country’s territory, and the replacement 
of one will make disloyalty by others much more likely. Put differently, the state would need to 
destroy an existing social order even if there is violent resistance, and it would have to offer 
adequate replacement in form of well-organized state bureaucracies. The radicalness of such an 
approach indicates that central governments will most likely opt for either co-optation or an 
incremental replacement of local institutions.  
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The monopolization process: A brief historical overview 
Across Europe during the 18th and 19th century, self-help communities regulated most of small-
scale violence. While the state increasingly became a monopolist of policing in cities throughout 
the 19th century, the rural areas where most of the population lived were ruled by landed nobility. 
The army was regularly used when local elites resisted demands of the central government, or 
when the local population did not obey their local rulers (Reinhard 1999: 363-364). There is a 
tendency in the literature to focus on the differences between policing systems across Europe, for 
example by arguing that there is an Anglo-Saxon tradition of democratic policing and a 
continental tradition of autocratic policing (Reiner 2010: 7). However, more important for this 
study is the fact that across all countries there has been a development from a decentralized 
regulation of violence through non-state institutions to an integration and eventually assimilation 
of these institutions through the state. This process was by no means a foregone conclusion, as 
local institutions and elites were extremely powerful in early modern Europe. “The magnates 
collaborated with the government without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, had 
some access to government-backed force, and exercised wide discretion within their own 
territories: junkers, justices of the peace, lords. Yet the same magnates were potential rivals, 
possible allies of a rebellious people” (Tilly 1985: 174). A brief discussion of the examples of 
Britain and Prussia will help to illustrate this development. 
In pre-industrial England, local elites (Justices of Peace) were the prime regulators of 
small-scale violence. They would also tax the population and pass revenues on to the central 
government. While these local institutions where efficient and mostly stable, they could not 
handle the rare occasions of mass unrests. In these situations, London had to send in the army to 
restore order (Knöbl 1998: 108-119). When unrest became more frequent due to the effects of 
industrialization, the government first reacted to this with a strengthening of paramilitary forces 
instead of the expanding modern policing to the whole of the country (Knöbl 1998: 166-171). 
Modern policing evolved first in London in 1829 when a 3,300-strong police force was set up in 
the capital country (Knöbl 1998: 182). Modern state policing expanded slowly but steadily across 
the UK, starting in the biggest cities. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 20 th century the state 
controlled a police force of over 50,000 (Knöbl 1998: 291). Overall, the expansion occurred 
mostly to deal with the threat of riots as well as during times of war or terrorism. Local elites 
were bereft of their strong autonomy in an incremental process.  
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Whereas Britain is usually seen as an example of strong local institutions, Prussia is seen 
as the typical case of top-down statebuilding. In this narrative, the Prussian government created a 
centrally-controlled police force that was early on able to suppress resistance and safeguard the 
monarchs rule. However, a closer look at the power structures of Prussia reveals that the 
government had much less control than is commonly assumed. The landed nobility, or Junkers, 
was a major pillar of the state’s rule. Local elites had the right to enforce their  own custom rules 
without state interference (Knöbl 1998: 74-78). After the defeat against Napoleon had laid bare 
the deficiencies of the absolutist order, attempts were made by dedicated reformers to expand 
police and justice to rural areas and to introduce a centrally-controlled gendarmerie force. These 
reforms were opposed by conservatives in the government whose power dependent on the 
support of local elites. Despite the diminishing importance of non-state law, the Junkers even 
managed to expand their right to punish their subjects, for example through corporal punishment 
and imprisonment (Knöbl 1998: 206-207). It would take another major crisis half a century later  
to decidedly weaken the position of the Juncker. Prussia only embarked on the creation of a 
modern police force in Berlin after the revolution of 1848, and in other cities since the 1870s. At 
the beginning of World War I, Prussia had a police force strong enough to control all of its 
territory (Knöbl 1998: 340-343). Thus, in Prussia (i.e. the largest part of Germany) the eventual 
collapse of the local institutions that had regulated everyday violence for centuries paved the way 
for the eventual breakthrough of a state-centered order in the early 20th century. 
In large parts of the contemporary world society, states have not monopolized the 
regulation of small-scale violence. Some of these para states are obvious, as the state is either too 
weak to be present outside its capital, or it has created institutions that co-opt self-help 
communities. In sub-Sahara Africa, the chieftaincy has developed from a colonial institution 
(built on older power structures) into a pillar of many weak states (De Waal 2009; Trotha 1996). 
In the Arab world and other parts of the Middle East, nationalist statebuilding has often created 
the impression of bureaucratic statehood, while tribes remained in a strong position at the local 
level (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). Even emerging markets such as Latin American countries 
have not fully monopolized the regulation of small-scale violence (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The 
fact that the Brazilian government had to deploy its armed forces to take control of favelas 
hitherto controlled by organized crime attests to these struggles. Overall, a lot has been written 
about state failure in places where violence is regulated by non-state institutions. However, the 
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more appropriate view would be to view states that regulate small-scale violence as the 
exception. In most state-like entities most of the time, there were some forms of local elites 
which had to be integrated into the polity (North et al. 2009). With this historical overview in 
mind, the next section will probe the existing state formation literature for theories that could 
explain the emergence of state monopolies on small-scale violence regulation. 
 
State formation theories and the regulation of small-scale violence 
Scholars of state formation have been much more concerned with large-scale violence than with 
the regulation of small-scale violence. Thus, it is difficult to distill specific hypotheses from the 
literature. However, two important aspects are worth mentioning. First, the state had to develop 
organizations that were more effective and legitimate than the existing order. And, second, the 
population had to internalize this state order. 
One important school of thought has argued that the replacement of local elites through 
state police, justice, and administration is part of a bargaining process. The ratcheting up of state 
revenue extraction has been briefly delineated in the discussion of the state formation literature 
above. As the state increased revenues from taxation and drafted its male population for service 
in the armed forces, the population increasingly demanded something in return. Tilly argues that 
rulers conceded an increasing number of rights to their subjects, thereby turning them into 
citizens. Furthermore, the state had to deliver public services including the provision of security 
and justice. This process of statemaking disempowered local elites over time. Thus, it became  
easier for central governments to either buy-off or eliminate local elites and, thereby, local 
institutions (Tilly 1985: 173-175). Overall, state formation scholars see the ‘statemaking’ as 
driven by the same process as the monopolization of large-scale violence: The state needed 
resources to wage war, and resource extraction could be improved by establishing direct policing 
of the population. 
 A second strand of scholarship places a greater emphasis on the social embeddedness of 
the state. Instead of seeing the replacement of non-state institutions as a product of bargaining 
between central governments and the population, some scholars have argued that it took the 
socialization of individuals into a state order. By expanding state bureaucracies to the local level 
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in both urban and rural settings, the state had not yet disempowered local elites. However, these 
state institutions changed the citizens’ expectations over time. Mandatory schooling and 
conscription made it possible to subject all of the population to state institutions (Schlichte 
2005a: 100-101). Here, people were disciplined and instilled with new beliefs about what 
constitutes legitimate political rule. Elias (Elias 1939[2000]) has termed this ‘taming’ of the 
population as the civilizing process. Over time, subjects of state rule developed into citizens who 
saw the rule by government as the only legitimate form of political order: State order became the 
natural order (Foucault 1991; Mann 1993: 730-731). Thus, not only did state institutions make 
non-state institutions redundant, they also delegitimized them in the long run.  To sum up this 
line of argument, the growth of state institutions has over time turned subjects into citizens that 
accept state rule as the only legitimate form political order. 
There is an important sequence in the development of the modern European state. The 
monopolization of large-scale violence was largely detached from the question of legitimization 
through the population. Until the French Revolution, European rulers saw no need to justify their 
rule and, in particular, the fact that they had monopolized large-scale violence. After 1800, the 
expansion of the state into the regulation of small-scale violence and the replacement of local 
elites went hand in hand with the expansion of citizen rights. The 19 th century saw both a massive 
expansion of state power and a process that Elias called the Vergesellschaftung des 
Gewaltmonopol (Elias 1997: 230-231). Control over the means of violence went from being a 
personal attribute (of the king) to being a public office. Hence, whereas the appropriation of the 
means of large-scale violence by the central government seems to have had little need for 
legitimization practices, the establishment of local state policing turned subjects into citizens. As 
the state imposed a tough regime of monitoring, taxation, and sanctioning, people increasingly 
demanded to be protected against misuse of state power (Tilly 1992). Taken together, the 
regulation of large-scale violence seems to be normatively less demanding than the regulation of 
small-scale violence.   
As this discussion shows, the institutionalization of a purely state-centered order of 
violence in Europe took centuries. During this time period, the existing non-state institutions 
were gradually incorporated and substituted by the state. Local elites who benefitted from these 
institutions lost their autonomy in the face of increased bureaucratization, and their authority 
waned as the state offered better services to its citizens. Individuals were socialized into a state -
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centered order where the private use of force became a taboo. The result was a new institutional 
arrangement to which both elites and the broader population were committed. 
 
Conclusion: Direct or Indirect Rule 
As this discussion tried to make clear, small-scale violence regulation is ubiquitous in human 
societies. While in practice, many institutional forms of regulation exist, they can broadly be 
categorized into self-help communities and state orders. Self-help communities can exist with or 
without a state. Monopolizing the regulation of small-scale violence offers huge rewards for 
statebuilders, but the process itself is highly risky. The modern, developed state has managed to 
monopolize the regulation of small-scale violence. This was again achieved through a 
combination of organizational and institutional innovation. Whereas bureaucratized police forces 
are the organization that provides states with a tool of small-scale violence regulation, this only 
works in an institutional environment that includes local administration, courts, and the absence 
of competing institutional arrangements. 
 The key insight of this approach towards small-scale violence regulation is that a 
government that aims at monopolization will have to confront existing institutions. Thus, the 
chance of success depends on the relative strength of the self-help communities and the local 
elites that would need to be replaced. A stronger central government will have greater bargaining 
power vis-à-vis local actors. However, given the high durability of these kinds of institutions, we 
should not expect governments to monopolize small-scale violence in short time periods even if 
other conditions are highly favorable. Instead, the monopolization process will occur 
incrementally, and for long periods, non-state and state institutions will exist in parallel. Worse 
for statebuilders, efforts to monopolize can lead to counter-reactions and setbacks. In sum, the 
monopolization of small-scale violence regulation is a slow, protracted, and non-linear process. 
As a consequence, governments will often refrain from taking the risk of monopolization and opt 
for managing the status quo (Staniland 2012). Nevertheless, central governments will need to find 
ways to incorporate local elites if they want to succeed in the long run. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has developed a neo-institutionalist outlook on the relationship between violence 
and politics. Violence needs to be regulated in human societies, it is a major source of power, and 
different forms of regulation have developed in history. As I have argued, drawing a distinction 
between large-scale violence and small-scale violence is analytically fruitful because these forms 
of violence require different forms of regulation. The modern state has monopolized the 
regulation of both types of violence, and thereby achieved a great decline in actual violence.  
One question needs to be settled before advancing to the analysis of statebuilding 
interventions: What is the relation between large-scale violence and small-scale violence? Do 
institutions that regulate large-scale violence and small-scale violence affect each other? The 
answer to this is that it depends on the type of state formation we are dealing with. Historically, 
both types of violence regulation were often very much intertwined. The historical development 
of the state monopoly on violence followed a clear sequence. Around 1800, European states had 
completed the monopolization of large-scale violence and began to monopolize small-scale 
violence regulation (Tilly 1992: 103-107). As a result, by the beginning of the First World War, 
Western European states had full monopolies on violence regulation. The sequence of 
monopolization had three main reasons. First, state formation did not occur according to any 
long-term plan (Tilly 1992: 25-27). For example, the fact that military conscription tied the 
population closer to the state was a byproduct of the simple need to mobilize large numbers of 
troops to survive as a sovereign entity in European politics. Second, it took a powerful central 
government to take on the nobility (Tilly 1985: 173-175). Governments could not afford 
challenging local institutions in a context where local elites could ally up to fight the state or seek 
the support of other armed actors. Third, all of the necessary institutional and organizational 
innovations from standing armies to modern policing and bureaucratic administrations were very 
expensive (Tilly 1992: 87-91). Governments had either to increase taxation or to borrow from 
domestic capitalists (and increase taxation later) in order to pay for all statebuilding measures. 
Taken together, the undirected development, the relative weakness of central governments, and 
the necessary increases in resource extraction made the establishment of both monopolies a 
protracted process spanning several centuries. In sum, large-scale violence monopolization was 
the prerequisite for a monopoly on small-scale violence. 
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The context in contemporary world society has greatly changed. A full monopoly on 
violence is no longer a random outcome of an undirected process, but a goal that can be 
intentionally pursued. Capital and weapons have become more readily available through global 
markets on which emerging states can sell commodities. Additionally, a host of international 
organizations interfere in the internal affairs of weak states (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 32-34). 
The capacities of states vary widely, both when it comes to large-scale and small-scale violence 
(BTI 2014a). In many parts of Africa and the Middle East, states lack a monopoly on large-scale 
violence. Most of these states clearly also lack a monopoly on small-scale violence regulation and 
can thus be considered as weak or para states. In contrast, there are cases of secessionist wars in 
the Balkans or Ukraine where small-scale violence had been monopolized by the state. State 
police forces often times kept operating and enforcing state law even though their city had been 
conquered by an armed group. As a result, small-scale violence can be regulated in a 
bureaucratized, state-centered way while the state itself is separated into different ‘zones of 
control’ (i.e. has no monopoly on large-scale violence). However, these are cases of 
fragmentation of existing states. Overall, although the world historical context has greatly 
changed, the basic sequence remains largely intact. Similar to early modern Europe, current states 
need to monopolize large-scale violence first, and these state formation processes lead to both 
intra-state and inter-state wars. As the next chapter shows, statebuilding interventions diverge 
from this pattern as they display a stronger disconnect between large-scale violence and small-
scale violence regulation. 
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3. Liberal Statebuilding Interventions and the Regulation of Violence 
 
Why do liberal statebuilding interventions sometimes succeed but often fail to establish a state 
monopoly on violence? By combining the insights from the state formation literature with the 
findings from the three case studies 15 this chapter provides an answer to the main research 
question of the dissertation. Based on the distinction of large-scale and small-scale violence 
developed in chapter two, I argue that statebuilding interventions will result in the creation of a 
state with a full monopoly on violence when two conditions are in place: First, the statebuilding 
intervention is supported by key regional actors, and, second, the target society had a history of  
strong statehood prior to the crisis that triggered intervention. If one of these conditions is 
missing, the second-best outcome is a partial monopoly on violence (i.e. on either large-scale or 
small-scale violence). 
The first argument is that statebuilding interventions lead to the establishment of a state 
monopoly on large-scale violence when the intervening actors and key regional actors have a 
common interest in statebuilding. Where intervening and regional actors cooperate, the borders of 
the target state can be secured either because neighbor states directly support the intervention, or 
because a regional alliance can force neighboring states into compliance. Making borders 
effective will forestall a transnationalization of the conflict, thereby depriving armed groups of 
access to markets and zones of retreat. Since the intervention strongly improves the coercive 
capabilities of the central government, it will be able to monopolize the means of large-scale 
violence once territorial integrity is (re)established. However, when major regional powers 
oppose the intervention, a monopolization of large-scale violence becomes highly unlikely. In 
such a constellation, the opponents of statebuilding will resort to transnationalization strategies. 
Where key regional states grant armed groups access to transnational spaces, the statebuilding 
intervention will fail as the armed groups manage to survive the externally induced expansion of 
state power.  
The case studies in the following chapters provide ample evidence for these causal 
mechanisms. In Afghanistan, the armed group that resists the government’s monopolization 
efforts enjoys the direct and indirect support of a neighboring country. The analysis of the 
                                                             
15 See chapters 4 – 6. 
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Taliban insurgency shows that the group could resist disarmament because it could use Pakistani 
territory as a sanctuary that offered access to global markets and protection for the organization’s 
leadership. In Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the regional constellation was much more 
favorable for the intervening actors. The Sierra Leonean armed group Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) was highly dependent on access to Liberian territory. When a regional alliance supported 
the UN in its statebuilding effort and succeeded in cutting off the RUF from its Liberian 
sanctuaries, the intervention built a stable monopoly on large-scale violence. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is a useful case at it displays variance in regional politics. In the first five years of intervention, 
Bosnia’s neighboring states Croatia and Serbia were hostile to the statebuilding effort. Due to 
radical reforms around the year 2000, their support for the Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Serb 
groups dried up and they accepted Bosnia’s sovereignty. By 2005, the statebuilding intervention 
succeeded in monopolizing the means of large-scale violence. 
The second argument is that statebuilding interventions will establish a state monopoly on 
the regulation of small-scale violence if the country had a history of strong statehood prior to the 
crisis that triggered intervention. Where the state had completed the monopolization of small-
scale violence regulation prior to the crisis, people will continue to expect the state to fulfill this 
function, and they lack alternative institutions that could offer them everyday security. If there 
was a weak state beforehand, self-help communities will be well institutionalized across the 
country. Statebuilders train police forces but cannot change the institutional structure at the local 
level, where local elites resist monopolization by the center. Thus, statebuilding interventions in 
countries that never had a strong state will lead to ‘para statehood’ in which state and non-state 
institutions of small-scale violence regulation co-exist.  
 The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina highlights the importance of a history of strong 
statehood. Although it has not been a sovereign state for centuries, Bosnia has been exposed to 
statebuilding efforts by Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and Yugoslavia. Since the mid-19th 
century, the self-help communities were slowly replaced by a state that policed, educated and 
indoctrinated its society. Thus, the intervention occurred in a society that had been exposed to a 
strong state and readily accepted the re-establishment of a state monopoly on small-scale violence 
after the war. Afghanistan and Sierra Leone provide stark contrasts. In these cases, the state has 
never been strong enough to replace self-help communities, and these institutions proved resilient 
enough to outlast the civil wars that devastated both countries. At the outset of intervention, 
53 
 
governments had to rely on local elites so as to create a basic order after war. Therefore, when the 
statebuilding interventions embarked on the creation of formal institutions and bureaucratic 
policing, local elites were in a position to either block the monopolization efforts or capture them. 
As a result, in both cases the outcome was a para state in which self-help communities and formal 
policing exist in parallel.  
 The following sections develop the argument in detail. In each of the two sections, I 
provide the reader with a brief overview of common monopolization strategies in statebuilding 
interventions. Afterwards, I discuss what we can learn from the literature about the effectiveness 
of these statebuilding approaches. Finally, I combine my theoretical assumptions, the knowledge 
derived from the literature, and insights from the case studies to construct the causal mechanisms 
that can explain the outcomes of statebuilding interventions. 
 
 
3.1. Statebuilding Intervention and Large-Scale Violence 
 
This section develops an explanation for the effects of statebuilding interventions on the 
regulation of large-scale violence. The argument put forward is that regional politics are the main 
condition that determines whether statebuilding will succeed or failure to regulate large-scale 
violence. I develop two causal mechanisms by first summarizing the major strategies of large-
scale violence monopolization in statebuilding: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
(DDR), and parts of Security Sector Reform (SSR) such as the creation of a professional army. 
The literature review finds that external statebuilding is generally effective in supporting the 
establishment of new formal institutions and in providing the government of the new polity with 
the organizational capacity to wield large-scale violence. However, whether this support also 
leads to a monopoly on large-scale violence depends on those actors who oppose monopolization. 
If they are able to organize sustained armed resistance, the intervention will most likely be 
aborted. New research on civil war suggests that the ability of armed groups to resist depends on 
their access to transnational spaces. Therefore, whether regional actors allow or deny armed 
groups this kind of support is crucial for the success or failure of large-scale violence 
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monopolization in statebuilding interventions. I begin with an overview of intervening actors’ 
strategies of monopolization.  
 
Monopolization Strategies 
In order to establish a state monopoly on large-scale violence, intervening actors have spent large 
amounts of time and resources in post-conflict societies. The challenge for statebuilders is to 
provide the government with means of warfare while taking these means from all non-state 
actors. Interveners have developed two major strategies to foster the monopolization of violence 
in statebuilding missions: DDR and SSR (McFate 2011: 214).  
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is aimed at armed non-state actors and 
mostly concerned with organizational capacities. As the name suggests, the DDR strategy is 
meant to defuse the threat from armed groups by orderly dissolving them. Without armed 
competitors, the state only needs to rebuild armed forces to obtain a monopoly on large-scale 
violence. DDR operations first disarm non-state actors: “Disarmament is the collection, 
documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy 
weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population” (UN 2014: 1). Afterwards, 
measures are taken to separate these (ex-) fighters from their combatant networks and offer them 
opportunities to find a civilian occupation. However, when armed groups resist disarmament, 
DDR cannot be conducted. Instead, interveners increasingly use force to coerce armed groups 
into compliance. This is illustrated by the spread of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies from 
NATO missions in Afghanistan and Iraq (U.S.Army 2007) to current UN missions such as the 
one in the D.R. Congo (UNSC 2013). 
Compared to DDR, Security Sector Reform is a much more encompassing concept. 
Whereas armed actors have to be disarmed in all violence monopolization processes, SSR gives 
them a distinctive liberal character. In a nutshell, SSR aims at providing governments with means 
of violence that are embedded in a liberal institutional framework. With regard to large-scale 
violence, SSR aims at the creation of armed forces that are supposed to be effective, politically 
controllable, and economically sustainable. The use of force should be regulated according to the 
principles of democratic accountability and rational-legal authority, and be constrained by the 
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rule of law (UN 2008a: 6-7) (Schröder and Kode 2012: 33). Institutionally, this means 
establishing Ministries of Defense that can actually control the army. 
Their support comes in the form of training and professionalization, funding, and by 
providing a security umbrella as long as the state’s armed forces are not strong enough to secure a 
monopoly on large-scale violence. Training and professionalization are mean to make the army 
both effective and politically controllable. At the level of rank and file soldiers, external actors 
assist recruitment and basic combat training. Professionalization occurs at all levels as the army 
leadership is reduced to a small core of capable officers (Dobbins 2007: 34-35). A central goal of 
army-building is thus to build a de-politicized officers corps that works according to an ethos of 
subordination to political elites. SSR tries to overcome this politicization by professionalizing 
armed forces, mainly by shifting the focus of recruitment and promotion from loyalty to 
meritocracy (Giustozzi 2011a: 45). The funding of the army is arguably the most crucial help for 
governments of that struggle to regain control over their territory. Support can range from the 
provision of basic equipment to paying for the personnel costs of the new army (Dobbins 2007: 
35-36). The inflow of resources enables governments to fund substantial armies without first 
engaging in the laborious process of building taxation capacities. However, this also makes SSR 
one of the most expensive components of statebuilding. In Afghanistan alone NATO spends 3.5 
billion dollars per year to fund the Afghan National Army (TheAtlantic 2012). 
If SSR would work according to plan, a monopoly on violence and democracy would be 
created at the same time. Control over the armed forces would thus be regulated through electio ns 
and the constitution would limit the power of governments to abuse its means of violence. The 
state would not only be strong but also legitimate. Critics have argued that democracy is seen as 
legitimate by external actors and the UN in general, but might not be the type of institution that is 
seen as legitimate by the people of the intervention society (Lake 2010b: 35-36). Nevertheless, 
democratic access to the monopoly on large-scale violence appears to be a widely accepted 
procedure to give authority to the state. Surveys in developing countries frequently show great 
support for democracy, although sometimes the meaning of democracy might differ somewhat 
from that in the US or Europe (Bratton 2007). One crucial problem with democracy, however, is 
the fact that it only works in states that have a monopoly on large-scale violence (Møller and 
Skaaning 2011). In combination, the regulation of large-scale violence and the establishment of 
an electoral democracy provide a sound source of authority for the newly established polity. 
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Where competitors are armed or parts of the country are under rebel control, elections can result 
in renewed conflict. Thus, “[..] current state-builders are putting the proverbial cart before the 
horse by emphasizing democratization over security [..]” (Lake 2010b: 47-48). This does not 
imply that it does not matter whether external actors build democratic or authoritarian 
institutions, but it implies that the democratic institutions will only become effective once the 
monopoly on violence is established. 
Taken together, liberal statebuilding interventions make extremely costly efforts to create 
state monopolies on large-scale violence. Their focus is on providing the central government with 
the organizational capacity to establish and sustain a monopoly on large-scale violence. In order 
to constrain the ability of the government to abuse these new coercive capabilities, statebuilders 
create formal democratic institutions. With this in mind, the next section will discuss the 
scientific literature on interventions and draw some broad conclusions about the effects of liberal 
statebuilding on its target societies. 
 
State of the Art: Interventions and large-scale violence 
When do statebuilding interventions succeed in monopolizing the means violence? In this brief 
literature review, I look at existing research with the aim to distil important factors that might 
help to explain the outcomes in terms of violence regulation. The literature review reveals that 
there has been a great debate between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ scholars who have focused 
on either external or domestic factors. In recent years, new scholarship on civil war and 
democratization has pointed out the importance of regional factors for domestic politics.    
Research on the question of how large-scale violence regulation is affected by 
interventions can be broadly categorized according to its level of analysis: International, 
domestic/local, and regional. Much of the initial scholarship on statebuilding dealt with the 
international level and focused on strategies to improve the outcomes of international 
interventions. These authors argued that statebuilding can be successful if interveners apply the 
right strategies and the appropriate amount of resources (Lake 2010a: 259 ; Paris and Sisk 2009: 
13-14), thereby implying that these are the key variables to explain the outcomes. One influential 
argument was that the monopolization of the means of large-scale violence requires a large 
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foreign troop presence. In this perspective, by first monopolizing violence in the hands of the 
foreign military and then handing it over to the new government, a ‘security vacuum’ could be 
avoided (Chesterman 2004: 99-101). Dobbins (2007: 41) argues that troop size for interventions 
requires “[..] an average of 13 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants for peace enforcement operations, 
and two soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants for peacekeeping operations”. Others have put more 
emphasis on well-planned DDR or SSR campaigns. First, former combatants should be 
systematically disarmed and reintegrated into society. Second, the security sector should be built 
according to principles of democratic accountability and subjected to the rule of law. The 
assumption is that if the according formal institutional framework is created and when 
professional armed forces are being trained, then the monopolization of violence will succeed 
(Hänggi 2004; Rubin 2008: 28-31 ; Sedra 2013). 
The strategies and resources of external actors certainly play an important role in 
statebuilding interventions. For example, recent research indicates that large troop deployments 
increase the chances of successful peacebuilding (Hultman et al. 2014; Ruggeri et al. 2013). 
Under the conditions of ongoing or simmering conflicts, a strong troop presence and DDR as 
well as SSR policies might be necessary for success in terms of monopolization of violence, but 
they are not sufficient. Leading actors of statebuilding, among them the UN, the US, and the EU 
have all adopted intervention policies that revolve around the above cited ‘lessons learned’. There 
have been several statebuilding missions with more than 10,000 troops deployed (Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, DR Congo, East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone). Among them, there have 
been successful cases (in terms of monopoly on large-scale violence) with less than 3 soldiers per 
1,000 inhabitants (Liberia, Sierra Leone), as well as failures with comparatively high levels of 5 
or more soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants (Afghanistan, Iraq). In almost all cases, the international 
actors have conducted DDR and SSR strategies. Thus, purely focusing on the external actors and 
the variables they can control does not suffice to explain the wide differences in outcomes.  
Accordingly, the ‘problem-solving’ approach received stark criticism for ignoring the 
politics and social structures of those societies where intervention took place (e.g. Chandler 2007; 
Mac Ginty 2010a; Richmond 2005). Across the field, the level of analysis has moved to the 
national and then local level. For example, SSR, the main tool for regulating large-scale violence, 
is often seen as a technical fix for security-related problems. Critics have argued that, far from of 
being an apolitical technical solution that can be applied in any given context, SSR touches upon 
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highly political issues: “[at] the heart of SSR are the core values of democracy, good governance, 
gender equality, transparency and accountability, as well as a desire to propagate universal 
human rights” (Jackson 2011: 1810). Thus, what sounds like a reasonable policy for a seemingly 
limited aspect of statehood and peace in fact easily amounts to far-reaching social engineering. 
Such dramatic societal changes are likely to create opposition by those who lose out, resulting in 
(armed) opposition to statebuilding (Mac Ginty 2012; Richmond 2010: 21-25). On the side of 
those who benefit from statebuilding, the investment of interveners into a monopoly on large-
scale violence might create incentives that undermine the monopolization effort in the long run. 
According to Giustozzi (2011a: 175-177), statebuilding has a ‘crowding out’ effect. Since foreign 
troops can bear the brunt of security provision, there is little incentive for central governments to 
genuinely invest into armed forces. Thus, the army built by externals remains a weak, artificial 
organization. Overall, the biggest contribution of critical scholars was to show that statebuilding 
is not just a technical exercise of constructing institutions, but a highly political endeavor that 
will trigger resistance.  
However, as I have argued in the introduction, the focus on the national-international-
nexus fails to account the variation in outcomes. Interventions always create winners and losers, 
so why do some of them organize violent resistance while others accept the newly created polity? 
Recent progress in the study of civil wars and intervention offers a clue, as the focus of attention 
has shifted to transnational and regional factors that affect statebuilding. Until recently, 
statebuilding and peacebuilding research has suffered from what Haldén (Haldén 2010) has 
called ‘endogeneity bias’. In this account, the problem of statebuilding is one of regional state 
formation. The emergence of a regional state system has to precede the creation of the single 
state. Thus, whereas statebuilding is solely focused on building domestic institutions, these 
efforts cannot succeed as long as there is no strong regional norm of statehood (Haldén 2010, 
2013). This systemic view is supported by empirical works on civil wars that show that conflicts 
in which armed actors have access to transnational spaces last longer, and that conflict clusters in 
regions (Gleditsch 2007; Pugh et al. 2003). Furthermore, this clustering effect can also be seen in 
the study of democratization, where the direct neighborhood of a state affects its regime type 
(Zuercher et al. 2013). 
To sum up, the literature has offered important insights for a theory that seeks to explain 
the variation in outcomes of external monopolization. Mobilizing larger amounts of resources and 
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staging well-planned DDR and SSR are conducive to statebuilding, but they are not sufficient on 
their own. Any statebuilding intervention will always create political winners and losers. 
Therefore, resistance by certain political actors is likely. Whether this resistance is violent will 
greatly depend on oppositional groups’ access to transnational supply networks. 
 
The Regulation of Large-Scale Violence in Statebuilding Interventions 
This section combines the insights from the literature on state formation and statebuilding 
interventions with the findings of my case studies. My argument is that statebuilding 
interventions can succeed in monopolizing the means of large-scale violence in the hand of the 
government. However, statebuilding interventions will only establish a state monopoly on 
warfare if it is supported by key actors in the region. This constellation will trigger what I call the 
regional cooperation mechanism. In contrast, where important neighboring states oppose the 
statebuilding intervention, the monopolization of large-scale violence is almost impossible to 
achieve in the short time span of a statebuilding mission. Such a set up will trigger a regional 
competition mechanism in which outside actors opposing statebuilding actively undermine 
monopolization efforts. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly summarize the broader 
theoretical insights with which I approached the empirical material. 
At the beginning of statebuilding interventions, the means of large-scale violence are 
dispersed among two or more actors. The state is not strong enough to disarm armed groups 
either through bargaining or through force. External military forces instantly shift the balance of 
power in favor of the central government. Statebuilding interventions support governments in 
building specific (liberal) formal institutions and in developing organizational capacities of large-
scale violence (armed forces). Thereby, the intervention further strengthens the central 
government vis-à-vis armed competitors. At the same time as the state increases its capacity to 
control large-scale violence, the statebuilders press for DDR. Whether armed groups give in to 
these demands or resist disarmament will depend on their capacity to successfully resist the 
statebuilding effort until external actors depart from the country. As the research on civil wars 
has shown, armed groups can greatly enhance their organizational capacities if they have access 
to transnational markets and cross-border sanctuaries.  
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In the case of statebuilding interventions, regional actors must decide whether their 
interests are best served by supporting the statebuilding effort or by supporting the armed groups. 
There are two important differences between regional actors and interveners: First, regional 
actors have strong interests in their neighboring states because it directly affects their security, 
while intervening actors have usually less stark motivations and their intervention is rather 
optional (‘war of choice’). Second, the regional actors have very long time horizons as they have 
to live with the outcomes of intervention. They can thus apply long-term strategies, while 
interveners will eventually withdraw from the region after a limited period of time. This 
asymmetry makes sabotaging statebuilding easier for regional actors even if they are not as 
materially powerful as the intervening actors.  
From this follows that statebuilding interventions will be limited by the social structures 
that exist in any given region. The last chapter has argued that statehood is a regional institution 
that requires that political elites in the region mutually accept the territorial integrity of 
neighboring states. States are built from the inside as well as from the outside.  Interveners 
strengthen the organizational capacity of the government, but they cannot change the 
fundamentals of a region. The relations of political actors in these regions can be characterized by 
cooperation as well as conflict. Since statebuilding interventions will change the status quo, 
regional actors such as great powers and neighboring states are affected by the outcomes. 
Depending on how they assess the changes, they will either support statebuilding or fight it.  
 The case studies show that regional support for statebuilding led to an isolation of non-
state armed groups. External support shifted the balance of power to the central government, and 
without transnational supply networks, the armed actors had to yield to monopolization. The 
actual monopolization process took very different forms in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Sierra Leone. Whereas Bosnia experienced a peaceful bargaining process between armed actors, 
monopolization in Sierra Leone was conducted forcefully until the RUF accepted disarmament. 
Nonetheless, in both cases the monopolization enabled the statebuilding mission to consolidate 
the monopoly through institutional reform and capacity building. In contrast, statebuilding in 
Afghanistan was actively undermined by Pakistan. Pakistan’s support allowed the Taliban to 
transnationalize their activities and evade defeat in Afghanistan. Their ability to survive major 
monopolization efforts enabled them to prolong the conflict. Eventually, the international actors 
withdrew without establishing a monopoly on large-scale violence. Figure 4 and figure 5 show 
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abstractions of the causal chains that could be observed in the case studies. The next paragraphs 
will present the mechanism in detail. 
   
 
The Regional Cooperation Mechanism 
 
Figure 4: Regional cooperation mechanism. 
 
The mechanism is triggered by key regional actors supporting the statebuilding intervention. 
Key regional actors are political elites both in neighboring countries and in the major regional 
powers. While additional support for the intervention is helpful, the minimum of support is that 
these elites have to accept the territorial integrity of the state where intervention takes place. Such 
a consensus allows for the institutionalization of statehood in the region. In such a situation, the 
government of the intervention state only needs to acquire the organizational means of large-scale 
violence. 
(1) Territorialization: Regional cooperation allows for an enforcement of the border regime. 
The conflict is transformed from a transnational into a national one. Establishing 
territoriality is crucial, as control over borders cuts off armed groups from access to safe 
havens in neighboring states and prevents them from supplying themselves on global 
markets. Where individual actors (armed groups, governments of small states) support 
opponents of the monopolization efforts, they can be pressured into compliance by 
concerted efforts of intervening actors and regional governments. 
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(2) Monopolization: The second step of the mechanism concerns the dismantling of armed 
groups. Once they lack access to transnational spaces, they are unlikely to withstand the 
material superiority of international statebuilding missions. The combination of lack of 
supplies, military pressure through foreign troops and, increasingly, growing domestic 
armed forces eventually leads to a collapse of the organizational capacity for large-scale 
violence: The armed group is being disarmed. 
(3) Consolidation: The third step concerns the organizational capacity of the government. As 
the means of large-scale violence have been monopolized with the disarmament of non-
state actors, the monopoly needs to be institutionalized. Without the military pressure of 
an ongoing insurgency, the armed forces can be professionalized, put under political 
control, and reduced in size that is economically sustainable.  
A full state monopoly on large-scale violence is achieved when there are no more armed groups 
on the state’s territory, the central government controls capable armed forces, and the intervening 
actors have withdrawn their troops from the country. 
 
The Regional Competition Mechanism 
 
Figure 5: Regional competition mechanism. 
 
In contrast, the regional competition mechanism is triggered when key regional actors oppose the 
goals of the statebuilding intervention. In these cases, the regional actor will support the armed 
groups that oppose the new government. The power of regional actors derives less from their 
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material capabilities than from the fact that they can undermine the territorial integrity of the state 
to be built. Such policies lead to the following causal mechanism: 
(1) Transnationalization: The first step of the mechanism is the transnationalization of 
conflict. Neighboring states that do not accept the state’s territorial integrity allow armed 
groups to freely cross borders. Access to this transnational space offers armed groups 
sanctuaries as well as access to global markets. 
(2) Resistance against Monopolization: Step two of the mechanism is the organizational 
consequence of the lack of territoriality. The interveners foster the monopolization 
process by supporting the creation of security forces and by expanding the government’s 
area of control. At the same time, sanctuary and access to markets greatly enhance the 
organizational capacities of armed groups and shield them from disarmament through the 
central government.  
(3) Escalation of Costs: In reaction to the growing strength of armed groups, external actors 
will invest more into the armed forces of the government. Armed groups keep evading 
their elimination by accessing transnational space. Eventually, the costs of statebuilding 
escalate and eventually lead to a withdrawal of international actors. 
There are two possible outcomes, neither of which is a monopoly on violence. The failure to 
monopolize can lead to (continued) civil war, thus creating something akin to a market of 
violence. Alternatively, government and armed groups might consolidate their control over 
territories and form something closer to an oligopoly of violence. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up the insights of this section, the establishment of a monopoly on the means of warfare 
is a major goal of statebuilding interventions. In order to achieve this goal, external actors can 
greatly enhance the organizational capacities of governments through funding, training, and 
equipping modern armed forces. However, as the section made clear, these efforts are on their 
own not sufficient for successful monopolization. If powerful regional actors oppose the 
statebuilding intervention, their support for armed groups can undermine the efforts. Armed 
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groups with access to transnational spaces are likely to outlast the intervention and challenge the 
central government in the long term.  
If the regional institutional setting is crucial to monopolization efforts, can intervening 
actors change the regional constellation? The answer is a qualified no. Regional political 
constellations are often times highly complex and have grown over long time periods. If 
neighboring states see it as vital for their national security to transgress national boundari es, 
changing their preferences is likely to be beyond the capabilities of external actors such as the 
UN and the US. Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which interveners still have great 
leverage over regional politics. As the case study of Bosnia-Herzegovina will show, the fact that 
the Balkans are located directly in the sphere of influence of the European Union eventually 
contributed to a change of preferences in Bosnia’s neighboring countries Croatia and Serbia. 
However, across the globe the regional spaces in which intervening actors enjoy such superiority 
are becoming rarer. 
 
3.2. Statebuilding Intervention and Small-Scale Violence 
 
When do statebuilding interventions create a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation? 
This section provides causal mechanisms that can explain the observed variation in outcomes. 
The central argument is that the long-term state formation creates legacies that affect the ability 
of statebuilders to monopolize small-scale violence regulation. Societies that have been governed 
by a strong state prior to the conflict lack self-help communities that could effectively regulate 
small-scale violence. Thus, in these societies the expansion of formal policing can lead to a 
successful monopolization of small-scale violence regulation. In contrast, societies that have 
never developed a strong state prior to the intervention have developed strong self-help 
communities. The existence of these local institutions and powerful local elites blocks efforts of 
international actors to foster the monopolization of small-scale violence regulation. The result is a 
form of para statehood in which state police and self-help communities co-exist in large parts of 
the country.   
The section develops the argument in three steps. In a first step, I present the most 
common strategies applied by interveners to achieve their goal of creating a bureaucratic state 
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order across the territory. Again, SSR is the most important tool as it includes the creation of an 
institutional framework (law, local government, courts, ministries, etc.) as well as the capacity to 
enforce rules by building a modern police force. In a second step, I review the literature on small -
scale violence regulation through intervention. Whereas researchers initially thought about post-
conflict societies in terms of anarchy and ‘power vacuums’, there has been a ‘local turn’ in recent 
years. There is now a consensus that weak states often have very strong non-state institutions at 
the local level, but there is no agreement on what this means for statebuilding. While some 
authors see local elites as spoilers of peace that need to be weakened, o thers have argued for an 
inclusion of these actors. Despite this local turn, research on policing in statebuilding 
interventions remains scarce and focuses largely on technical aspects of training and 
organization.  By bringing together research on local institutions and police-building, I argue that 
statebuilders neither create powerful enough governments nor last long enough to successfully 
challenge self-help communities. Before presenting my causal mechanisms in detail, I will briefly 
present common strategies of small-scale violence monopolization in statebuilding interventions 
and review the corresponding literature. 
 
Monopolization Strategies 
Statebuilding interventions aim at the monopolization of small-scale violence regulation in the 
hands of the government as part of a wider effort to create a liberal, state-centered security 
architecture. International actors make use of Security Sector Reform to achieve these goals: 
“Two related central themes have emerged. The first is that security, human rights and 
development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable peace. The 
second is the recognition that these fundamental elements can be achieved only within a broad 
framework of the rule of law” (UN 2008a: 3). However, a necessary condition for liberalization is 
that small-scale violence is regulated through bureaucratized state institutions. Therefore, 
intervening actors support the government in establishing formal state institutions (i.e. 
constitution, administration, courts, etc.) as well as the organizational means of small-scale 
violence regulation (i.e. police). 
The expansion of government control across the territory and down to the district level is 
pursued through the establishment of formal state institutions. On the macro-level, the 
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constitution provides the legal framework in which law enforcement agencies operate (Schröder 
and Kode 2012: 33). Regarding the justice system, support by external actors usually includes the 
training of judges in rule of law missions and other material support (McFate 2011: 220). 
However, all of these formal institutions need an enforcement mechanism to be effective (Trotha 
1995: 133-134). Thus, police-building is the core feature of externally-led efforts to create a state 
monopoly on small-scale violence regulation.  
International police-building tries to build bureaucratically organized police forces. Thus, 
police-building in statebuilding missions resembles in many ways the efforts to build armed 
forces. External actors provide funds and police trainers to the government, and in return they 
formulate reforms regarding organizational structures or recruitment procedures (OECD 2007a). 
In cases where police units have been involved in grave human rights violations prior to 
intervention, external actors often conduct ‘screenings’ in order to dismiss officers who were 
involved in atrocities (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 190-191). Part of SSR is also an assessment 
of how many police forces are needed, so that personnel strength targets are formulated. 
Furthermore, a focus on local accountability and professionalization aims at making officers less 
susceptible to corruption (OECD 2007a). Statebuilding missions regularly put a special emphasis 
on the need to make the police (democratically) accountable, less repressive, and to respect 
human rights. One concept that is often invoked is that of community policing. Based on Anglo-
Saxon models of police, the idea is to reduce the potential of government’s using police for 
repression by making the police force accountable to local communities (Giustozzi 2011a: 182-
183).  
Overall, the standard statebuilding approach treats small-scale violence regulation as a 
mostly organizational problem. The assumption is that the state needs to be endowed with a 
professional, properly sized police force. Corruption and repression are seen as the main 
problems. Once this force is in place, the state can exercise control over the population. Political 
considerations deal mostly with questions of local accountability and democratic oversight, but 
do not go beyond liberal prescriptions for policing.  
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State of the Art: Interventions and small-scale violence 
With regard to the regulation of small-scale violence, two important strands of literature can be 
identified. First, some of the literature on SSR has dealt with police-building by focusing mostly 
on organizational aspects. Second, there is a growing body of literature on local non-state 
institutions and actors that regulate small-scale violence. Scholars who deal with non-state actors 
have highlighted the interaction with formal institutions but have come to diverging conclusions 
with regard to the effect of local elites on the statebuilding process. 
Early peacekeeping and statebuilding studies usually did not account for a ‘local level’. 
Many scholars of statebuilding have operated on the assumption that interventions will occur in 
an anarchical environment (Kaplan 1994). In this view, civil war destroys almost all social 
structures of an affected state and, therefore, statebuilding can start from a clean slate. Police-
building takes central stage in efforts to regulate small-scale violence, and a quick deployment of 
police is deemed necessary to fill the void of post-conflict societies. “Societies emerging from 
war face a variety of threats from extremist and criminal organizations. Indigenous capacity to 
meet these challenges is almost always inadequate and sometimes nonexistent” (Dobbins 2007: 
48). In this context, some scholars have argued that SSR was the right strategy to address 
political issues as it combines policing with liberal institutional solutions. For example, Marenin 
(2005: 123) argues that “SSR points to the systemic connections of the police to wider security 
concerns; it stresses the inherently political nature of trying to reform policing systems, especially 
by the notions of democratic control and good governance; and it points to the importance of 
rights as a counterbalance to demands for security in a democratic system”. However,  these 
approaches have rarely asked whether there is unequivocal support for democracy and good 
governance at the local level. Manning was one of the first to highlight that the implementation of 
post-conflict policies at the community-level often depends on the cooperation of local elites 
(Manning 2003).  
As more recent research has shown, the collisions of externally sponsored formal 
institutions and local structures have led to unintended outcomes. Instead of leading to either the 
persistence of the local structures or the creation of liberal institutions, the outcomes are hybrid 
orders that combine both elements (Mac Ginty 2011). “The hybrid peace is a result of a series of 
distortions and reminds us of the lack of autonomy on the part of actors in peacemaking contexts” 
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(Mac Ginty 2010a: 392). Such ‘hybrid outcomes’ have been criticized on the grounds that local 
institutions are a source of instability and conflict. In this view, local elites act primarily as 
spoilers who sabotage the expansion of state powers in order to keep their rent-seeking 
opportunities (Stedman 1997). The local institutions which empower these actors are seen as 
illegitimate as their rules are not issued by democratically elected bodies, not everyone has the 
same rights (or status) within the community, and elites are often not cons trained by formal rules 
(Gerdes 2013a). For example, Denney (2013: 13-14) argues that “[the] chieftaincy system in 
Sierra Leone has instituted some highly oppressive practices and maintains a discriminatory 
justice system that frequently disregards the rights of women, young people and other vulnerable 
groups”. Hence, some have concluded that these institutions will produce grievances that increase 
the likelihood of renewed conflict (De Waal 2009: 106 ; Richards 1996).  
In contrast, others have pointed out that local institutions are usually seen as legitimate by 
their populations (Lake 2010b). Local elites are in direct contact to their constituency and have to 
provide security. The power of local elites derives from their ability to take care of communities 
and also to represent the interests of the community vis-à-vis the central government (Abrutyn 
and Lawrence 2010). According to Boege et al (2008: 9) “[..] it is the community that provides 
the nexus of order, security and basic social services. People have confidence in their community 
and its leaders, but they have no trust in the government and state performance”. The legitimacy 
of self-help communities has often developed over decades or centuries (Boege et al. 2008: 7-8). 
Autessere (2010: 270) argues that for statebuilding to succeed, “[having] village- or district-level 
authorities whom local populations accept and consider legitimate will help ensure that state 
authority extends beyond the provincial capitals”. Many of the local institutions that interact with 
statebuilding can be classified as self-help communities. Compared to these institutions, state 
policing can appear to be ineffective, detached from the population, and thus unaccountable. 
Police forces are often the most corrupt of all state institutions, as their position is quite unique: 
They are armed, enjoy great discretion in everyday operations and are in close contact with the 
population. Furthermore, despite efforts to reform recruitment, police offices often become 
bargaining chips for governments that seek the loyalty of local elites. Hence, a patrimonialization 
of police forces is often the outcome of statebuilding efforts 16. Thus, central to efforts to reform 
                                                             
16 For example in Afghanistan (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 119-120); East Timor (Radin 2012: 20-21); 
Sierra Leone (Baker 2008: 140-141) 
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justice and law enforcement in post-conflict societies is the fact that a change in these societal 
areas implies a significant shift in power (Berg 2012). For example, Jackson (2011: 1810) argues 
that “[at] the heart of SSR are the core values of democracy, good governance, gender equality, 
transparency and accountability, as well as a desire to propagate universal human rights. This not 
only brings SSR into direct conﬂict with some proposed local owners who may not want all of 
these things, it also represents a strong allegiance to the liberal peace-building project”. Thus, the 
insistence of external actors on a specific form of political institutions combined with state 
policing ignores the de facto political realities in a society. Those actors who would lose power 
are thus very likely to oppose changes. Hence, Barnett and Zürcher (2009) argue that local elites 
will seek to retain their autonomy, and they use their power to bargain both with external actors 
and the central government to defend the status quo.  
The bottom line of this review is that the efforts of statebuilding interventions to 
monopolize the regulation of small-scale violence often collide with existing self-help 
communities. On the one hand, interventions build police forces according to Western principles 
of organization. On the other hand, local institutions often remain in place despite the expansion 
of state policing. The local elites that control small-scale violence regulation make use of their 
power to influence national politics in order to safeguard their self-help communities against the 
central government’s monopolization efforts. However, while this explains the failure of 
statebuilding interventions to a certain degree, it cannot properly account for the successful cases.  
 
The Regulation of Small-Scale Violence in Statebuilding Interventions 
Based on combining the insights from the state formation and statebuilding literature with my 
findings from the case studies, I put forward my main argument with regard to small-scale 
violence. Statebuilding is an effective way to build modern police forces and to create formally 
liberal institutions in post-conflict societies. However, a history of weak statehood will trigger the 
weak state legacy mechanism. Statebuilding interventions will fail to create a monopoly on small-
scale violence regulation in societies that never had a strong state. In contrast, a history of strong 
statehood prior to the crisis will trigger the strong state legacy mechanism, causing statebuilding 
interventions to succeed in creating a monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. The next 
paragraphs will detail my reasoning. 
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The state monopoly on the regulation of small-scale violence consists mainly of two 
elements. On the insitutional side, the state is present at the local level across the territory, and 
society is regulated exclusively by state law. On the organizational side, bureacratically 
controlled police forces are the major tool to police society and enforce state laws. In countries 
where the state has not monopolized the regulation of small-scale violence regulation, self-help 
communities fulfill this task for a great share of the population. Self-help communities provide an 
atlernative set of rules and rule enforcement at the local level. To achieve a state order, the 
government has to engage in a monopolization process that entails the replacement of self-help 
communities by a state policing system under a unitary legal framework. In state formation, this 
process usually takes decades and entails a habituation of the population to state rule. 
These basic theoretical considerations have implications for statebuilding interventions. In 
the previous sections I have argued that the main focus of statebuilding is on the establishment of 
formal institutions and the strengthening of organizational capacities in form of professional, 
bureaucratized police forces. In states with a history of strong statehood, there are no self-help 
communities and the population has been socialized into accepting state order as the only 
reasonable way to regulate small-scale violence. Furthermore, the power of local elites does not 
depend on non-state institutions. Therefore, statebuilders efforts to re-construct the state 
monopoly on small-scale violence regulation will be met with little resistance.  
Traditionally weak states offer a very different picture. In these states, self-help 
communities have developed that are well-entrenched at the local level and cannot simply be 
replaced by state institutions. In the following, these existing institutions will be theorized as 
legacies of the long-term state formation process17. The view that the longue durée of history 
creates structures that can outlast short-term cyclical events is well-established in the social 
sciences (Braudel 1958). Political institutions that have developed in the long-term process of 
state formation create strong path dependencies that will structure power relations even during 
critical junctures such as regime changes or civil wars (Kitschelt 2001: 307-311 ; Pierson 2004). 
Through these legacies, the historical state formation acts as a ‘remote cause’ for the outcomes of 
statebuilding (Schneider and Wagemann 2006). Since they outlast such events as civil wars, self-
help communities are in place at the beginning of statebuilding interventions. Any new 
                                                             
17 I borrow the term from Kitschelt who could show that the institutional set up in post-Soviet countries 
was strongly affected by their pre-Soviet regime (Kitschelt 2001: 299-300). 
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government will have to rely on those local elites who control local non-state institutions. 
Therefore, local elites become very powerful in the statebuilding project and have strong 
incentives to block monopolization efforts. As a result, the statebuilding intervention creates state 
capacities (especially in the form of police forces) without actually disbanding self-help 
communities. The result is a para state that is characterized by legal pluralism and competition 
between police and non-state rule enforcers. 
 Empirically, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone never had a strong state that could have 
replaced the self-help communities. Whereas Sierra Leone displayed a rather well-
institutionalized chiefdom system that regulates small-scale violence in most parts of the country, 
Afghanistan was more heterogeneous. Especially due to several decades of civil war and internal 
displacement, self-help communities have developed a great variety of forms (such as traditional 
tribal communities as well as militarized mujahedeen commander communities). Thus, in both 
cases the statebuilding efforts were confronted with the existence of self-help communities. At 
the early stages, local elites captured parts of the statebuilding process. In Sierra Leone, the 
government depended on the support of chiefs and, thus, the chiefdom system remained in place. 
In Afghanistan, there were no officially acknowledged self-help communities, but local elites 
kept in de facto control over small-scale violence regulation. Thus, the statebuilders created new 
institutions and build modern police forces without abandoning self-help communities. As a 
result, the outcome of both cases was a para state. In contrast, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a long 
history of strong statehood during which small-scale violence monopolization already began in 
the late 19th century. Thus, at the end of the war there were no well-institutionalized alternatives 
to bureaucratized policing. The statebuilding intervention demilitarized Bosnia’s society and 
reconstructed a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. Figure 6 and 7 show the 
causal mechanisms developed through the case studies. 
 
The Weak State Legacies Mechanism 
In countries with weak state legacies, statebuilding interventions will most likely fail to 
monopolize the regulation of small-scale violence in the hands of the state. The overwhelming 
majority of countries ridden by civil war are post-colonial states that never had a strong central 
government or sophisticated state infrastructures. Thus, the weak state mechanism is the one most 
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likely to be observed in statebuilding interventions. It consists of three parts that are triggered by 
the initial condition of weak statehood prior to the crisis that triggered intervention. 
The Weak State Legacies Mechanism 
 
Figure 6: The weak state legacies mechanism. 
 
The long-term absence of a strong state causes local communities to develop their own 
institutions to regulate small-scale violence. Prior to the crisis that leads to intervention, a large 
portion of the population is governed by self-help communities, whereas state policing is weakly 
developed. Local institutions produce local elites which are highly powerful compared to the 
central government which often lacks the social ties in rural areas.  
(1) Self-Help Community Resilience: The first part of the mechanism concerns the 
resilience of institutions that regulate small-scale violence. When a crisis such as a 
civil war occurs, self-help communities remain intact during the conflict because they 
are well-institutionalized and do not depend on the central government. While they 
might be drawn into the conflict, they mostly continue to regulate small-scale violence 
at the community level. Thus, at the time of intervention self-help communities and 
local elites have gained power compared to the government which resides over a 
greatly weakened state. 
(2) Government Dependence on Local Elites: In step two, at the beginning of the 
statebuilding intervention, the central government is weak while local elites (whose 
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power stems on the self-help communities) are strong. At this point in time, capacity-
building has not started yet and the government depends on the support of local elites 
which can provide stability and security. 
(3) Capacity-Building without Monopolization: Step three of the mechanism entails the 
main part of statebuilding, namely the capacity-building through SSR. The central 
government is provided with a strong police force. However, the local elites have 
entrenched their power either through early formal acknowledgement or by capturing 
formal institutions at the local level. The self-help communities remain in place. 
The outcome is a form of para-statehood in which small-scale violence is regulated by competing 
institutions. Since the goal of interventions is the creation of liberal statehood, including a full 
monopoly on violence and governance bound by the rule of law, para-statehood is seen as a 
failure of intervention by policy-makers. While the effect of deeply rooted social structures on 
statebuilding makes the limitations of these missions apparent, a failure to liberalize statehood 
can nevertheless also have stabilizing effects.  
 In cases where strong local institutions block monopolization efforts, the question will be 
how the statebuilders deal with self-help communities. Two strategies are conceivable: One 
approach would be to officially ban local institutions and force the population to accept formal 
state institutions. Another approach would be to accept the existing of self-help communities and 
bind them institutionally to the state. 
 
The Strong State Legacies Mechanism 
States that have developed strong institutional structures are less affected by civil wars, but they 
are not immune to internal armed conflict. Statebuilding interventions in these societies are likely 
to establish a state monopoly on small-scale violence, because they can reconstruct formal 
institutions and organizations in a society that has accepted this mode of governance as the norm. 
While they are very rare, interventions into societies that had strong statehood before the crisis 
have occurred for example in the Balkans. Under these conditions, the presumptions of SSR 
(with regard to small-scale violence) are correct and the intervention techniques do work. 
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The Strong State Legacies Mechanism 
 
Figure 7: The strong state legacies mechanism. 
 
The strong state mechanism is triggered in cases of statebuilding intervention where there has 
been a modern state prior to the crisis. In these cases, the country has been governed by 
bureaucratic state institutions that had monopolized the regulation of small-scale violence. 
Whether the state as such existed at this point in time, or whether it was part of a larger state, is 
not relevant for the mechanism. What matters is that in these societies, the state has been present 
in people’s life both by providing public goods as well as by ‘disciplining’ them in school or the 
military. Thus, self-help communities have been replaced by state agencies, and local elites (if 
present) lack a strong local powerbase. Put differently, the state’s claim on regulating small-scale 
violence was well institutionalized prior to crisis.  
(1) State Resilience: The first step of the mechanism is triggered when civil war breaks out. 
As the monopoly on large-scale violence collapses, armed groups take control of different 
swaths of territory. Where armed groups have zones of control, they leave the 
bureaucratic structures in place. Hence, ‘state’ policing continues under the new rulers  
because it is well institutionalized at the local level. During this period police forces can 
be militarized and be used for counterinsurgency purposes, i.e. the organizational quality 
of police forces might deteriorate. Nevertheless, the institution of state(-like) bureaucratic 
policing remains in place during conflict. 
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(2) Monopolization: In step two, the statebuilding intervention monopolizes small-scale 
violence regulation. Formal institutions are introduced that provide a liberal legal 
framework for the regulation of small-scale violence. Small-scale violence actors that 
have spread during conflict are disarmed. The monopolization is effective because there 
are no strong non-state institutions and, therefore, no non-state elites that would be 
powerful enough to obstruct the process. 
(3) Consolidation: In a third step, the statebuilders consolidate the state monopoly on small-
state violence regulation through the provision of funding, training, and equipment for the 
police, and they set incentives for the state to reform its police structures. A modern 
police organization is formed and deployed across the territory. 
 
The outcome is a state monopoly on the regulation of small-scale violence. As the causal 
mechanism shows, the institution of state policing never completely disappears, although it might 
be strained during the conflict. There are no self-help communities that could provide the 
population with alternatives systems of rules and rule enforcement. Hence, there are also no 
strong local elites that could block the process of reinstating state policing. In cases where the 
monopolization of large-scale violence did not succeed, the outcome is likely to be the same: 
Bureaucratic police forces can be rebuilt and strengthened, but ultimately are controlled by two or 
more macro level entities.  
 
Conclusion 
Statebuilding interventions aim to create liberal statehood, and state regulation of small -scale 
violence is a core feature of the liberal order. Thus, interveners embark on expensive 
policebuilding missions embedded into wider institutional reforms. More ambitious goals such as 
the liberal rule of law are only conceivable once the regulation of small -scale violence is 
controlled by the state. As the chapter has argued, the template that intervening actors use to 
achieve this goal is very similar across different contexts. The focus is on formal institutions and 
organizational capacities, especially in terms of building a professional police force. Yet, the 
conditions that determine whether a certain strategy will succeed or fail vary starkly across cases. 
Interventions have occurred in well-developed regions such as former Yugoslavia as well as in 
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some of the poorest, weakest states of the world such as Afghanistan or Sierra Leone. As I tried 
to show, the outcome of statebuilding interventions depends on the long-term institutionalization 
of small-scale violence regulation in a given country. As institutions create strong path 
dependencies, neither civil wars nor statebuilding interventions are likely to radically alter these 
social structures within a short time period. 
 The implication of this finding is that most statebuilding interventions will lead to the 
establishment of ‘para statehood’. Local elites and non-state institutions will be somehow 
integrated into the larger state structures but retain a large degree of autonomy. If the benchmark 
of intervention is the set of goals formulated by those actors who conduct statebuilding, this 
outcome is disappointing. Instead of liberal statehood, the intervention (re-)creates a 
neopatrimonial system in which local elites can sustain local institutions that operate non-liberal 
legal systems and cannot be properly controlled by the government. Furthermore, the strong 
position of local elites carries the risk of coalitions against the government that could de-stabilize 
the state in the future.  
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
The monopolization of violence is a fundamental element of statebuilding interventions, but it 
has produced greatly varying outcomes. Given that the interventions were conducted by a similar 
set of actors with similar strategies and amounts of resources, the pattern of outcomes is puzzling. 
Based on the distinction between large-scale violence and small-scale violence, this chapter has 
forwarded an explanation for the varying outcomes of statebuilding. So far, this distinction has 
been made by few scholars, and Security Sector Reform approaches have been blind to the 
distinctive logics of violence at the two levels. Once this analytical distinction is adopted, it is 
possible to distill the conditions under which statebuilding will succeed or fail to institutionalize 
state regulation of violence. As this chapter has argued, two conditions need to be met for 
statebuilding interventions to succeed: First, the intervention needs to be supported by key 
regional actors. Second, the target society has to have experienced a history of strong statehood 
prior to the crisis that triggered the intervention. Only when both conditions are in place can 
statebuilding interventions lead to a full monopoly on violence. 
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 The argument in the case of the regulation of large-scale violence was that the focus on 
domestic factors to explain monopolization outcomes is insufficient. Instead, we need to shift 
attention to the regional level and ask in how far statehood has been institutionalized in the wider 
region. Where external actors deploy a large number of troops, conduct DDR and SSR programs, 
and commit themselves for a period of several years (see definition above), the support or 
opposition of regional becomes the crucial condition that determines whether a monopoly on 
large-scale violence can be achieved. I argued that the causal chain linking condition and 
outcome concerns the capacity of armed groups to wage war, as these actors can only resist 
superior Western interventions when they have the support of regional actors. Where regional 
actors support the intervention, statebuilding proves to be a successful tool of monopolizing the 
means of warfare in the hands of a (democratically elected) government. 
In contrast, the regulation of small-scale violence hinges on the degree to which local 
communities have developed the capacity to set out rules that are accepted by their members and 
enforce them effectively. Given the separate treatment of these two types of violence, the theory 
of intervention and violence regulation laid out so far begs the question how the two levels 
interact with each other. There are two answers to this: For state formation in general, the 
interaction effects are of great importance. For statebuilding interventions in particular, the 
influence of one dimension on the other is rather limited. 
 
 
 
Monopoly on Large-Scale 
Violence  
 
Dispersed Means of 
Large-Scale Violence 
 
 
State Order 
 
 
Modern State 
 
 
 
 
Fragmented State 
 
 
 
 
Self-Help Order 
 
 
Para State 
 
 
 
 
Weak State 
 
 
Table 7: Typology of possible statebuilding outcomes. 
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Given the separate explanations I offer for the two types of violence regulation, the question 
arises the regulation of large-scale and small-scale violence are related. My argument is that they 
are largely de-coupled in current statebuilding interventions. The last chapter has argued that the 
two emerged in a sequence but were also highly intertwined in historical state formation. 
Governments monopolized the means of warfare first, but in order to defend their monopoly 
against outside threats they had to increase tax revenues and mobilize their populations. Hence, 
they engaged in statemaking: They built local administrations and bureaucracies, developed 
modern police organization, indoctrinated the population in schools and through military services 
and weakened local elites (Tilly 1992: 114-116). Although statebuilding interventions are a very 
specific form (i.e. a subset) of state formation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 4-6), such a 
protracted, long-term statemaking process is far beyond the time horizon of statebuilding 
interventions. 
In statebuilding interventions, the creation of a monopoly on large-scale violence does not 
depend on the monopolization of small-scale violence regulation. As the weak state legacy 
mechanism implies, neither external actors nor the central government are likely to engage in the 
aggressive disempowerment of self-help communities. Statebuilding greatly reduces one major 
difficulty of monopolization, namely the buildup of organizational capacity (Tilly 1992: 68-70). 
Through an inflow of funding, training, and equipment, the newly established polity can quickly 
acquire modern armed forces and police.  Thus, the newly built state does not need to 
aggressively expand its tax base and exercise greater control over the local level. These current 
practices of statebuilding favor an accommodation of local elites. Put differently, the government 
no longer needs to develop vast extractive capacities to build armed forces and police forces as 
the necessary resources are provided by external actors (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 7-11 ; 
Schlichte 2005b: 182-221).  Therefore, although the resulting para statehood implies reduced 
revenues and the long-term risk of renewed rebellion by alliances of local elites, a monopoly on 
large-scale violence can exist without a monopoly on small-scale violence regulation.  
 While it is easy to imagine that a monopoly on small-scale violence regulation is no 
necessary condition for a monopoly on large-scale violence, the opposite appears to be more 
difficult. Small-scale violence regulation is affected by large-scale violence regulation in limited 
79 
 
spatial areas. As argued above, where either the government or armed groups have full control 
over territory, the determining condition for small-scale violence regulation will be whether there 
are strong self-help communities in place or not. For example, during the war in Ukraine in 2014 
control over the city Sloviansk changed at least two times between government and rebels. A 
certain number of desertions notwithstanding, state-centric small-scale violence regulation 
remained in place throughout the conflict (NYTimes 2014a). However, in fiercely contested areas 
where large-scale violence actually erupts, self-help communities as well as police forces are 
often exploited for the broader war effort (Kalyvas 2008: 111-115). In these zones, small-scale 
violence regulation can collapse temporarily. Nevertheless, in most areas most of the time small-
scale violence regulation is not greatly affected by the actors who control the means of large-
scale violence.  
 Based on the model presented in this chapter, the following chapters analyze the cases of 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They show how statebuilding interventions 
have succeeded and failed to monopolized violence regulation in post-conflict societies. 
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4. Afghanistan 
 
The liberal statebuilding intervention in Afghanistan was perhaps the most ambitious 
statebuilding intervention that was ever conducted. It was the embodiment of mission creep: 
What began as a light foot print mission in 2002 transformed over the years into the second 
biggest military interventions of the post-Cold War era18. With close to 150,000 troops and 
billions of dollars of aid money, NATO tried to build a modern state in Afghanistan. It was meant 
to become secure, governed by democratic principles and the rule of law, and on the track of 
economic development. Yet, in 2014, while NATO was shutting down its International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), the country performed badly on almost all indicators. Regarding the 
institutionalized control of violence, the intervention has neither created a state monopoly on 
large-scale violence nor on small-scale violence regulation. This chapter argues that the 
intervention failed to create a monopoly on large scale violence because of an unfavorable 
regional political system, and it shows that the long-term absence of a strong state led to a failure 
of monopolizing small-scale violence regulation. 
 With regard to the monopoly on large-scale violence, the argument is that the security 
competition between two key regional states, India and Pakistan, has prevented ISAF from 
succeeding. While India supports the pro-Western Afghan government, Pakistan supports the 
Taliban insurgency. The chapter shows that the regional compe tition mechanism outlined in 
chapter three can explain who regional politics caused statebuilding failure in Afghanistan. Since 
Pakistan granted the armed groups of Afghanistan access to its territory, the Taliban and its allies 
could resist monopolization efforts. Due to this transnationalization strategy, the armed group 
could prolong the conflict and drive up monopolization costs to such an extent that the 
intervening actors aborted the mission despite an ongoing civil war.  
 In contrast, the cause of ISAF’s failure to monopolize small-scale violence regulation is 
more remote. The long-term absence of a strong state in Afghanistan has created legacies in the 
form of strong self-help communities and powerful local elites (mujahedin commanders, tribal 
leaders, village elders, etc.). These communities have outlasted the twenty years crisis that has 
preceded the Western intervention and were thus able to shape the statebuilding process early on. 
                                                             
18 The coalition in Iraq deployed over 170,000 troops at the height of the occupation. 
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From its inception the Karzai government depended on the cooperation of local elites who had 
little interest in letting the state replace their powerbases with formal institutions and 
bureaucratized police forces. As a result, Afghanistan is a para state, i.e. a state in which self-help 
communities continue to play a decisive role and where state institutions of small-scale violence 
regulation (e.g. local government, police offices) have been captured by local elites.  
 
Before going into the detailed case study, it is necessary to check the plausibility of case-specific 
alternative explanations. A major rival explanation for ISAF’s failure of violence monopolization 
has been the thesis that the intervention has put too little emphasis on inclusion and 
reconciliation. In this reading, the focus of the US and later NATO on warfare has caused the 
armed groups to grow stronger and eventually undermine the newly established state (Sedra 
2013; Suhrke 2012). Suhrke (2012) sees a major contradiction between the use of force on the 
one hand and building a peaceful Afghanistan on the other. By concentrating on stability and 
fighting the Taliban, the intervention squandered good governance and justice, increasingly 
causing Afghans to turn against ISAF (Suhrke 2012: 485-487). There are several reasons for why 
this argument cannot explain ISAF’s failure to establish a monopoly on large-scale violence. 
First, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that the Taliban first expanded their military 
presence and only afterwards did NATO respond. Armed groups were especial ly successful 
where there was neither ISAF nor Afghan National Army (ANA) presence. Second, the state 
formation literature discussed in chapter two shows that the monopolization of violence is itself 
often a violent process. There is little reason to assume that a promotion of good governance can 
succeed before the state’s monopoly on large-scale violence. Third, in comparative perspective 
the explanation appears implausible. As the next chapter will show in detail, the UN’s coercive 
disarmament of the RUF in Sierra Leone did not create resentment but became the basis of its 
popularity in the West African country. Others have focused on the fact that the statebuilding 
intervention started off as an alliance with the warlords of the Afghan North (Mac Ginty 2010b). 
However, this chapter shows that the dissolution of the warlord armies (Afghan Military Force, 
AMF) and their integration into the formal army are one of the successes of the otherwise failed 
monopolization process. Furthermore, Hamid Karzai’s tribal networks also integrated warlords 
and strongmen of the South into the state and security forces.  
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 One popular counter-argument is that Pakistan is not able to control its border (Saikal 
2006b: 137-138). In such a reading, Pakistan is not a regional power pursuing its interest but a 
weak state unable to challenge the armed group operating on its soil. However, as I make clear in 
the discussion of Pakistan’s policies, the weak state hypothesis is not convincing. Except for the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan rules most of its provinces bordering 
Afghanistan directly (including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 19 ). Furthermore, the most important 
Taliban hub is not the FATA but Quetta and the surrounding Belochistan province. While 
Pakistan has done nothing to confront the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network, it has waged 
an intense counterinsurgency campaign against the Pakistani Taliban. In sum, the evidence I 
present throughout the sub-section on the monopolization of large-scale violence strongly 
suggests that Pakistan actively supported the Afghan Taliban. 
The failure of the intervention to create a state monopoly on small-scale violence has been 
attributed to the paramilitarization of police training after the return of the Taliban (Friesendorf 
2011). While it is true that the later recruitment of ‘trigger pullers’ has undermined the quality of 
the Afghan police, there are several reasons why this hypothesis does not fully explain the 
monopolization failure. First, under Germany’s leadership police training was focused largely on 
creating a strong professional leadership that could transform policing in Afghanistan. During 
this period, no gains were made in terms of replacing local elites with professional ANP forces. 
Second, the argument does not hold in comparative perspective as the case of Sierra Leone has 
shown that even a well-planned, quality-oriented police training mission will not replace self-help 
communities. In a nutshell, the paramilitarization argument focuses too much on the 
technicalities of policing and ignores the political dimension of small-scale violence regulation.  
The chapter will briefly outline Afghanistan’s history of state formation and civil war prior to 
the intervention. Afterwards, it provides an explanation for the failure to monopolize the two 
types of violence regulation. 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 Formerly known as Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP). 
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4.1. State Formation and Civil War in Afghanistan 
 
In 2002, NATO entered a country that had been devastated by decades of civil war. Afghanistan 
had suffered much more than either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Sierra Leone as it has been the scene 
of two successive civil wars. Between 1979 and 2001 armed factions fought each other at varying 
degrees of intensity. However, before this period Afghanistan had experienced a long period of 
relative stability and state formation. This chapter shows that an Afghan state was slowly taking 
shape since the 19th century. Unlike some characterizations of Afghanistan as a chaotic 
crossroads where tribes rule and empires die, this chapter shows that successive central 
governments have succeeded in slowly but steadily monopolizing the means of coercion. 
Nevertheless, it is also necessary to point out that the eventual collapse of the state and the Soviet 
intervention were direct consequences of the modernization process that occurred in mid-20th 
century Afghanistan. 
 
State Formation before the Civil Wars 
 
Early State Formation 
The area that is today’s Afghanistan was for most of its history part of empires. After a series of 
revolts against the Persian Empire in the early 18th century, Kandahar became a focal point of 
Afghan state formation (Schetter 2003: 194-197). In 1747, Ahmed Shah took advantage of the 
situation created by the murder of the Persian ruler and became the new strongman in Kandahar. 
He founded the Durrani dynasty by uniting local tribes and conquered large swaths of territory, 
including most of the areas of modern day Afghanistan (Rubin 1995: 45-46). Ahmed Shah 
Durrani is still seen as the founding father of the Afghan nation. However, his rule was based on 
the patronage of tribal elites and the Durrani nobility, and he did little to institutionalize the rule. 
His main tool to keep his empire together was his personal army (Schetter 2003: 199-204). Under 
his successor in 1776, Kabul became the capital of the Pashtun kingdom due to civil war that 
threatened Kandahar (Schetter 2003: 204-205). However, the capital would change several times 
in the subsequent centuries. Nevertheless, before it fell apart in 1801, the Durrani dynasty was 
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arguably central to the emergence of Afghanistan as a state, although there would be no 
sustainable institution-building until the early 19th century.  
Due to the expansion of Russia and the British Empire in Central Asia, the Pashtun 
kingdom became part of the so-called ‘Great Game’ between the two great powers during the 19th 
century. While the Afghans won their first war against the British Empire (1839-1842) in the 
1830s, the second war (1878-1880) ended with a deal which gave Britain de facto control over 
Afghan foreign policy (Schetter 2003: 216-217). While Emir Abdu Rahman accepted this 
condition during his reign from 1880 to 1901, he nevertheless tried to build a state within the 
borders the Empires had forced him to accept. His vigorous efforts to unify and modernize 
Afghanistan brought him the byname “Iron Emir”. He weakened the tribes, built the first modern 
bureaucracy, and sought the establishment of a nation state. In contrast to earlier monopolization 
efforts, Abdur Rahmans rule was the first major statebuilding effort (Schetter 2003: 220-223). 
 
Building a Modern State 
During his reign, the British Empire and Russia negotiated and eventually agreed on most of the 
borders of the Afghan state20. As Cullather (2002: 515) argues, “Afghanistan, at its origin, was an 
empty space on the map that was not Persian, not Russian, not British[..]”. Especially the border 
with British-India, the Durand-Line, was drawn arbitrarily through all kinds of tribal and ethnic 
territories. This laid the foundation for future border disputes with Pakistan. However, with the 
shift from ruling over tribes to ruling over the population of a fixed territory, Abdur Rahman 
began a campaign to unify the country. In over forty military encounters he enforced state rule 
and tried to dissolve non-state political structures. State administration was extended to the local 
level, thereby weakening tribal leaders (Schetter 2003: 222-230). Lacking an Afghan national 
identity, Rahman resorted to Sunni Islam as the one unifying ideology that differentiated  
Afghanistan from its neighbors. Rahman described his effort in terms that resemble European 
state formation as much as the challenges Karzai is facing in 21st century Afghanistan: 
“I had to put in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers, and cut-
throats, who are the cause of everlasting trouble in Afghanistan. This necessitated 
                                                             
20 The border with Persia was delineated in 1904. 
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breaking down the feudal and tribal system, and substituting one grand community under 
one law and under one rule.” (Schetter 2003: 221) 
This statement of a statebuilder captures a central element of Afghan social structure. In this  
poor, agricultural society, the only resource surpluses were generated in cities such as Kandahar. 
This allowed for social stratification and, thus, larger scale political rule. However, while there 
was some hierarchy in the Pashtun macro tribes that ruled Afghanistan, most governance 
occurred at the local level (Schetter 2003: 214-216). Life was centered on local customary law 
and (Sunni) Islam, and the latter was arguably the only idea that created something close to a 
collective identity (Schetter 2003: 230-233). Ethnicity did not play a role until the mid-20th 
century. When the centralization process began, there was no such thing as an Afghan national 
identity. The decentralized power structure created strong centrifugal tendencies against which 
Abdur Rahman and his descendants had to mobilize their scarce resources. 
His successor Amanullah decided to seek full independence from the British in 1919. 
While the Afghans were militarily beaten in the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), the British 
wanted to avoid further warfare and thus agreed to sign the Treaty of Rawalpindi, granting 
Afghanistan full control over its foreign affairs. The signing of the treaty on 20 August 1920 is 
seen by Afghans as their independence day. A period of radical modernization followed in which 
Amanullah gave Afghanistan its first constitution (1923) and sought to transform it into a modern 
nation state. He proclaimed that his power derived from ‘the nation’ instead of Islam, his 
constitution sought equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims, and he wanted to liberalize 
gender relations. This led to a massive backlash by the tribes, which ousted him in 1929 (Rubin 
1995: 54-58).  
The first army in a modern sense was created by Nadir Shah after he seized Kabul in 
1929, with about 40,000 troops (Cullather 2002: 518). In a somewhat Prussian fashion, the army 
during Shah Zahir’s rule was meant to integrate the national elites into the state. To achieve this 
goal, “[..] the Afghan army was subordinated to the executive authority through the appointment 
of aristocrats as generals; since all key positions were controlled by aristocrats, the loyalty of the 
army should have been ensured” (Giustozzi 2011b: 8). Great steps in enlarging and modernizing 
the army were taken by successive governments between the 1950s and the beginning of the civil 
war. Due to the US alliance with Pakistan, Afghanistan sought a stronger partnership with the 
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USSR and received large amounts of military aid and training. During this period, the force was 
for the first time equipped with modern technology. Afghanistan received tanks, helicopters and 
planes from the Soviets, and a whole generation of officers was trained in Russia (ICG 2010a: 3-
4). The professionalization came at a high price, as it were these Soviet-trained officers who 
would eventually stage a socialist coup in Afghanistan in 1978. 
 
The Socialist Statebuilding Experiment 
A coup by the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978 overthrew 
the young republic and led to a period of radical social reform. Reforms ranged from land reform 
to a re-definition of gender norms. This revolution from the top was met with fierce resistance 
from the local level, leading to the development of anti-government forces that rallied behind the 
banner of Islam. It was the first real test for the Afghan army, and the armed forces largely failed 
the test. Only one year into the war, and with substantial Soviet backing, the mutiny of one 
division in Kandahar almost led to a total collapse of the army (ICG 2010a: 4). In order to 
prevent the collapse of the regime, the USSR militarily intervened in Afghanistan in December 
1979 and started a socialist statebuilding intervention. The result was an internationalized civil 
war in which armed groups who called themselves mujahedin and were supported by Pakis tan, 
Arab states, and the US fought against the central government and the Soviet army. As in many 
civil wars, the Afghan-Soviet War displayed strong centrifugal forces that led to a de-
centralization of the means of violence. The government increasingly armed militias in order to 
contain the spreading insurgency. Young men fought in great numbers in the armed forces, pro-
government militias or mujahidin groups. “While an estimated 262,000 had served in pro-
government militias or the official army by 1988, mujahidin forces reached nearly 340,000 
personnel by 1991” (ICG 2010a: 5). 
Militias and mujahedin were incorporated into the armed forces in order to co-opt them into 
state structures. As a consequence, “[the] Afghan security force, while growing substantially, 
became increasingly ‘tribalized’, resembling less of a professional military force and more of a 
loose coalition of tribal forces brought together by material payoffs and other inducements”  (Hess 
2010: 179). However, the government could not pay for these expenses and was heavily 
dependent on Soviet money, supplies and arms (Rubin 1995: 148-149). The Najibullah 
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government survived a mujahedin offensive in Eastern Afghanistan in 1989, and two coup 
attempts by Kalqhi party members and Hekmatyar in 1989/1990 (Rubin 1995: 151-152). 
Nonetheless, once Russian support was terminated in 1992, the neopatrimonial system collapsed, 
the armed forces fragmented into regional warlord fiefdoms, and eventually Afghanistan would 
slide into civil war (Rubin 1995: 269-271). 
To sum up, it would be too easy to claim that Afghanistan could never be ruled by a central 
government. Since the late 19th century, Afghan rulers have embarked on a statebuilding project 
that accumulated power over decades. As a state emerging in a globalized world, all Afghan 
rulers had to deal with great powers from the British Empire to the Soviet Union, and they always 
managed to acquire some external support for their institution-building measures. Before the 
revolutions, the government had a quite modern army which was instrumental to keeping up 
internal order. The police force was slowly modernized and often acted rather as a canary in the 
coal mine. However, the state never played an important role in the life of the great majority who 
lived in rural Afghanistan. Thus, the state lacked deep roots in Afghan society. With the onset of 
radical reforms by the socialist government and the interference of the USSR, the US and 
Pakistan, the fragile achievements of almost a century of state formation were destroyed. When 
the Najibullah regime collapsed, the institutions of the state fell apart. 
 
Civil War and the Rise of the Taliban 
The Afghan civil war resulted from a power-sharing arrangement in 1992. Different mujahedin 
factions and former army commanders brought their forces close to the capital as negotiations 
were brokered by the UN. After the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992, the major 
warlords had agreed on a shared occupation of Kabul (Peshawar Agreement) and declared the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on 28 April (Rubin 1995: 271-272). Rubin (1995: 272) argues 
that, “[perhaps] this entity was Islamic, but it was hardly a state, and it certainly did not rule 
Afghanistan”. Within weeks, the agreement unraveled. The resulting war between the different 
factions led to a wide-ranging destruction of the capital between 1992 and 1994. Among the main 
combatants were Hezb-i Islami (led by Hekmatyar), Jamiat-i Islami (led by Massoud), and 
Junbesh-i Milli (led Dostum), networks that should dominate Afghan politics again after the fall 
of the Taliban (Rubin 1995: 272-274). By the mid-1990s, the state of Afghanistan had ceased to 
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exist: There was no centrally controlled army, and the remnants of the state police were 
controlled by regional warlords (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 32-34). 
While Afghanistan was mired in civil war, the rise of the Taliban movement began in 
1994. Initially recruited among the millions of Pashtuns who lived at refugees across the border 
in Pakistan and funded by the Pakistani government, the Taliban quickly defeated almost all 
mujahedin factions between 1994 and 1996 (Rashid 2000: 26-27). According to Rashid (2000: 
97), “[the] Taliban’s emergence coincided with a fortunate historical juxtaposition, where the 
disintegration of the communist power structure was complete, the Mujaheddin leaders were 
discredited and the traditional tribal leadership had been eliminated” . They conquered Kabul in 
1996 and, by 2001 they were ruling large swaths of Afghanistan. Only Shura-i Nazar, the armed 
sub-group of Jamiat which was led by Ahmed Shah Massoud retained control of substantial parts 
of Northeastern Afghanistan (Schetter 2003: 516-551). 
The Taliban system had its center of gravity in Kandahar, and was organized in the 
fashion of a one state party. They were mainly Pashtuns from the Durrani tribe (Rashid 2000: 98-
99). In terms of state formation, the Taliban achieved little during their reign from 1996 to 2001. 
The armed forces of the Taliban regime, numbering approximately 25,000 – 30,000 men, were 
theoretically structured like a modern army, with a chief of staff and an organization into several 
divisions. However, there was no clear chain of command. Mullah Omar was the head of the 
armed forces. Additionally, there was a Military Shura which would work on strategy and tactics. 
While the Military Shura, chief of staff and head of the armed forces existed as individual offices, 
Mullah Omar had monopolized most decision-making powers (Rashid 2000: 99-100). He also 
rotated military commanders at all levels in order to keep them under control and prevent them 
from developing patronage networks. However, these tactics led to a highly unprofessional 
military leadership. At the lower levels, most soldiers did not receive regular payments, but were 
directly supplied by their commanders. Thus, as Rashid has pointed out, the actual fighting force 
of the Taliban resembled a tribal militia rather than a modern military (Rashid 2000: 99-101).  
Soldiers were recruited through a conscription system which put a heavy burden on the 
population, in particular on the Pashtun tribes who had to bear the brunt of recruiting. This led to 
all kinds of shirking and resistance on part of the village elders in the south, who had to give 
away their young men for the Taliban’s war in the north (Malkasian 2013: 67-69). However, the 
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regime also relied heavily on Pakistanis to fill the ranks of the army. There are estimates that in 
1999, for example, about one third of the force consisted of young Afghan men that were 
recruited through madrassas in Pakistan (Rashid 2000: 100). Overall, the degree of 
institutionalization and the actual military strength were very low.   
However, the Kandahar Shura (headed by Mullah Omar) did not only control all military 
matters. The Taliban erected the most centralized system of rule that had been created in 
Afghanistan to that date. The inner circle personally selected leaders at provincial and district 
levels. Through a system of personal appointment and rotation, the Taliban leadership tried to 
maximize control and minimize the ability of local elites to build their own power bases. The 
power of the tribal leaders was broken in many parts of the country, and they were replaced by 
Mullahs. Hence, Taliban rule drastically changed Afghanistan’s power relations, producing clear 
winners (religious elites) and losers (tribal elites). Tribal leaders and village elders were further 
weakened by land reform. Local elites were often land owners, and their power depended on the 
economic advantage that comes with having more land than others in an agricultural society. 
Taxation was increased and a draft was introduced to keep up the war in the north against the last 
remnants of Shah Massouds forces (Malkasian 2013: 63-69).  
 Nevertheless, the Taliban never succeed in fully monopolizing the means of violence. 
While they gradually conquered parts of the North, they never completely defeated the well -
trained forces of Shura-i Nazar (Jamiat) that had defended a small part of territory in the north 
eastern region. Furthermore, the Taliban build weak armed forces and weak governance 
structures. Jalaluddin Haqqani supported the Taliban militarily and was rewarded with the 
position of Minister of Borders and Tribal affairs, but he remained in control over his forces 
(Dressler 2010: 8-9).  
Overall, in terms of state institutions the Taliban did not rebuild what the civil war had 
destroyed. They were not able to do so, but they were also not interested in building a modern 
state. Instead, their Islamic Emirate was solely built on the control over an army funded by 
Pakistan and personal loyalties to a charismatic leader. The army resembled more a militia than 
modern armed forces, and policing had been devolved either to the army or local institutions. 
Policing powers mostly emanated from the rule through local religious leaders, which allowed 
the Taliban to enforce a draft and generate some tax revenue. In the North, the state was unable to 
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defeat Jamiat, even though the rebels lacked substantial external support. Hence, when the 
intervention began in 2001, the weak Taliban polity quickly fell apart. 
 
4.2. Statebuilding Intervention and Large-Scale Violence Regulation 
 
In its twelve year statebuilding intervention, ISAF and the Afghan government have failed to 
create a monopoly on large-scale violence. When the mission was officially ended in 2014, the 
civil war between the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and the central government continued. This 
section argues that the cause of this monopolization failure was the competitive regional 
constellation in which Pakistan and India are caught in an enduring rivalry. However, before 
explicating the causal mechanism, I will provide an overview over the statebuilding mission and 
its components that deal with large-scale violence monopolization. 
The statebuilding intervention in Afghanistan was perhaps the most resource-intensive 
statebuilding effort of all. While ISAF was initially conceptualized as a light footprint mission, it 
was gradually transformed into a statebuilding intervention (Lister and Wilder 2007: 242-243). 
At its peak in October 2010, about 149,000 ISAF troops were deployed across the country to 
fight the Taliban, train Afghan security forces and, thereby, create a monopoly on violence (ISAF 
2011). The US alone spent over $700 billion between 2001 and 2014 on the intervention in 
Afghanistan (cf. Cordesman 2012). Yet by 2014, the Afghan state did not have a monopoly on 
large-scale violence.  
Initially, the Taliban were quickly defeated by an alliance of the United Front (i.e. 
Northern Alliance) and the US. With limited air support and American Special Forces, United 
Front fighters managed to quickly conquer most of the country (Giustozzi 2009: 88-90). Similar 
to the case in Sierra Leone, the international intervention in Afghanistan began with relatively 
modest means. Against the backdrop of the US war on terror, the international community agreed 
on a plan to transform post-Taliban Afghanistan into a liberal state. At the Bonn Conference in 
December 2001, international and Afghan actors agreed upon a schedule for the establishment of 
a transitional government, the drafting of a constitution and elections. In order to support the new 
Afghan government, the International Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) was set up. About 4,000 
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soldiers were deployed to Kabul in the beginning of 2002 (Saikal 2006a: 527-529). Over the 
following years, the focus shifted modest assistance for the Afghan government to one of the 
most ambitious and expensive interventions ever conducted. In 2005, NATO ministers agreed to 
a plan to expand ISAF to the whole Afghan territory, to put ISAF and OEF under one command 
and to increase the military presence from 9,000 to 15,000 troops (NATO 2005). In January 
2006, the international community agreed on the Afghanistan Compact which officially updated 
the intervention’s goals. The compact clarified that the intervention aimed at establishing 
security, democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic and 
social development (Afghanistan Compact 2006: 2). With regard to the monopoly on large-scale 
violence, the Afghan security forces were meant to be expanded significantly. By 2010, the ANA 
was supposed to have grown to 70,000 soldiers, while the ANP was set to reach a strength of 
62,000 officers. Armed groups were supposed to be disarmed until the end of 2007 (Afghanistan 
Compact 2006: 6). 
 
The Regional Competition Mechanism 
The statebuilding project in Afghanistan was ambitious, protracted and very costly in terms of 
lives and money. Yet it ended with a failure to build a monopoly on large-scale violence. While 
the intervention has created an Afghan state that controls up to 260,000 soldiers and 160,000 
police officers, the armed groups who oppose the regime were able to survive both the 
international military operations and the expansion of national security forces. This section 
explains how the regional constellation affected the statebuilding outcome by tracing the process 
with the help of the regional competition mechanism which I have developed in chapter three.   
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Figure 8: Regional competition mechanism. 
 
This section argues that the cause of monopolization failure in Afghanistan was the competition 
of two key regional actors. The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan structures the 
strategic thinking of Pakistani security elites. In order to ensure strategic depths and to avoid 
being encircled by India and India-friendly regimes, Pakistan thus supports anti-Indian actors in 
Afghanistan. Although Pakistan always cooperated with the US in certain areas like counter -
terrorism, it fundamentally opposed the Afghan state under Hamid Karzai. This constellation 
triggered the regional competition mechanism that translated regional conflict into an enduring 
civil war in Afghanistan: 
(1) Transnationalization: Step one of the mechanism concerns the transnational dimension 
of the conflict. Pakistan provided the Afghan Taliban with access to its territory and to 
global markets. At times, it even supported the Taliban directly. Therefore, the 
monopolization process always took place in a transnationalized environment without 
effective or even accepted borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a result of the 
transnationalization, the armed groups that opposed ISAF’s monopolization process could 
use Pakistan as a safe haven. This allowed them to escape physical destruction, keep their 
basic organizational capacities and eventually rebuild their capacity to conduct large-scale 
violence. 
(2) Resistance against Monopolization: ISAF starts to build a monopoly on large-scale 
violence by launching DDR and SSR programs. It invested into a new Afghan army and 
expanded territorial control. However, due to their sanctuaries in Pakistan, the Taliban 
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were able to successfully block the monopolization effort and hold territory in 
Afghanistan. 
(3) Escalation of Costs: Since the armed groups could retain their means of large-scale 
violence, NATO and the Afghan government expanded the Afghan security forces 
beyond sustainable size. The costs of intervention increased so that international actors 
eventually seek to exit the country without finishing the monopolization project. 
The outcome is a failure of the ISAF mission to create a state monopoly on large-scale violence. 
The last year of the statebuilding intervention was also the year with the highest number of 
casualties among the Afghan security forces: In 2014 alone, over 4,600 ANSF personnel have 
been killed in the ongoing civil war (Reuters 2014a). This clearly indicates the strong means of 
large-scale violence controlled by the armed groups.  
 
 
Cause: Regional Competition in Afghanistan’s Neighborhood 
This section argues that Afghanistan is caught in a competitive regional constellation. Of the 
cases discussed in this book, Afghanistan has by far the most complex neighborhood. The 
regional security complex is heavily influenced by the great power competition between India 
and Pakistan. While Iran strives to become a regional power itself, it has a stronger focus on the 
Middle East, where it sees itself as a patron of the Shia populations of several states. The former 
Soviet republics in the North of Afghanistan are more oriented towards Russia, although many 
Afghans are of Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen ethnicity. Although Pakistan is the crucial actor with 
regard to the statebuilding intervention, it is necessary to briefly discuss the degree of regional 
integration and the stance of Afghanistan’s other neighbors.  
Afghanistan is located at the intersection between three world regions: The Middle East 
(Iran), Central Asia (the former Soviet Republics Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) and 
South Asia (Pakistan) (see figure 9). As discussed in the history chapter, Afghan politics have 
been strongly shaped by its location as a land-locked country in between the spheres of influence 
of great powers. When compared to Africa, the region is more developed and has stronger states. 
Its main regional powers are Pakistan and Iran, while the Great Powers Russia and India mark the 
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outer fringes of Afghanistan’s neighborhood. The region is characterized by ‘lower middle 
income countries’ (India, Pakistan, Turmenistan, Uzbekistan), one ‘upper middle income 
country’ (Iran) and two poor countries (Afghanistan, Tajikistan)  (WorldBank 2014). Thus, while 
most countries in the region are not rich, they are significantly more developed then most sub-
Sahara African states. This is also reflected in the strength of central governments. While most of 
the countries do fairly well in terms of their monopoly on violence, Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
the stark outliers (BTI 2012). 
 
 
Figure 9: Map of Afghanistan and its neighbors {Google, 2014 #759}. 
 
The degree of regional integration is minimal. Regional organizations in Asia are mostly 
platforms for enhanced coordination of state activities and emphasize a strong norm of 
sovereignty. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Asian Cooperation 
Dialogue have a very narrow scope (often times focused on economic cooperation) and are rather 
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exclusive (Webber 2010: e.g.). Even if there was more regional integration in Eurasia, 
Afghanistan would not be a clear member of any sub-region. For example, the post-Soviet states 
are stronger oriented towards Russia, while Pakistan is more strongly drawn into China’s orbit.  
Overall, there is no regional institution that would have such a strong role as ECOWAS in West 
Africa or the European Union on the Balkans. 
 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan 
Until 1991, Afghanistan had only one neighbor in the north: The Soviet Union and, before that, 
the Russian Tsarist Empire. Since 1991, the former Soviet republics Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Tajikistan share a border with Afghanistan. The three countries have inherited rather strong 
institutions and autocratic rule from the USSR, and their main interest in the past decades has 
been to insulate themselves from radical Islamism in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is the most 
powerful of the three with a population more than two times as large as those of the other two 
combined. It is ruled autocratically and operates strong armed forces. Uzbekistan’s key interest is 
the survival of its regime and a strengthening of state rule. The biggest threat to the regime so far 
was the ascent of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which started a jihad against the 
government in 1998. The Uzbek government responded by attacking IMU bases in Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, demonstrating that it is willing to use force across borders to protect its interests 
(Stein 2012: 76-77). While Uzbekistan backed Junbesh during the civil war in the 1990s, since 
then it has confined itself to external interference only when directly threatened. Although there 
is a large Uzbek minority living in Northern Afghanistan, the Uzbek government has no policy to 
protect ‘ethnic kin’ abroad (Fumagalli 2007: 107-108). However, Uzbekistan’s government sees 
the Afghan war as a regional conflict and has repeatedly called for a regional settlement, both 
during the Taliban rule and ISAF’s intervention (Stein 2012: 78-79). 
 
Iran 
While Iran is a regional power with aspirations to become a Great Power (e.g. through acquiring 
nuclear weapons), it has stayed noticeably neutral regarding the intervention in its neighboring 
country. Iran’s population of 77 million consists almost exclusively of Shiite Muslims. This 
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contrasts with the Sunni dominated Arab world, especially states such as Saudi-Arabia, but also 
with Sunni Afghanistan. Iran’s foreign policy is strongly shaped by two factors: The Arab world 
and the USA. Like Pakistan, Iran was subject to the state formation through inter-state war 
mechanism. In the 1980s, Iran was attacked by Iraq and drawn into a long and bloody war. At the 
same time, the country has had hostile relations with the US since the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. The enduring rivalry with the world’s foremost superpower was certainly a major incentive 
to strengthen its military capabilities as well as to develop nuclear weapons. However, Teheran 
was always careful to not risk an open conflict with the US. At the same time, it has used its ties 
to Shia groups (like Hezbollah) and Shia-dominated states (Syria, Iraq since 2003) to manage 
potential threats from its Arab neighbors (Barzegar 2009). 
Historically, Persia was an important actor for the area that became Afghanistan in the 
modern era (Schetter 2003: 193-197). Hence, Dari (the Afghan version of Farsi) is one of the two 
official languages in Afghanistan. In modern times, Iran backed the mujahedin against the Soviet 
Union, and later supported the factions that fought against the Taliban. The Iranian government 
opposed the Taliban not only because they were radical Sunnis, but also because they were 
suspected to support anti-regime forces in Iran (Rashid 2000: 189-203). During the reign of the 
Taliban in the 1990s, tensions between the two states arose that almost led to an Iranian 
intervention (Rashid 2000: 203-204). Nevertheless, interaction between the modern states of 
Afghanistan and Iran has been much less intense than Afghan relations to Pakistan. 
 
Pakistan 
Pakistan is arguably the most important and powerful neighbor state of Afghanistan. With a 
population of over 180 million people, Pakistan is by far the largest state in the direct 
neighborhood (while at the same time it is dwarfed by its neighbor India’s population of one 
billion). While it is not a rich country, Pakistan is not in the lowest income classification of the 
World Bank (over 1,000 GDP per capita) (WorldBank 2014).  
Pakistan is a major military power. Perhaps its most distinguishing feature is its status as a 
nuclear power, which it acquired after testing atomic weapons at the end of the 1990s. Its army 
has a size of over 600,000 active soldiers (plus about 500,000 reserves). The history of Pakistan 
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after independence in 1947 was strongly shaped by wars and conflict with India over the Kashmir 
region. In this sense, Pakistan had a classical state formation experience. Pakistan’s security 
establishment views India as the outstanding threat to national security (Yusuf et al. 2011). 
Hence, the military strategy is above all shaped by the desire to deter India and to avoid being 
encircled by Indian allies. In order to achieve these goals, Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons, 
sustains a large armed force and supports militants in the border region to India. 
 Despite these massive military capabilities, Pakistan has not a full monopoly on the use of 
force. Part of this is by design: The Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-
Western Frontier Province (NWFP) are controlled by local tribes and governed by Islamabad 
through indirect rule. Many districts have seen little government presence since Pakistani 
independence in 1947. During the last decade, the Pakistani government had to fight several 
inconclusive counterinsurgency campaigns against tribal uprisings in the north-western border 
region to Afghanistan. There is a long-standing dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over 
the Durand-Line, which the Afghan government does not officially accept as the border between 
the two states. Both states have historically seen themselves as protectors of the Pashtun tribes. 
However, the tribes have mostly tried to avoid becoming part of either state (Schetter 2003: 263-
267). Thus, an important step of state formation, the acceptance of borders, has not been taken by 
the two states. 
  With regard to Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic goal has been to avoid 
encirclement by pro-Indian forces (Yusuf et al. 2011: 38-39). Thus, during the Soviet-Afghan 
War Pakistan (and the US) massively supported the anti-communist Mujahedin. After the Soviet 
withdrawal, it has supported the Taliban as a Pashtun force against the warlords of northern and 
western Afghanistan. While it is not completely clear whether the civilian government or the 
military leadership dominates Pakistan’s security policy-making, the wider foreign policy elite 
shares certain views regarding the NATO intervention Afghanistan since 2001. A study based on 
interviews with military officers, politicians and journalists from the Pakistani security 
establishment has concluded that Pakistan’s strategic goals in the conflict are to create a stable 
Afghan government that includes the Quetta Shura Taliban and possibly the Haqqani network, 
and which denies India a larger role in development assistance (Yusuf et al. 2011: 12-13). 
Whether or not this logic is sound, it is true that the Karzai administration has closely cooperated 
with India. India has been one of the major donors from the beginning. It has supported the new 
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Afghan state through a range of development assistance and aid, but has always strayed away 
from supporting the military aspects of intervention. This has been described as an effective soft 
power approach by India which has a strong interest in preventing a return to a Taliban regime. In 
October 2011, the two states signed a strategic alliance agreement (D'Souza 2011). 
To sum up, Pakistan is the most important neighboring country for Afghanistan. The 
region lacks strong institutions that could mitigate conflicts and secure cooperation between all 
relevant actors. Since the Pakistani security establishment views India as a threat to national 
security, it has a strong interest in strengthening anti-Indian actors in Afghanistan. The next 
section shows how this policy preference translated into a transnationalization of the conflict. 
 
Step one: Transnationalization 
The competitive regional constellation caused Pakistan to see the statebuilding intervention in 
Afghanistan as a threat. As a result, Pakistan allowed the armed groups that opposed the 
statebuilding intervention in Afghanistan to freely operate across the Pakistani border. The result 
was that the Afghan rebels had sanctuaries for their leadership, access to global markets to sell 
drugs and buy arms, and greater populations in which they could recruit their troops.   
Pakistan has fought wars against two enemies which continue to be seen as the main 
threats to national security: India and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). While India has been 
seen as an enemy since independence, TTP is a fairly new threat. However, Pashtun insurgent 
groups that operate in Afghanistan are not perceived as a threat but as an important tool to retain 
influence in the neighbor country (Waldman 2010: 4-5). These strategic priorities shape 
Pakistan’s seemingly contradictory strategy with regard to the statebuilding intervention in 
Afghanistan. Officially, Pakistan supports NATO in Afghanistan and has been one of the 
signatories of the Afghanistan Compact (2006). However, the relationship between Pakistan and 
the US is much more complex than simple formulas such as ‘allies in the war on terrorism’ 
suggest. After 9/11, Pakistan has fulfilled some of the demands the US had. Pakistani authorities 
helped to capture or kill a significant number of al-Qaida leaders. One of the most important 
aspects of cooperation was that the CIA was allowed to use Pakistani air fields to run its drone 
operations against Islamist militants within Pakistan. In return, the US has supported Pakistan, 
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and especially the Pakistani armed forces, with billions of dollars in aid and military equipment 
(ICG 2013: 1-5). Despite seemingly cooperating, Pakistan has maintained its long-term strategic 
priorities. Islamabad has supported Pashtun groups who fought against the Afghan state in order 
to weaken the India-friendly Karzai government (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013; Hänni and Hegi 
2013; Waldman 2010). The scale of operations by Afghan armed groups within Pakistan and the 
ease with which they can cross the border cannot be explained by a weakness of the Pakistani 
state. Whereas the Federally Administered Tribal areas are ruled indirectly, both Belochistan 
(from where the Quetta Shura operates) and the former Northwestern Frontier Province (now: 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) are ruled directly by the Pakistani state (Fishman 2013: 340-341). 
Furthermore, it has restricted the areas in which the US could conduct drone strikes. While 
drones have attacked a vast number of targets in tribal areas of the Northwest, there have been no 
attacks in Belochistan where the Quetta Shura is located. The US is allowed to attack TTP and al -
Qaeda targets, both of which are threatening the Pakistani state, but there have been very few 
instances of drone attacks against Pakistan-based armed groups that operate in Afghanistan21 
(ICG 2013: 22). 
Overall, Pakistani policies had a strong impact on the capability of armed groups to 
challenge the Afghan government’s claim to a monopoly on violence. In order to illustrate the 
importance of Pakistan’s transnationalization strategy, it is necessary to analyze how Afghan 
insurgency groups re-organized after their initial defeat. However, the insurgency is less 
homogenous than the term ‘Taliban’ suggests. It consists of seven armed groups that all fight 
against the government and its external backers: 
Organisationally, the insurgency is segmented and consists of seven armed structures: the 
Islamic Movement of the Taleban, the networks of the Haqqani and Mansur families in 
the South-East, the Tora Bora Jehad Front (De Tora Bora Jehadi Mahaz ) led by Anwar-
                                                             
21 At first sight, this should appear to be reason enough for the US to cancel all support for 
Pakistan and treat it as a Pariah state. However, most likely the US government fears that the 
radical Islamists of Pakistani Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP), the strongest anti-government force in 
Pakistan, could overthrow the government and, thereby, establish control over the country’s 
nuclear arms.  
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ul-Haq Mujahed in Nangrahar (Eastern region), HIG, small Salafi groups in Kunar and 
Nuristan provinces (Eastern region)28 and, as a new phenomenon, a number of not inter-
related local exmujahedin groups that (or whose historical leaders) had been pushed out 
of power, are taking up arms and starting to adopt Taleban-like language and behaviour. 
(Ruttig 2009: 10)  
However, only two groups are able to effectively challenge the state’s claim to a monopoly on 
violence: The Quetta Shura (QST, or Afghan Taliban) and the Haqqani Network (HQN) 
(Waldman 2010: 2). These two groups work together under the ‘Taliban’ umbrella, and formally 
HQN accepts the Taliban’s leadership. While the Afghan Taliban are the biggest group and 
operate mainly in the South, Haqqani operate in the Eastern parts of Afghanistan.  Hence, it is 
useful to focus on the two major armed groups in the Afghan civil war. 
 
Organizing Armed Resistance – The Haqqani Network 
Jalaluddin Haqqani was a tribal leader from Loya Paktia who started fighting against the Daud 
government during the 1970s. Already during this time, Pakistan funded Islamist resistance 
groups in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a nationalist or communist state.  Since 
then, the Haqqani network has enjoyed the support of Pakistan. In 1995, Haqqani joined the 
Taliban movement while retaining control over his military capabilities. He became minister in 
the Taliban’s cabinet, but was excluded from the decision-making process because he was neither 
a Kandahari nor a Durrani Pashtun. After the US invasion, the Haqqani clan first retreated to 
Miram Shah in North Waziristan, Pakistan, where they re-established contact to the Taliban in 
2003. Since then, Jalaluddin has been succeeded by his son Siraj who has transformed the 
Haqqani Network into the most professional Afghan insurgent force, and the strongest opponent 
of the new government in Eastern Afghanistan. While the network remained an autonomous 
entity, strategic leadership was apparently exercised by the Quetta Shura (Dressler 2010: 7-11).  
The Haqqani Network has used North Waziristan as its organizational center. “The 
Haqqani network maintains its main command and control, training, and logistical node in and 
around Miram Shah, the largest town in Pakistan’s [North Waziristan]. [..] From Miram Shah, the 
Haqqanis run a parallel administration that includes courts, recruiting centers, tax offices, and 
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security forces” (Dressler 2010: 11). From there, it had access to the Loya Paktia region which 
entails the provinces Khost, Paktia and Paktika in Eastern Afghanistan. Even before the Quetta 
Shura began its armed resistance in the South in 2003, there were attacks against the new Afghan 
government in the region between Zabol and Nuristan, indicating that HQN was faster in 
reorganizing itself than the QST (Maloney 2008: 203). In late 2003, the Haqqanis had established 
control of half of the mountainous province of Paktika and began to operate in large units of 
several hundred militants. (Dressler 2010: 21) Thus, due to their access to Pakistani territory, 
HQN was able to organize a major armed force within less than two years. It took the QST only 
little longer to recover from their ousting from power in 2001 and return with a vengeance. 
 
Organizing Armed Resistance – The Quetta Shura 
The intervention in 2001 defeated the Taliban in most areas of the country. Even in the South, the 
Taliban feared a total defeat at the hands of the Northern Alliance and the US and, thus, withdrew 
to Pakistan (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 847-848). Too weak to resist, the organization could 
have collapsed in the early months of the intervention. However, the leadership managed to 
escape to Pakistan, from where it could rebuild its organization and reinsert its fighters into 
southern Afghanistan. The main target areas of this rebuilding phase were Helmand and 
Kandahar. Kandahar City is the former capital of the Taliban movement, and it is of great 
strategic importance to anyone who wants to rule Afghanistan. Home to a population of 500,000, 
it is the second biggest city of the country, located at Highway 1 (‘ring road’), and a logistical 
hub for trade across the Afghan-Pakistani border. After the Taliban’s retreat in 2002, neither the 
government nor the international community had the capacities to control Kandahar province. 
Instead, a US battalion was stationed at Kandahar Air Field, while an AMF unit was sent into 
Kandahar City. The rest of the province had to govern itself without support from either the 
government or the intervention force (Maloney 2008: 203-204). 
 In 2003, the Taliban started a propaganda campaign in which they communicated (via fax 
and email) that they still exist, and that Mullah Omar continues to lead the organization. This 
message was underlined by a very limited guerilla war against the forces in Kandahar (Maloney 
2008: 204). “The establishment of Taliban base and support structures in Pakistan of course pre-
dates the 2001 intervention but these structures were reactivated in late 2002. By 2003, the 
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Taliban was able to mount the first cross-border foray into southern Kandahar Province west of 
Spinboldak” (Maloney 2008: 204). By 2004, the Taliban set up insurgent cells in several rural 
districts surrounding Kandahar. Taliban Mullahs were sent to districts to influence local Mullahs, 
and night letters were delivered to threaten anyone who might be willing to work with the 
government. In 2005, the Taliban had become so strong that they switched to a war of attrition 
strategy. The Taliban controlled several districts around Kandahar, started to interrupt traffic flow 
into the city on the strategic Highway 1, infiltrated the police force and staged high-profile 
suicide attacks in the city center (Maloney 2008: 206-209). By 2006, Taliban forces had erected 
conventional defense systems in the districts surrounding the city. They governed much of the 
province and aimed at controlling the streets that are the lifelines of Kandahar City (Maloney 
2008: 212). 
The same pattern can be found in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, although the capita l 
Lashkar Gar has neither the size (200,000 inhabitants) nor the strategic importance of Kandahar 
City. Outside the provincial capital and some district capitals, the government had no capacities 
to govern in the aftermath of the regime change. Thus, it relied instead on warlords and tribal 
leaders in order to somehow extend its influence into the province. 
 In 2004 and 2005, the Taliban first send Mullahs to spread propaganda, followed by small 
teams to assess the situation and to organize political support. These small groups also staged hit-
and-run attacks against the few pro-government forces (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 849 ; 
Malkasian 2013: 86). As with the central government, there were parts of the population who 
were against the Taliban, while others supported them. Groups which have traditionally suffered 
from the tribes (mostly landless ‘immigrants’), and those who have benefited from the Taliban 
regime during the 1990s (the religious elites), embraced the return of the Taliban (Malkasian 
2013: 149-155). By 2006, the Taliban operated in groups of hundreds of fighters and openly 
conquered districts in which only the district center was held by the central government (Farrell 
and Giustozzi 2013: 849-850).  
To sum up, Pakistan allowed Afghan armed groups to use its territory as a sanctuary. This 
transnational space was decisive for re-organization, both in the cases of the Taliban’s strategic 
center in Quetta and of the Haqqani Network’s retreat in North Waziristan. Consequently, their 
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defeat at the hands of international and Afghan forces in 2001/2002, and their subsequent 
disappearance from most of Afghanistan, had no lasting effect.  
 
Step Two: Resistance against monopolization 
The occupation of transnational spaces enabled the Taliban and their allies to resist the 
monopolization efforts of ISAF and the Afghan government. Whereas the statebuilders expanded 
the organizational capacities of the government, they were challenged by the Taliban in those 
areas that bordered on Pakistan.  
The Afghan National Army was meant to become a lean and sustainable force that 
guaranteed that Afghanistan would not again become a harbor for armed groups and international 
terrorists. At the beginning of the intervention, a true national armed force did not exist anymore 
in Afghanistan. Instead, warlords commanded a few hundred troops each, while Shura-I Nezar 
still commanded up to 15,000 troops. The US support for the Northern Alliance warlords since 
2001 allowed them to massively expand their armed forces. Within months, the warlord factions 
could mobilize thousands of fighters who overran the Taliban with the help of US air support 
(Giustozzi 2009: 87-89). Since the warlords were the only actors allied to the West who 
controlled means of large-scale violence, these groups were chosen to be the core of the new 
Afghan security forces. It was envisaged to integrate them into one army and to turn them into a 
professional force. The different militia groupings were organized into the Afghan Military Force 
(AMF), which filled out the role of the official military until the creation of the ANA in 2003 
(ICG 2010a: 7). “The AMF, which represented the bulk of Afghan security forces, consisted 
largely of militias that had filled the security vacuum in 2001. Although the number of active 
militia personnel shrunk from 75,000 in 2002 to 45,000 by the end of 2003, the number of AMF 
divisions expanded to 40 during roughly the same period” (ICG 2010a: 7). This early 
incorporation of well-organized militias into the official armed forces laid the foundation for the 
dominance of Tajiks in the higher command levels of the ANA. At the end of 2002, the Afghan 
National Army was officially created. The aim was to build an armed force consisting of 70,000 
soldiers across all service branches, controlled by a national Ministry of Defense (Younossi et al. 
2009: 12-13). However, the recruitment goals that had been initially declared were not met in the 
first years. The funding for recruitment was increased in 2004, so that the ANA expanded 
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somewhat faster. Nevertheless, the modest expansion of commissioned battalions translated into 
a much slower growth of combat-ready units (Giustozzi 2007: 48-51). As a result, when the 
government was meant to expand its control over the whole territory in 2005, the ANA had only 
about 26,000 soldiers at its disposal (NYTimes 2005). 
In late 2005, ISAF was expanded to the whole territory of Afghanistan (NATO 2005). 
With increased troop levels and more resources, the goal was to establish governmental control 
over the whole country. In order to achieve this, NATO troops (in particular British, Canadian 
and Dutch) were deployed to Helmand and Kandahar (Malkasian 2013: 91-92). There are several 
reasons for this focus: These provinces are not only home to about ten percent of the Afghan 
population, but also to large swaths of arable land (Helmand River Valley), and to the second 
biggest city of the country (Kandahar City). Furthermore, they border at Pakistan and have 
historically been important transit areas for trade and cross-border migration. Last but not least, 
they are the homeland of Afghanistan’s biggest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Any government that 
wants to exercise authority over Afghanistan has to be in control of these areas. The Afghan 
government had already started to deploy ANA to Paktika and Kandahar in 2004, facing stiff 
resistance from the Taliban. Through a combination of soldiers killed in action and wide-spread 
desertion, these units suffered attrition rates well over 50% (Giustozzi 2007: 54). When NATO 
troops arrived in South Afghanistan, they faced armed groups that were not only well organized 
but had developed proto-state structures across Southern Afghanistan. They had re-erected their 
own systems of jurisdiction and taxation, and were able to build an army to control the region. 
Thus, ISAF’s efforts to take control of key cities, roads and populations were countered by the 
Taliban by conventional means. They fought a territorial war, attacking ISAF outposts with 
battalion-sized combat groups (Malkasian 2013). For several years, southern Afghanistan 
experienced a symmetric war in which two actors of large-scale violence were caught in a bloody 
stalemate. Despite the ongoing monopolization efforts of ISAF and the Afghan government, the 
Taliban had re-built a strong capacity to control and apply means of collective violence. They 
militarily occupied large parts of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, where they installed their 
own system of governance, taxation and recruitment. The political leadership remained in 
Pakistan, where “[..] since 2007 the Taliban’s military structure has been centred on two military 
commissions [..]: one in Quetta and the other in Peshawar” (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 855). 
105 
 
 Overall, the Taliban had recovered by 2003 and were able to resist the mili tary expansion 
of both ISAF and the Afghan government. 
 
Step Three: Escalation of monopolization costs 
In the final step of the causal mechanism, the resilience of armed groups led to an escalation of 
the monopolization effort. The statebuilders expanded the Afghan security forces beyond the 
limits of sustainability. However, the continued access to transnational spaces allowed the 
Taliban to endure the monopolization offensive until the costs for the interveners were high 
enough to force them to withdraw.   
In late 2005, as NATO realized that the Afghan government would not be able to 
establish a monopoly on violence if the Afghan National Army did not accelerate recruitment. 
While the Afghanistan Compact (2006) reaffirmed initial target (70,000 ANA, 60,000 ANP), it 
clearly articulated that this troop level should be met by 2010 (Afghanistan Compact 2006). 
However, subsequently the goals were further increased and by 2009, the target was an expansion 
to 260,000 ANA soldiers and 160,000 ANP officers in 2015. These were supposed to be support 
by a 45,000-strong militia operating under the label Afghan Local Police (ALP) (Goodhand and 
Hakimi 2014: 15). Thus, while the original plan so a force of 130,000 as an appropriate force for 
a country with about 35 million inhabitants, the statebuilders eventually deemed it necessary to 
triple that number. 
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Figure 10: Number of Afghan National Security Forces, Afghan Local Police and ISAF troops. 
 
The expansion of the Afghan Army was accelerated to an extreme pace. Within five years (2006-
2011) the size of the ANA grew from 36,000 to 179,000 soldiers (see figure 10). In order, to 
achieve the expansion, recruitment requirements needed to be lowered while expenses shot up. 
While low rank soldiers are easy to recruit, the ANA lacks the officer corps to command these 
troops because the training of high rank soldiers takes much more time (DoD 2012: 46). Also, the 
ANA was still heavily dependent on external help for its operations. A report by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) assessed the state of ANA’s capabilities in 2012. While the army 
conducted about 80% of all operations on its own, a great deal of operations was still planned by 
ISAF (DoD 2012). Even more problematic is the issue of financial sustainability as it is unclear 
how Afghanistan is supposed to finance its massive security apparatus. According to World Bank 
data, the annual Afghan security spending (FY 2012-2013) amounts to 10.7% of GDP. This 
compares to domestic revenues of only 10.6% of GDP, while the donor money that goes directly 
into the state’s budget is more than twice as high (WorldBank 2013a). This means the Afghan 
state is completely dependent on external funding, and is not even close to being able to pay for 
its security forces (see figure 11).  
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Figure 11: Afghan government finances (WorldBank 2014). 
 
In 2009, the US government decided to shift resources from Iraq to Afghanistan. Large amounts 
of US troops were deployed to Helmand, the homeland of the Taliban insurgency, and troops in 
Kandahar were reinforced. US Special Forces began to massively increase raids to capture or kill 
mid-level Taliban leaders. ISAF troops increasingly conducted joint patrols with Afghan soldiers. 
Additionally to hiring more ANA and ANP personnel, an attempt was made to create a national 
militia system along the lines of the Iraqi ‘Awakening Councils’ (or the Sierra Leonean CDFs). 
At the same time, civilian assistance to the Afghan government was dramatically increased in 
order to guarantee that for every district the US conquered from the Taliban, there would be 
enough Afghan government capacities to fill in the gap (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 868-869). 
Overall, the balance in the market of large-scale violence tipped strongly in favor of the Afghan 
government. 
Initially, the drastically increased pressure on the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan had a 
strong impact on their organizational capacities. Personal networks that developed between 
Taliban leaders on the middle and lower levels, and the links between Quetta and the middle-tier 
leadership, were partially disrupted by the targeted killing campaign (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 
870). US forces pushed Taliban out of the Helmand River valley region and Kandahar city, and 
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thereby deprived them of access to large recruitment areas. One local Taliban commander from 
Garmser reports: 
Before, Garmser was a bridge for traffickers and we got lots of money from the traffickers 
as zakat [tax]. At that time we didn’t need our leaders to support us; we could find the 
money for everything, weapons, ammunition, food and other necessary stuff. But now it’s 
completely different; we have few villages under our control and collecting zakat from 
those villages is not enough. Most of our supplies are coming from Pakistan … Only we 
can get our food here. (quoted in Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 869) 
Between 2006 and 2010, the situation in Southern Afghanistan, and particularly in Helmand, 
changed from one in which the Taliban could govern large areas to one in which they were 
reduced to a regular guerilla force. However, the success of these hugely expensive efforts was 
limited. First, the offensive focused on southern Afghanistan. Thus, it hit mostly the Qutta Shura, 
but to a lesser extent the Haqqani network in the East where the pro-government forces were 
strengthened but were insufficient to control much of the population (Dressler 2010: 37-38). 
Second, the Taliban could simply evade the pressure, switch to guerilla tactics and wait for the 
announced withdrawal of ISAF. 
Despite the immense military pressure that both the expansion of ANSF to over 300,000 
soldiers and police officers, and despite the surge of ISAF, the Taliban kept up their campaign in 
the years up to 2014. Fighting reached a new peak; while the number of ISAF troops killed in 
action was in decline due to the ongoing withdrawal, the number of ANSF casualties steadily 
increased. Of the over 13,000 soldiers and policemen killed in the conflict, over 8,000 were killed 
between March 2011 and March 2014 (NYTimes 2014b). While there are no reliable figures 
about the number of casualties for non-state armed actors, the UN estimates that 12,000 Taliban 
were killed in 2013 alone (Guardian 2013). In addition, civilian casualties peaked at 3,000 in 
2013, and over 14,000 civilians have been killed between 2001 and 2014 (UNAMA 2014).  
There are no official estimates about the strength of the Taliban insurgency, but media reports 
indicate that NATO assumes that the number of Taliban is high and rising. Whereas the reported 
estimates were up to 20,000 in 2007 (WashingtonPost 2008), the strength seems to have grown to 
35,000 in 2012 (Telegraph 2012). While being vastly outnumbered by ANSF, an armed group (or 
collaboration of groups) of such size would be a serious threat to any government’s rule. 
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However, without the safe havens in Pakistan, the logistics of the Taliban insurgency were 
impossible to protect against ISAF and the government. Paying, feeding, arming, and providing 
health care for 35,000 fighters demands an infrastructure that could hardly exist in a country in 
which NATO has deployed up to 150,000 troops. This indicates two things: First, despite massive 
statebuilding efforts, Afghanistan faces an escalating civil war in which the means of large-scale 
violence are owned by at least two major factions (government and Quetta Shura). Second, the 
scale of the Taliban insurgency would be unthinkable without substantial state support. 
 The effect of the Taliban’s capability to resist monopolization and the ever rising cost of 
the statebuilding project was that the US sought to end the mission independently of whether it 
would succeed or fail. Presenting the new Afghanistan strategy in 2009, US President Barack 
Obama announced not only the ‘troop surge’, but added that “[a]fter 18 months, our troops will 
begin to come home”(WhiteHouse 2009). By spring 2012, NATO had developed an exit strategy, 
announcing that “[..] ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014” (NATO 2012). 
Subsequently, despite the ongoing civil war responsibility for security was officially transferred 
from ISAF to the Afghan government in June 2013 (NATO 2013b). 
Overall, the Taliban have suffered heavy losses. Nevertheless, their access to 
transnational spaces secured them the organizational capacity to continue their fight against the 
central government. With headquarters in Pakistan, the armed groups were capable of 
coordinating and resupplying their resistance against monopolization.  
 
Outcome: No Monopoly on Large-Scale Violence 
The statebuilding intervention in Afghanistan has failed to establish a state monopoly on large-
scale violence. Although NATO will leave a supporting military force in the country to assist the 
government, the major statebuilding effort has ended with the official exit of ISAF. The 
withdrawal of ISAF occurred against the backdrop of ongoing large-scale violence in 
Afghanistan’s east and south. Due to sustained access to transnational spaces, the Taliban were 
able to outlast some of the biggest military offensives in Afghan history and managed to 
continuously challenge the strongest Afghan army the state has ever had at its disposal.  
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 ISAF has achieved several goals that were necessary for a monopoly on large-scale 
violence. The warlords of the Northern alliance were largely disarmed and their forces were 
integrated into the official Afghan National Army. The ANA is widely seen as one of the most 
competent state institutions, and it can be argued that no Afghan government before had an 
armed force of this size and quality. It is still possible that Afghanistan will monopolize the 
means of large-scale violence on its own. However, as the events in Iraq after the US withdrawal 
in the early 2010s show, it is also possible that the Afghan state disintegrates further. 
 
4.3. Statebuilding Intervention and Small-Scale Violence Regulation 
 
As the previous chapter shows, ISAF and the Afghan government have failed to establish a 
monopoly on large-scale violence. Nevertheless, the statebuilders went at great lengths to 
consolidate those zones in which the government had broadly established control. In order to 
build a strong liberal state, the statebuilding intervention aimed at the monopolization of small -
scale violence in the hands of the state. As in the case of large-scale violence, ISAF failed to 
replace non-state actors with state institutions of small-scale violence regulation. 
In terms of institution-building, the international community and the Afghan elites had 
brokered a constitution that establishes an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. While invoking its 
Islamic foundations, the constitution is “[..] based on rule of law [..]” (IRoA 2004: preamble) and 
defines many liberal goals such as “[..] preservation of human dignity, protection of human 
rights, realization of democracy [..]” (IRoA 2004: §6). With regard to small-scale violence 
regulation, the constitution states: “Discovery of crimes shall be the duty of police, and 
investigation and filing the case against the accused in the court shall be the responsibility of the 
Attorney’s Office, in accordance with the provisions of the law” (IRoA 2004: §134). ISAF itself 
resorted to a standard Security Sector Reform approach  that was meant to support the Afghan 
government in creating an accountable and effective police force as well as a judiciary that 
operated according to the principles of the rule of law (Afghanistan Compact 2006: 2 ; UN 
2001a). Small-scale violence regulation in the new Afghan state was thus meant to be 
monopolized by the state.  
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In theory, Afghanistan was supposed to have one system of rules (based on the constitution) 
that is enforced by the Afghan National Police. Districts and provinces would each have a 
governor, a Chief of Police (CoP) and a head of intelligence (NDS) (Murtazashvili 2014: 3-4 ; 
Saltmarshe and Mehdi 2011: 17-18). However, directly after the fall of the Taliban there was no 
proper police force and most communities continued to police themselves. In terms of police-
building, ISAF at first aimed mainly at providing specialized expertise for the re-building of 
Afghanistan’s police force. The lead nation, Germany, helped setting up the Police Academy in 
Kabul again and provided training for the future leadership of the new police. From 2005, the 
resources made available for police-building were drastically increased, and a stronger emphasis 
was put on increasing the number of low rank police officers. It is difficult to come up with 
precise figures of police advisors as police training after 2005 was conducting not only by 
civilian police officers (as was the case in the German police training program), but also by the 
private contractor DynCorp as well as by the US military (Friesendorf 2011: 84-88). Overall, 
policebuilding in Afghanistan went from an approach where the focus was on training a 
professional leadership to a stronger emphasis on quantity and paramilitarization. 
 
Weak State Legacy Mechanism 
This section argues that the cause of ISAF’s failure to monopolize small-scale violence regulation 
was Afghanistan’s history of weak statehood. It applies the weak state legacy mechanism to the 
case of Afghanistan, showing how the lack of a strong state prior to intervention has led to an 
outcome in which the state competes with non-state institutions for control over regulating small-
scale violence. The analysis shows that despite creating liberal formal institutions and endowing 
the state with a strong police force of over 160,000 police officers, small-scale violence is still 
controlled by self-help communities. Before providing a detailed analysis, it is necessary to 
provide an overview over the causal mechanism. 
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Figure 12: Weak state legacies mechanism. 
 
The cause of ISAF’s failure to monopolize small-scale violence regulation in the hands of the 
state is the legacy of Afghanistan’s history of weak statehood. Prior to the intervention, there has 
never been a strong central state. The strongest central governments that ruled over Afghanistan 
did so in an indirect manner, and a bureaucratized rule over local community had never been 
established when Afghanistan slipped into its three decades of civil war and outside intervention.  
 
(1) Self-Help Community Resilience: When the series of crises that shattered 
Afghanistan began in the late 1970s, self-help communities were the dominant 
regulators of small-scale violence. Self-help communities showed resilience in the 
face of the collapse of the state as well as during Taliban rule. They were thus the 
mode of small-scale violence regulation when NATO intervention began in 
2001/2002: Customary and religious law regulated life for the vast majority of the 
population at the local level, and these institutions were controlled by elites such as 
maliks, tribal leaders or mujahedin commanders. The state police had all but 
dissolved. 
 
(2) Government Dependence on Local Elites: In the first months and years of the 
statebuilding intervention, there was no more state police that could have been used to 
rule Afghanistan. In contrast, self-help communities were strong, either in the form of 
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tribes in the South or of the commander polities in the North. Thus, the Karzai 
administration needed to incorporate local elites in order to create a minimum amount 
of stability and taxation capacities.   
 
(3) Capacity-Building without Monopolization: After a slow start, ISAF’s efforts to 
provide the Afghan government with assistance for police-building and the expansion 
of state judiciary lead to a great increase in state capacities. However, local elites 
exercise strong influence over the government through informal networks, capture 
local police or public offices, and are thereby able to resist monopolization. 
 
The outcome is a form of para statehood in which small-scale violence regulation remains in the 
hands of local non-state institutions although the state has amassed a large law enforcement 
apparatus. The following section will present a step-wise analysis of the causal mechanism, 
beginning with the initial cause: Afghanistan’s history of weak statehood. 
 
Cause: History of Weak Statehood 
Although Afghanistan has been a state for about two centuries, it has never succeeded to 
monopolize the regulation of small-scale violence. The following section shows how successive 
governments launched attempts to weaken local elites and build policing capacities, but had 
eventually to acquiesce into the existing of self-help communities. With the advent of the civil 
wars era in the late 1970s, state policing eventually collapsed. 
At the level of small-scale violence, the rulers of the emerging Afghan state were eager to 
adopt Western policing methods in order to control the population. As in Europe, specialized 
policing developed in Afghan cities during the 19th century (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 13). 
First steps were already taken from the 1880s onwards, but only in the 1930s did the government 
institutionalize a modern police force. A Ministry of Interior was established in the 1920s and 
was granted control over police forces in the 1930s. In 1935, the government established the first 
police training center in Kabul, where police officers were trained according to manuals imported 
from Turkey (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 14). It was the first time that university graduates 
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were recruited in order to increase professionalism. Early on, the Afghan government secured 
external help in order to professionalize its police forces. Thus, it established cooperation with 
Germany which continued after World War II. Turkey was another partner in building the 
Afghan police. During the 1950s and 1960s, the police acquired increasingly modern methods of 
criminal investigation. Overall, the government attempted to bureaucratize policing, make the 
organization more meritocratic and enforce internal discipline (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 
21-24). 
However, until the end of the monarchy, the police was led by military generals and, thus, 
did not develop into a fully autonomous policing organization. It was neither present in the whole 
territory, nor were rules applied consistently to all citizens. Policing spread uneven from the 
centers of power outwards, form Kabul to the main cities such as Kandahar and Herat, and only 
in the 1970s was policing institutionalized at the district levels across the country. Furthermore, 
Pashtun tribal areas were allowed to police themselves. This differential treatment indicates that 
early on, the privilege of policing was granted to those local elites who were important for the 
stability of the central government.  
 Even in the Republic under Daud (1973-1978), state policing did not enable the state to 
constantly monitor the whole population or to tax it efficiently, but it was effective in stabilizing 
the country.  
The MoI was able to enforce compliance when needed and with minimal effort. Former 
police officers and elders agreed that the appearance of a lone policeman armed with a 
stick was enough to prompt villagers into cooperation and suspects would be handed over 
without resistance. Even khans could be arrested peacefully, including sometimes in 
places like Kandahar where even in the 1970s they had retinues of armed men around 
them. The khans never challenged the police and relied instead on negotiations and 
political patronage to get out of prison. 
However, this was not so much the result of respect or fear of the police per se, but of the 
knowledge that resistance would lead to the intervention of the army. (Giustozzi and 
Isaqzadeh 2013: 18) 
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Only in 1973, there was for the first time a national Police Law. The number of total police forces 
varied between 15,000 and 30,000, meaning that at the district level they operated in teams of 3 
to 15 officers (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 18-19). Thus, “[..] most villages only saw traces of 
the police once every several months, if not even less often” (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 20).  
While the police force was thinly spread, it acted as the eyes of the central government. However, 
the police’ law enforcement capacity was very limited because the state was not strong enough to 
abolish self-help communities. As a consequence, the Afghan state had developed a form of 
governance in which the tribes mostly ruled themselves, while the district government sustained a 
balance of power between the tribes. The power of the tribal leaders was based mostly on 
tradition as well as on control over land. Policing was done by the communities themselves, 
either through village elders or tribal leaders, and a combination of tribal customs, Sharia and 
state law was applied (Malkasian 2013: 8-13). As Malkasian shows for one district in the Afghan 
south, “[t]he government depended on the tribes. Tribal leaders retained armed guards who 
helped the police detain criminals” (Malkasian 2013: 9). 
To sum up, the state in Afghanistan has never been strong enough to monopolize the 
regulation of small-scale violence. Thus, when the period of civil war and Taliban conquest 
began in 1991, the self-help communities were the most important small-scale violence 
institutions for most Afghans. 
 
Step One: Self-Help Community Resilience 
In the absence of a strong state, self-help communities have remained the main regulators of 
small-scale violence. Since these institutions have developed over decades and people have been 
socialized into non-state systems of small-scale violence regulation, self-help communities have 
displayed great resilience during the civil wars and were thus the dominant form of small -scale 
violence regulation in the early 2000s. Accordingly, local elites who ruled self-help communities 
were in a powerful position when the statebuilding intervention began. The following paragraphs 
will provide illustrations of the how self-help communities 
Due to the absence of a state during the last centuries, villages (where today about 80% of 
the population lives) had to rely on their self-organizing abilities (Murtazashvili 2014: 4). Self-
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help communities form several layer of governance, and they work differently in various areas of 
Afghanistan. The smallest social unit is often referred to as qawm and can be a family, a village 
or some tribal community (Rubin 1995: 25). Across Afghanistan, local jirgas or shuras have 
become a non-state institution of small-scale violence regulation. Everyday life is to a large 
extent governed by informal or customary rules (Wardak and Braithwaite 2013: 199-201). Thus, 
the informal justice system is the dominant mechanism to deal with private conflicts in 
Afghanistan (Coburn 2013: 12-13). Koehler (2012: 12-13) argues that the degree of governance 
provided by institutions in Afghanistan diminishes the greater the scope of institutions. The local 
elites who rule the self-help communities are called maliks, mullahs  or commanders, and they 
are not always ‘traditional’ leaders. Due to the long civil war in Afghanistan, local rule has been 
partly militarized and tribal networks have been disrupted. Thus, power and legitimacy have been 
transformed through the dynamics of civil war. Many tribal or village elders whose legitimacy 
was based on tradition were increasingly displaced by ‘commanders’. These new local leaders 
derived their legitimacy mainly through their ability to command small groups of armed men and, 
thus, offer a higher degree of security and order (Wilde and Mielke 2013: 360-361).  
As this discussion shows, the local elites in Afghanistan were not leaders of criminal 
gangs, or ad hoc militias or neighborhood watches (as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Their power bases were local institutions of small-scale violence regulation that developed over 
decades (e.g. commander polity) or centuries (e.g. village, tribe). Due to their strong local roots, 
these actors and their institutions were able to outlast the most ambitious monopolization effort 
that had occurred prior to NATO’s intervention: The Soviet’s attempts to build a modern state in 
Afghanistan. In 1979, the PDPA government had quickly politicized the police by abandoning 
meritocracy and bringing politically loyal individuals into the leadership. In the face of armed 
revolt, the police force suffered a wave of defections (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 25). Of the 
aforementioned police force only 5,000 to 6,000 officers had remained in service at the time 
when the USSR intervened. Under Soviet supervision, the police forces were rebuilt and re-
professionalized. Its overall size was massively expanded to 96,700 in 1988, and it grew further 
to over 100,000 in 1991 when the Najibullah regime collapsed (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 
32). The Soviet statebuilding project in Afghanistan began with great ambition, but after years of 
heavy military casualties and hundreds of thousands of dead civilian, the USSR changed its 
course in 1986. It abandoned efforts to monopolize the use of force and to bureaucratize state 
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rule. In 1987, this shift was underlined by a new constitution that went back to traditional 
institutions such as Islam and the Loya Jirga, and by a change in personnel. Najibullah became 
the new President, who would subsequently start negotiating ceasefires with various mujahedin 
commanders (Hess 2010: 177-178). As the example of the Najibullah regime shows, 
patrimonialism could guarantee a degree of stability as long as the central government had 
enough funds to pay its clients (Hess 2010: 177-181). By February 1989, the Soviets had with 
withdrawn. The state they left behind was highly neopatrimonial, relying on the payment of local 
commanders and other elites to manage of the risk of a coup.  
At the end of the socialist experiment, the government had at its disposal the biggest 
police force the country had ever seen. When the funding from Russia dried up, it became 
apparent that this large repressive apparatus was not sustainable. The Afghan police completely 
dissolved with the end of the Najibullah regime (Hess 2010). The Police Academy in Kabul 
closed during the mujahedins’ battles for the city, and police forces either dissolved or came 
under control of regional warlords. “[..] when the Afghan state collapsed following the Soviet 
invasion, social order continued to exist in Afghan rural villages, where the overwhelming 
majority of Afghans live” (Wardak and Braithwaite 2013: 198). Once the Taliban had taken 
control over most of Afghanistan, the police was further de-professionalized. Policing was mostly 
conducted by Taliban fighters, and professional policemen were accused of being communists 
and quit the service. Especially in the South, the Taliban disempowered the village elders and 
tried to concentrate power in the hands of local religious elites (Malkasian 2013: 72-75) 
Nevertheless, the Taliban system was effective in creating a degree of stability through the 
combination of local policing and threats from the central government to use force in case of non-
compliance (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 34-35). Summing up the monopolization efforts of 
both the Soviets and the Taliban, their approaches differed in many respects but the outcome was 
the same: A return of the elites and institutions that had been in place beforehand. 
 
These patterns can be found across Afghan provinces, although the type of self-help community 
varies according to the region. In Kandahar and Helmand, social structures are more homogenous 
than in the north or west, and many traditional institutions are still in place. Major power 
networks are centered on the two Pashtun ‘meta-tribes’, the Durrani and Popolzai. In Helmand’s 
118 
 
Garmser district, the ruling (Durrani) tribes traditionally were the Alizai and Noorzai who settled 
there under Durrani’s rule in the 18th century (Malkasian 2013: 2-3).  In their short reign over 
Afghanistan, the Taliban tried to sideline self-help communities by empowering religious leaders. 
However, once that system had collapsed in late 2001, the same elders and tribal leader who were 
in power reasserted their control (Malkasian 2013: 72-75). In many Pasthun villages of the 
Southeast, local shuras controlled policing of the village, which was conducted by tribal police 
(arbakai). These Arbakai were not permanent organizations like state police or militias, but are 
convened on an ad hoc basis to deal with conflicts (Schmeidl and Karokhail 2009: 320-322). 
In northern Afghanistan, traditional structures had been partly replaced by new self-help 
communities that were led by so-called mujahedin commanders. Thus, the equivalent to the meta-
tribes of the South is the mujahedin parties. The example of Kunduz province is instructive as its 
social structure had been in flux since resettlement policies started in the late 19 th century 
(Schetter et al. 2006: 7-9). Compared to their peers in the Pashtun regions, the Northern 
powerbrokers of the post-Taliban era were important players ‘only’ for several decades before 
NATO’s intervention. As Schetter et al. (2006: 9) observe: 
“[..] a high variety of warlords and ’big men’, who differ widely in the scope of influence 
and power, are controlling the means of physical violence in Kunduz province. Moreover 
a complete lack of religious, ethnic-tribal or even modern institutions can be observed 
which are capable to constrain the arbitrary of the rulers. This results in a strong 
localisation of the ‘rules of the game’ and varying architectures of the power structure 
from district to district, and as in Khanabad district from village to village. Additionally, 
the rentier economy of large landlords strengthens the position of the warlords, makes 
them independent from the population and further weakens the existing collective 
institutions.” 
At the time when NATO intervened in Afghanistan, the most powerful local commander in 
Kunduz was Mir Alam, who was a member of Shura-i Nazar. He rose to power in Kunduz during 
the 1990s, when different Jamiat factions battled each other. During the Taliban reign, local 
offices were given to those commanders who defected, while Mir Alam fought for Shura-i Nazar, 
and alongside Junbesh, against the Taliban (Münch 2013: 10-11). Thus, “[a]fter 2001, Mir Alam 
successfully recovered his fiefdom [..] and became the strongest single military commander of 
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Kunduz” (Münch 2013: 11). Similarly, the Ibrahimi family, which belonged to the Hezb 
mujahedin faction and switched sides repeatedly during the Taliban era, were powerful enough to 
emerge as a major force in the post-2001 period. Their authority rested less on coercive capacities 
and more on their control over access to markets and water in their district (Münch 2013: 11-12). 
A third major actor was Daud Daud, who became an important powerbroker under Massoud and, 
thus, was very well connected within Shura-i Nazar. Thus, the individuals and networks that 
controlled the North after the fall of the Taliban were the same that already fought against the 
PDPA government and the Soviets. Consequently, policing in the countryside was conducted by 
local commanders and their organizations, while the larger warlord polities held greater sway in 
the cities (Schetter et al. 2006: 8-9).  
Overall, despite efforts by the Soviet Union and the Taliban to sideline these institutions, 
small-scale violence in Afghanistan was regulated by different kinds of self-help communities 
throughout the decades of civil war. When Karzai became interim President, he used the few 
resources he had to build a patrimonial central government which relied on power-sharing with 
major factions. The result was a complex power structure that existed when the statebuilding 
intervention commenced.  
 
Step Two: Government Dependence on Local Elites 
At the beginning of the statebuilding intervention, a new government and new institutions were 
created. This section shows that those who became central state elites were highly dependent on 
local elites. Hence, before the statebuilding effort could engage in monopolization, the actors 
who controlled small-scale violence regulation had already seized the power in the new state.  
As the last section has argued, the mujahedin parties of the north as well as the meta-tribes 
of the south are essentially macro-level alliances of local self-help communities. When the 
Taliban were defeated in 2002, the control over small-scale violence regulation shifted back to 
those who had always been local elites. The powerbase of the Northern Alliance warlords were 
the many local commanders at the local level: “Until 2005 AMF fighters received a salary, and 
even though they were part of a national army, they remained de facto under the control of their  
Jihadi or civil war period commander” (Koehler and Gosztonyi 2014: 236). In the early phase of 
120 
 
statebuilding in Afghanistan, the government had to rely on these local elites and effectively 
integrated them into the state. While DDR should have been targeted not only at warlords but 
also at district level strongmen,  “[..] the demobilization of armed mujahedin units. [..] ‘pushed’ 
compliant commanders into political and parliamentary positions that permitted them to legally 
retain armed followers as bodyguards” (Koehler and Gosztonyi 2014: 233). 
In the immediate aftermath of the Taliban regime, the new government was characterized 
by a power-sharing arrangement between former military elites and technocrats. Warlord polities 
such as Jami’at (Ismail Khan), Junbesh (Rashid Dostum) and Shura-I Nezar (Mohammad Fahim) 
tried to seize the government, as did those technocrats around Karzai who had the support of 
foreign donors (Giustozzi 2009). Western support tipped the balance of power in favor of Karzai, 
but in order to stabilize the country he integrated the warlords by giving them different ministries 
and granting them great autonomy in their respective regions (Mac Ginty 2010b: 588-589). 
Among them, Minister of Defense Fahim was the central link between the Northern networks 
(especially the Panjshiris) and the new government in Kabul. In a form of division of labor, 
Karzai took care of building up a patronage network into Southern Afghanistan through his good 
connection with the Durrani tribe(s) and the elites of Kandahar , Afghanistan’s second city. 
Overall, the government could do little to build effective formal institutions and thus created a 
centralized patronage-based state that disarmed the major militias to a certain degree (Giustozzi 
2009: 89-94). 
These groups are still structuring much of the local politics in parts of the country. While 
their means of large-scale violence were appropriated by the state through the dissolution of the 
AMF, they still have powerful networks at the local and provincial levels, as well as into the 
central government (Münch 2013). In the South, the large tribal networks have a similar function 
as the former United Front parties in the North. While they are not cohesive organizations, the 
(meta-)tribal structures nonetheless facilitated networking between elites on different levels. 
During the last two century, members of the Pashtun Durrani tribe (Ahmad Shah Durrani, Mullah 
Omar, Hamid Karzai), and the Durrani-affiliated Barakzai tribe (Abdur Rahman, Mohammad 
Zahir Shah), have dominated Afghan politics.  
Local elites were the crucial links that connected local institutions of small-scale violence 
regulation to the central government in Kabul after the ousting of the Taliban regime. Especially 
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the former mujahedin factions and the warlord polities of the North have created lasting legacies. 
These institutions emerged during the 1970s and 1980s as resistance movements against the 
socialist governments. Organized like political parties, they were often led by charismatic leaders 
such as Ahmed Shah Massoud or Ismail Khan. These proto-states, commanding tens of thousands 
of troops, and controlling whole regions of Afghanistan, were heavily weakened during the 
Taliban regime of the 1990s, so that the only significant organization that was left in 2001 was 
Massoud’s Shura-i Nazar (about 16,000 troops) (Giustozzi 2009).  
The direct links between the national level and the local self-help communities can be 
exemplified again by looking at specific districts and provinces. Here, formal institutions were 
created immediately while it would take several years until ISAF trained and equipped the ANP 
so that it could be deployed in sufficient numbers to the provinces. In Kunduz province, the 
office of police chief was given to a Pashtun affiliated with the Ittehad faction in 2002 (Münch 
2013: 14-15). In 2004, in the run up to Presidential elections, and with increased government 
power through the ISAF PRT Kunduz, the office was given to member of Junbesh (Münch 2013: 
21). Similarly, the introduction of formal state policing in Helmand province was captured by 
local politics. Between 2001 and 2005, the office of provincial chief of police of Helmand was 
held by Abdur Rahman Jan, a warlord from Marjah. Under his rule, the ANP was mainly a tool to 
extort money from the population. District CoPs were instated by Abdur Rahman Jan and would 
in return give some of the ‘taxes’ he collected to his provincial CoP. In return, the ANP would do 
little to provide safety to the population and, thus, they were seen as tool of mere repression. 
Worse, the warlords who took over the provincial governor and the chief of NDS posts were 
fighting each other (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013: 847-848). The next session will discuss in detail 
how the capacity-building efforts of ISAF affected self-help communities. 
To sum up, the intervention defeated the Taliban and led to the creation of formal 
institutions. However, the central government lacked a police force while local elites could base 
their power on the self-help communities which had outlived the decades of civil war. As a result, 
the new state had to rely on the local elites for the maintenance of order.  
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Step Three: Capacity-Building without Monopolization 
This section shows how ISAF helped the Afghan government to build a large police force. 
However, due to the power of local elites, the statebuilders were unable to replace self-help 
communities. Thus, the state capacity-building was not accompanied by a monopolization of 
small-scale violence regulation. 
The creation and expansion of the Afghan National Police was one of the central pillars of 
ISAF’s statebuilding efforts. From the very beginning of the new Afghan polity, the international 
community supported the establishment of a modern police organization that would be 
accountable and bound by the rule of law. In 2002, police training started in Afghanistan as a 
small-scale effort by Germany to train a new police leadership in Kabul. A small team of German 
police officers trained Afghan police officers in order to establish an ANP leadership that can live 
up to Western standards of professional and accountable policing. The German approach put 
strong emphasis on historic continuity, as it was centered around the re-launch of the Kabul 
police academy and the continuation of the decade-old (though repeatedly interrupted) Afghan-
German police cooperation. This very modest program was increasingly accompanied by US 
training of rank-and-file police officers in regional training centers (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 
2013: 48-49). Two problems arose from this approach. First, the number of police officers 
increased very slowly, which deprived the state of personnel to be active in all areas of 
Afghanistan. Second, the police quickly became a major target for the Taliban insurgency. Since 
police forces are the local face of government, and because they are only lightly armed, they 
represent a very valuable target for insurgents. 
With the increasing expansion of the intervention, the approach shifted from low numbers 
and leadership training towards greater numbers and paramilitarization. The US slowly took over 
from Germany (and the European EUPOL), and “[..] transferred responsibility for the Afghan 
police assistance program from the Department of State to the [Department of Defense]” (Planty 
and Perito 2013: 2). Thousands of US soldiers and PMCs were mobilized to train police officers, 
and the ANP pay system was improved in order to combat corruption (Murray 2007: 113).  “By 
early 2010, the ANP was present in all 34 provinces, six of which were deemed medium-threat 
and ten high-threat areas” (Friesendorf 2011: 88). Thus, fielding the police force into all 
provinces took about eight years, and this does not mean that the police had been deployed into 
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every district, let alone every village. Overall, the number of police forces has increased from 
about 60,000 in 2005 to over 150,000 in 2013 (NATO 2013a). 
In response to the problems of corruption, state-capture and high attrition rates on the 
level of local policing, ISAF re-arranged its police-building mission in 2007 by introducing the 
Focused District Development (FDD) program. The idea behind the program was that training 
single police officers and reinserting them into their deficient units would do little to change the 
organizational culture. Hence, in the FDD program ANP units were taken out of their district as a 
whole in order to form local police units that were less corrupt und less prone to desertion 
(Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 50-51). However, FDD also had a very strong focus on 
paramilitary training. 
Seven out of the eight weeks of the FDD curriculum were devoted to military tactics, with 
basic police skills given a one-week slot. Regular ANP officers therefore learned little about 
policing ethics, criminal procedures, the Afghan constitution or human rights, especially after 
November 2008, when training on community and democratic policing, as well as domestic 
violence and women’s rights, was removed from the FDD curriculum and replaced by 
military training. (Friesendorf 2011: 86) 
 The expansion of state policing was accompanied by efforts to create an effective 
Ministry of Interior. However, as leadership positions in the MoI are important for the balance of 
power between the different factions in the country, reform of the MoI has been difficult. Unlike 
in the MoD, there was very little continuity in MoI in terms of leadership. Between 2001 and 
2014, eight different ministers were in charge of the department. Ambitious ministers like Al i 
Ahmad Jalali or Hanif Atmar, whose reforms threatened the patrimonial network of the Karzai 
government, were blocked by the president (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 135-136; 141-142).  
 Given the power of non-state actors in the provinces, the Minister of Interior had to 
constantly balance reform efforts that aimed at bureaucratizing the police and centralizing 
internal security with the need to accommodate local elites. One of the actors most aware for the 
need to satisfy all factions is President Karzai, who sacked MoIs whose anti-corruption efforts 
could threaten the broader ruling elite alliance. The ANP leadership of many provinces and 
districts is staffed by local strongmen who have worked for regional warlords in the past. A 
survey by Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013: 119-120) shows that out of 
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the police chiefs of the ten most populous provinces in April 2011, seven were former mujahedin 
commanders. Five of these provincial police chiefs were affiliated with Jamiat, the former 
mujahedin group that fought both against the Soviets and the Taliban. At the same time, the 
central government is very active in assigning and rotating police chiefs both at the provincial 
and district level. In order to balance the different factions on the local level and secure support in 
elections, Karzai frequently reshuffles offices among the local elites (Giustozzi and Orsini 2009: 
10-13).   
However, eventually the statebuilders came to the conclusion that they needed the local 
elites to create a modicum of social order. In order to strengthen them and bind them to the state, 
a large militia program was initiated. The inability to deploy a sufficient number of police 
officers to remote rural areas and, crucially, to control them, has led the Karzai government to 
reconsider its stance towards militias. In order to relieve the ANP and to reduce the sway of the 
Taliban, the government has created the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP program funds 
local-level militias that declare themselves willing to work with the government. It was set up in 
August 2010 and is controlled by the MoI. Within only three years, the number of ALP fighters 
has surpassed the 20,000 threshold, and the goal is to arm forty-five thousand militiamen by 2015 
(Goodhand and Hakimi 2014: 14-15). While initially a skeptic, President Karzai and his MoD 
increasingly saw the ALP as a cheap tool to extent both state power and personal patronage 
networks into rural and contested areas (Goodhand and Hakimi 2014: 16). The creation of the 
ALP was a compromise that was struck in the hope that a greater official role for self-help 
communities would increase their loyalty to the state. While ALPs are formally commanded by 
the district’s Chief of Police, they enjoy in fact a great degree of autonomy (Koehler and 
Gosztonyi 2014: 240-241). Compared to regular ANP, the ALP personnel receives only a very 
limited training. Their main task is not to enforce national law, but to defend local communities 
against Taliban infiltration. Hence, the ALP is the cheapest form of increasing manpower against 
an insurgency. However, the government has little control over these units, and there are 
widespread reports about abuse of their power by taxing and harassing the population (Goodhand 
and Hakimi 2014: 40). The whole strategy underlines that the central government is well aware 
of the power of local actors, and tries to tap into their authority by creating patron-client 
relationships on a grand scale. 
125 
 
Politically, the growing power of the local elites has been accompanied by a return of the 
Loya Jirga. National level jirgas had not been summoned after the Emergency Loya Jirga 2002 
and the Consitutional Jirga 2003. However, since 2009 Karzai has gathered two Loya Jirgas. The 
purpose of the first one in 2010 was to discuss the potential for reconciliation with the Taliban. 
Crucially, he invited Taliban leaders themselves to join the Jirga. The second Jirga was consulted 
to make a decision on the Bilateral Security Agreement which was supposed to regulate the status 
of foreign forces after ISAF. By gathering tribal leaders and other informal elites in Loya Jirgas, 
Karzai weakens the formal institutions of the state and strengthens non-state actors. It is thus a 
turn away from externally supported parliaments to traditional sources of power. As Schetter 
(2003: 214-216) argues, these gathering should not be mistaken for true democratic participation 
of local elites. Since the formation of the Afghan state, national leaders have used Jirgas to 
legitimize their decisions. Overall, Karzai has used the traditional assemblies to distance himself 
from external actors and to accommodate both rural elites and the Taliban. 
 
A look at the provincial and local level helps to understand the dynamics at play. Both in the 
North and in the South, local elites retained a strong powerbase. When state institutions expanded 
to the local level, non-state actors did not give up their power over small-scale violence 
regulation but would either compete with the state or capture public offices. In Helmand, the 
tyrannical rule of the warlord and provincial Chief of Police Abdur Rahman Jan was ended when 
ISAF deployed to the region and public offices were reshuffled in 2005. Later that year, governor 
Sher Mohammad Akhundzada was dismissed due to NATO pressure on the central government. 
However, replacing the provincial chief of police and the provincial governor meant that “[..] the 
de facto powerbrokers in the province were replaced in their de jure provincial positions” (Martin 
2011: 52-53). Abdur Rahman Jan kept his militia and took advantage of the growing drug market. 
Attempts by ISAF to eradicate poppy in 2008 were thus met with stiff resistance. “Through his 
patronage network, [Abdur Rahman Jan] still controlled most of the police in central Helmand. 
He retaliated by allowing the Taliban to enter and take control of Marjah” (Farrell and Giustozzi 
2013: 852). After being released from the office of provincial governor, Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada responded in similar fashion. In a newspaper interview he later claimed that: “ When 
I was no longer governor the government stopped paying for the people who supported me. [..] I 
sent 3,000 of them off to the Taliban because I could not afford to support them but the Taliban 
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was making payments” (Telegraph 2009). Hence, attempts to take out local elites and replaced 
them with a small-scale violence regulation regime that is centered on formal policing and 
professionalism in public offices had strong implications for local politics. Due to the availability 
of the Taliban as an alternative patron, local elites could retaliate against the monopolization 
attempts of the statebuilders. 
In the North, the German-led police-building had greatly expanded in line with the 
broader ISAF approach: “in 2009 the three German Police Training Centres of the north-east 
(located in Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz and Fayzabad) trained a total of 4,000 police” (Koehler and 
Gosztonyi 2014: 239). In Kunduz, after an internationally-led Rank Reform Commission 
suggested that the current police chief was too corrupt, Karzai replaced him with more 
professional personnel in 2006. However, while the two police chiefs between 2006 and 2010 
enjoyed the legitimacy of (German) ISAF forces because they were seen as professional and less 
corrupted, they were also ineffective in reducing the Taliban infiltration of self-help communities 
across the province (Münch 2013: 31). When the control over public police offices in the North 
in general and in Kunduz in particular was given back to powerful local commanders from Shura-
i Nazar in late 2010, these new police chiefs used their connections with the Ministry of Defense 
to request more personnel. At the same time, they proved much more effective in organizing 
control of insurgency-threatened areas and were able to increase the state’s presence (Münch 
2013: 40-41). There were also powerbrokers in the province who had rarely access to public 
offices, but still commanded small groups of armed men and controlled substantial economic 
resources. The most influential of these was Mir Alam of Shura-i Nazar, who clashed with ANP 
several times. Ironically, he was later accommodated by receiving money from a joint program 
by US forces and the NDS, which channeled money and weapons towards ‘community defense’ 
forces in order to fight the Taliban (Münch 2013: 36-38). Mir Alams militia was thus 
strengthened vis-à-vis the official forces in a program that became one of the forerunners of a 
nation-wide militia-building effort. “In the case of the north-east, the setting up of these militias 
was supported by the governors of these provinces, the National Directorate of Security (NDS)  
and the police (ANP). They were mostly organized along former Jihadi party lines” (Koehler and 
Gosztonyi 2014: 238). In sum, the constant wrestling between the government and the Taliban 
has further increased the leverage of local elites who hedge their bets by supporting those actors 
of large-scale violence that appear to be stronger. 
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To sum up, the expansion of formal policing across the state territory has not replaced 
informal policing. The government lacked the leverage to take the privilege of policing from 
local powerbrokers. Instead, it had to tolerate the existence of non-state policing institutions, and 
it also used formal police offices as rewards for those local elites who cooperated with the central 
government. Thus, instead of monopolizing the means of small-scale violence, the interaction of 
local elites and the central government led to a fragmentation of policing. 
 
Outcome: Para State 
At the end of ISAF in 2014, there was no state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation in 
those areas that were not under Taliban control. While the ANP has grown to be the biggest 
police force Afghanistan has ever seen, self-help communities have persisted. At the same time, 
the local elites that control these institutions have strong influence on the central government. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of formal integration of local communities into the state apparatus, 
local elites have taken over formal police and governor offices. While this has increased the  
police effectiveness in some cases, it has also made the police a partisan tool in the hand of local 
powerbrokers. 
For Afghans, the simultaneous existence of state and non-state institutions of small-scale 
violence regulation has created a complex situation at the local level. A study by the Asia 
Foundation in 2013 asked respondents whom they report crimes to. People did report crimes to a 
variety of state institutions such as the ANP (26%), district governor (11%), ANA (10%), 
provincial authority (3%), public prosecutor (3%), or courts (2%). Overall, 55% of crimes were 
reported to these various state institutions. However one has to keep in mind that many 
officeholders are also informal powerbrokers. The same survey shows that many people still turn 
to the shura/elders (18%), tribal leader (12%), or Mullah Sahib (5%) (AsiaFoundation 2013: 35). 
Furthermore, in the broader category of dispute settlement, people rely on the local state courts 
(36%) as well as on the courts of self-help communities (36%), and many issue are brought 
before both court systems (24%) (AsiaFoundation 2013: 84).  
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Figure 13: Answers to the question “Who did you report the crime to?”. Figure reproduced from Afghan 
Survey 2013, The Asia Foundation (AsiaFoundation 2013: 35). 
 
Given the common criticism by scholars and international organizations who see the police as too 
corrupt and too paramilitarized, the population has a rather positive view of the ANP. A 
representative survey conducted by Boehnke, Koehler and Zuercher (Boehnke et al. forthcoming) 
in 2007-2013 shows how North-Eastern Afghan22s evaluate the ANP. Although the results of 
surveys from war zones have to be taken with a grain of salt, the data helps to get a sense of the 
relation between police and population. Overall, the study shows that the population embraces the 
ANP despite all its shortcomings as a policing organization (fig. 14). This indicates that it is not 
the weakness of the Afghan police but the strength of its competitors that has prevented the state 
from monopolizing small-scale violence regulation. Furthermore, the data shows a dip in 
favorable views in 2011 (fig. 15). Since 2010 was the peak year of ISAF’s counterinsurgency 
campaign in the north, the data might reflect public sentiments against the aggressive style with 
which the security forces hunted down Taliban in the North. At the same time, many people 
(54%) still believe that local commanders will provide security if ANSF retreat and fear of 
                                                             
22 The survey was conducted in the districts Aliabad, Imam Sahib (both Kunduz), Taloqan, Warsaj (both 
Takhar), Yaftal and Jurm (both Badakhzan). 
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militias has been declining since they were integrated into the ALP (Koehler and Gosztonyi 
2014: 244-247).  
 
 
Figure 14: Question on attitude towards the ANP in 2013, item from Northeast Afghanistan Longitudinal 
Study (Boehnke et al. forthcoming). 
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Figure 15: Question on attitude towards the ANP, item from Northeast Afghanistan Longitudinal Study 
(Boehnke et al. forthcoming). 
 
As the case study also shows, the introduction and strengthening of police forces tends to shift the 
balance of power at the local (district) level. Where several strongmen compete for control over 
the population, the central government can generate leverage from distributing police offices. At 
the same time, this form of patronage undermines professionalization and turns police districts 
into local fiefdoms. Furthermore, the links between local and national elites is often more fluid 
than the distinction between these levels suggests. Networks such as tribes or former mujahedin 
parties connect local policing powers directly to the national elites in the Ministry of Interior and 
to the President. Last but not least, this type of divide-and-conquer politics opens up spaces for 
armed groups who can become more reliable partners of local elites. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
ISAF has failed to create an Afghan state with a monopoly on violence. If we take the gap 
between the situation in 2001 and the postulated goals of ISAF, the intervention in Afghanistan 
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can be seen as the most ambitious statebuilding mission so far. However, great ambition can lead 
to great failure. Despite immense efforts to build a strong liberal state, Afghanistan was neither at 
the end of NATO’s ISAF mission. The attempt to monopolize violence regulation has failed 
despite the fact that the Afghan state today has the strongest organizational capacities in its 
history. Nevertheless, at the level of large-scale violence, the Taliban and its allies have 
demonstrated their capability to inflict casualties to the Afghan National Security Forces at a rate 
that must be described as open warfare. The result has been a fragmented state whose territory is 
partly under government and partly under armed group control. At the level of small -scale 
violence, self-help communities have shown great resilience towards monopolization as local 
elites have captures the state or have worked with the Taliban. Thus, where the government rules 
it does so through a form of para state. 
 The chapter has offered explanations for these outcomes. The failure to create a monopoly 
on large-scale violence stems from the competition of key regional states over influence in 
Afghanistan. India and Pakistan have both invested a lot in Afghanistan, but due to their decade-
old rivalry, their goals are highly divergent. As the process-tracing analysis has shown, there is a 
clear causal link between this regional competition and the resulting failure to build a monopoly 
on large-scale violence. Pakistan’s (indirect) support for the Taliban insurgency enables the rebel 
group to sustain their organization. The Taliban’s continued resistance has driven up the costs of 
monopolization to a point where NATO members decided to retreat in the absence of a state 
monopoly on large-scale violence.   
 There seems to be little that can be done about the regional constellation. There is no 
regional institution that could facilitate cooperation between key states in Central and South Asia, 
and NATO is not powerful enough to fundamentally alter Pakistan’s stance towards Afghanistan. 
The findings of this case study do not implicate that Afghanistan will not succeed in 
monopolizing the means of large-scale violence. After all, it is possible that the central 
government will defeat the Taliban at some point in the future with external assistance and 
against the will of Pakistan.  What the chapter has demonstrated is that it’s implausible to assume 
that Pakistan is just unable to secure its borders. After all, the main operations of the Quetta 
Shura Taliban are conducted not from the tribal areas but from Baluchistan. At the same time, 
Pakistan conducted warfare against some of its tribes (TTP) while sparing the Haqqani Network. 
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With regard to the creation a state monopoly on small-scale violence, the legacies of a 
long history of weak statehood have prevented the statebuilding intervention from succeeding. 
Afghanistan has been an independent state for about a century, but it has never had a strong 
central government. As the chapter argued, this resulted in strong self-help communities 
regulating the lives of most Afghans. With strong institutions come strong local elites who have a 
lot to lose from a state seeking to replace self-help communities with formal government 
structures. Thus, despite massive investments by the international actors to strengthen 
governments and police at all levels, the old elites have managed to capture the formal 
institutions with their personal networks. As a result, a combination of corrupt police forces and 
self-help communities regulate everyday life in Afghanistan. What distinguishes Afghanistan 
from the case of Sierra Leone is the ongoing civil war. Not only do local elites use their self-help 
communities as powerbases and sources of revenue. In areas that are contested between the 
government and the Taliban, strongmen can bargain for more resources by threatening to shift 
support to the other side in the civil war. Hence, the absence of a state monopoly on large-scale 
violence only increases the power of small-scale violence actors. 
Overall, the Afghanistan shows the clear limitations of what statebuilding interventions 
can achieve. The case lacked both conditions that would have been necessary to turn the 
intervention into a success. In the following chapter, I will analyze a case in which statebuilding 
has resulted in a para state: Sierra Leone.  
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5. Sierra Leone 
 
The statebuilding mission in Sierra Leone began in 2000 when the UN decided to transform its 
peacekeeping operation into a more ambitious peacebuilding effort. At this point, Sierra Leone 
had become a synonym for concepts such as ‘state failure’ and ‘new wars’ due to its civil war 
that had begun in 1991. The globally broadcasted pictures of machete-wielding, drugged child 
soldiers shaped a picture of Africa as a place where Hobbesian anarchy prevails and life is ‘nasty, 
brutish and short’ (Keen 2005: 3). Given the scope conditions, including an ongoing and 
devastating transnational civil war, a history of weak statehood, ethnic heterogeneity, and 
extreme poverty, prospects for successful statebuilding were bleak. Peace treaties were regularly 
violated, and a wide range of actors (army factions, militias, PMCs, regional forces) had become 
part of a complex conflict. Nonetheless, Sierra Leone turned  into a showcase of externally-led 
statebuilding. In 2000, when the UN sent troops to enforce peace in Sierra Leone, the state 
institutions had mostly ceased to exist. However, within few years, the RUF insurgency was 
defeated and the government regained control over the state’s territory. By the end of 2005, the 
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had completely withdrawn its troops and the state 
enjoyed a monopoly on large-scale violence. This monopoly was further stabilized by elections in 
2007 and 2013, one of which saw a peaceful transition of government from the Sierra Leonean 
People’s Party (SLPP) to the All People Congress (APC). The statebuilding intervention in Sierra 
Leone not only succeeded in creating a monopoly on large-scale violence, it even transformed the 
country into an electoral democracy. At the same time, small-scale violence in most parts of the 
country is still mainly governed by chieftaincies, with local governments and police only 
complementing self-help communities. In sum, the intervention has failed to create a full 
monopoly on violence. This case study explains why the statebuilding intervention in Sierra 
Leone succeeded in creating a monopoly on large-scale violence, while failing to establish a state 
monopoly small-scale violence regulation.  
The explanation for the success in monopolizing the means of large-scale violence can be 
found in the support for UNAMSIL by key regional actors. As this chapter will show, the 
intervention succeeded in creating a monopoly on large-scale violence because it had the support 
of ECOWAS, specifically of Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria. Their support for the statebuilding 
intervention made it possible to cut off the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) supply routes 
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which ran through Liberia, thereby forcing the armed group to seek a political settlement. As a 
result, the intervention led to the complete disarmament of the RUF within the following two 
years. Meanwhile, the external actors supported the government in disarming militias and re-
building its national security forces. The re-establishment of the army as a small but professional 
force made an institutionalized monopoly on violence possible and, thus, led to the complete 
withdrawal of external military. The civil war was declared over in 2002, and UNAMSIL 
withdrew in 2005.  
Despite the major success, UNAMSIL and the UK-led security sector reform did not lead 
to a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. This outcome was caused by Sierra 
Leone’s weak state legacies. Prior to both intervention and civil war, Sierra Leone never had a 
strong central state. Outside of larger cities, the chiefdoms were the major regulator of small -
scale violence as they provided people with customary rules and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, 
these self-help communities outlasted the crises of the 1990s. The statebuilding intervention 
created government capacities in the form of formal institutions and a competent police force, but 
the chiefs could capture the statebuilding process early on. As a result, Sierra Leone today is a 
parastate in which small-scale violence is regulated both by state institutions and by self-help 
communities. 
 
Before testing the proposed causal mechanisms, it is necessary to deal with major alternative 
explanations. The end of the civil war in Sierra Leone has so far been explained by variations of 
two arguments. First, in the common narrative on UNAMSIL and the war in Sierra Leone, the 
British intervention led to an instant defeat of the RUF (Bah 2012: 106-107). In this explanation, 
it was the determined and overwhelming military commitment of the UK that left no choice for 
the rebels but to surrender their arms. A closer look at the empirics reveals that there is little 
evidence for this interpretation. British forces intervened but were not part of many military 
engagements with the RUF. Furthermore, the UK withdrew most of its troops within few weeks 
(Olonisakin 2008: 63-64). The RUF was not completely defeated until over a year after the major 
military intervention began in May 2000. While Britain certainly played a crucial role in 
providing support for UNAMSIL and training Sierra Leonean security forces, its direct 
contribution to defeating the RUF was marginal. Lastly, it is not clear why UK should have 
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succeeded easily in Sierra Leone and only shortly afterwards would fail in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
The second explanation that has been provided by several authors is that of the weakness 
of the RUF as a rebel group. In this line of argument, the RUF was simply a very poorly 
organized armed group and it took little external pressure to make it collapse. Its weakness is 
seen as a combination of bad leadership, a lack of legitimacy (Gberie 2005: 11-16) and poor 
supply networks (Hazen 2013: 73-75). While all of these points might be valid to a certain extent, 
they have little explanatory value. The RUF shares many of these features with other armed 
groups around the globe. More importantly, however, the Sierra Leonean rebel group was able to 
fight a civil war for eleven years. Their opponent was not just a weak government, but they also 
managed to resist ECOMOG with up to 15,000 troops as well as the strong PMC Executive 
Outcomes. Furthermore, the group was able to resist UN forces for another 2-3 years. Like all 
rebel groups, the RUF suffered military defeats, but it was always capable of recovering and 
resuming the war. The organization was institutionalized well enough to compensate for the 
absence of its charismatic leader, Foday Sankoh, from 1997 on. Because of the RUF’s resilience, 
the international community hesitated to intervene and feared that Sierra Leone could become the 
next Somalia. All this indicates that the RUF was not a particularly weak group and, thus, its 
demise must have other reasons. 
 At the level of regulating small-scale violence is Sierra Leone, the intervention has failed 
to create a state monopoly. While there is a general consensus on the strength and autonomy of 
the chiefdoms, there have been few attempts to explain the monopolization failure. Instead, 
several authors have focused on the peacebuilding aspect of intervention. They criticize the 
illiberal character of chieftaincy, arguing that the re-establishment of the institution has recreated 
the causes of war (Acemoğlu et al. 2013; Hanlon 2005; Jackson 2005). In general, it is plausible 
that the exclusionary practices of the chieftaincy system have contributed to the slide towards 
civil war in the 1990s. As the case study will show, the strength of the post-war chieftaincy has 
several negative effects for statebuilding (like social exclusion or a lack of tax revenue). 
However, there are three aspects that should be considered when criticizing the interveners for 
return of chiefs. First, as this chapter will show, the alliance between the national elite and the 
chiefs preceded intervention. When the statebuilding mission began, the local eli tes were already 
in a powerful position vis-à-vis the central government. Second, as the theory chapter has argued, 
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confronting self-help communities is very likely to lead to armed resistance. Despite external 
capacity-building, it is doubtful whether the central government would have been strong enough 
to risk such a strategy. Third, not every para state is the same. Under Stevens, the Sierra Leonean 
polity was highly centralized and chiefs had strong incentives to ignore their constituencies in 
favor of pleasing the central government. In contrast, the institutional set-up of post-war Sierra 
Leone has become much more inclusive as the central government is elected and local councils 
have been established. Chiefs increasingly have to compete with these democratic institutions. 
Overall, the accommodative strategy of the Kabbah administration might have undermined 
liberal statebuilding but was perhaps the most promising approach towards peacebuilding. 
 Statebuilding always occurs in the context of long-term state formation processes. Thus, 
before presenting the analysis, the next sub-chapter will set out the context by briefly describing 
the history of state formation in Sierra Leone, the main developments of the civil war and the 
regional political setting. Thereafter, it will analyze the mechanisms that produced the outcomes 
in monopoly scope and depth. 
 
5.1. State Formation and Civil War in Sierra Leone 
 
The effects of the UN statebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone cannot be properly understood 
without a basic idea about the historical context. State formation in West Africa is closely 
intertwined with colonialism and imperialism, as France and the United Kingdom have colonized 
the area for several centuries. The legacies of British colonization have affected state formation 
after independence, as Sierra Leonean government’s struggled for about thirty years to create a 
stable state. In 1991, the struggle had been lost and a civil war began that destroyed the state and 
turned Sierra Leone into one of the poorest countries in the world. This chapter discusses the 
origins of the Sierra Leonean state, its post-independence era and its eventual drift into civil war. 
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State Formation 
 
Colonial Rule 
The history of modern day Sierra Leone began in 1787 when the ‘St. George’s Bay Company’ 
with 400 ‘black poor’ from London founded a settlement called ‘Province of Freedom’ in the 
region. This first settlement did not survive, however, and was followed by the Sierra Leone 
Company in 1792. 1,100 settlers founded Freetown, Sierra Leone’s current capital. However, the 
company controlled the settlers’ access to land, which led to revolts. The Sierra Leone Company 
was replaced by the African Institution after slavery was abolished in England in 1807. While 
these settlements were far from constituting a nation state in the modern sense, they laid the 
foundation for the state formation in the following two centuries. The early settlement did not 
extent much beyond the borders of Freetown and, hence, there was little interference with the 
indigenous Mende and Temne population. Within the Mano River region, many ‘indigenous’ 
people had only arrived there at the time of colonization, and the overall social landscape had 
been in flux even before the colonization of the coast had begun (Gerdes 2013b: 15-16). 
Compared to both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan, Sierra Leone experienced very little 
endogenous state formation, and the process itself began historically late. 
By 1896, the UK began to expand its territory and declared the hinterland to be part of its 
protectorate. Under British rule, Sierra Leone did not have an army in the modern sense. Instead, 
the British had created the so-called Sierra Leone Frontier Force (SLFF) in the 1890s to 
strengthen their grip on the hinterlands . However, these areas were ruled by local chiefs in these 
areas rebelled against British claims to taxation in the so-called Hut Tax War (Acemoğlu et al. 
2013: 9-10). The SLFF had been re-named Sierra Leone Battalion in 1901, and the British 
Empire integrated the battalion into a regional West African Frontier Force. During the Second 
World War, the SLB was expanded to regiment size and its strength remained about the same 
well into the era of independence. Under British rule, the military’s two major goals were to 
maintain the internal colonial order and to defend the colony against other colonial powers 
(Rashid 2009: 93). Overall, Sierra Leone had little state infrastructure, had no national army, and 
was built upon a system of indirect rule up to its independence. 
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Independent State 
In 1961, Sierra Leone became an independent state. As was the case with many (if not most) 
former colonies, the colonial structures had a great impact on the shape of the state. Infrastructure 
had been built for the sole purpose of mining diamonds or planting cash crops, and exporting 
them overseas (Peters and Richards 2011: 378-380). Thus, there was a stark divide between 
urban Freetown and the rural hinterland. In rural areas there was little public infrastructure and 
the state was mostly absent form people’s lives. The state was confined mostly to the tax 
collections chiefs had to conduct for the central government. 
On becoming a sovereign state, Sierra Leone had to take care of its own defense policies 
for the first time. However, the government was reluctant to transform the colonial army23 into a 
proper national army. The slow transformation process, combined with an increased politicization 
of officers, resulted in several coups during the 1960s. After one term under the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP), the second free elections were won by Siaka Stevens and his All People’s 
Congress (APC). Once he became President, the political situation was drastically de-stabilized 
by three consecutive coups in 1967/68 (Rashid 2009: 93-94). At the end of this period, Stevens 
was re-instated as President. Stevens was to become one of the key figures of Sierra Leone’s 
post-independence statebuilding effort. Under his leadership Sierra Leone slowly transitioned 
into authoritarian rule, and this process was finalized by the transformation of the APC into the 
official state party. In 1985, Stevens handed over his Presidency to the head of the Armed Forces, 
Joseph Saidu Momoh, while staying chairman of the APC (Olonisakin 2008: 10-11). 
Stevens’ approach to building security forces was similar to that of many rulers of weak 
post-colonial states (Migdal 1988: 208-213). Under the impression of further coup attempts in the 
1970s and 1980s, Stevens concluded that a strong army would be a threat to political stability. 
His regime made several institutional choices that paved the way for the future weakness of the 
armed forces (Rashid 2009: 94). The two major goals were to make the army leadership loyal and 
to weaken the military’s capabilities. Loyalty was guaranteed through a patrimonial recruitment 
and payment system in which officers were promoted on the grounds of political allegiances. By 
                                                             
23 At this point named West African Royal Regiment of Sierra Leone (Rashid 2009: 93). 
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transforming Sierra Leone into a one-party state, Stevens could also utilize membership in the 
APC as a way to bind military leadership to his personal rule (Rashid 2009: 94). Additionally to 
these measures, the personnel strength was decreased and the armed forces were split. With 
international help Stevens built the Internal Security Unit (ISU), which was meant to act as a 
Praetorian Guard of the one party state. Its members were recruited on the basis of loyalty to the 
regime. Despite this recruitment procedure, Stevens took his divide and conquer tactics to the 
extreme by dividing the ISU into two separate units. One unit was trained by the British and 
Israelis, while the other unit was trained by the Cubans. However, the split led to internal 
tensions. Stevens eventually decided to merge the ISU parts into one coherent organization called 
Special Security Division (SSD) in 1979 (Krogstad 2012: 274). Due to all of these policies 
aiming at weakening the armed forces, the army consisted of no more than 3,000 soldiers at the 
beginning of the civil war in 1991 (Gberie 2005: 60). 
At the eve of the civil war, Sierra Leone was a weak state that exercised little control outside 
the main cities. Within the short period between independence and civil war, the small country 
had not succeeded in overcoming the colonial design of its state institutions. Political elites 
competed for wealth and did little to strengthen the state’s capabilities.  Given the two-tier 
structure of its weak armed forces, the monopoly on large-scale violence was extremely fragile. 
The government oversaw a fragmented security sector consisting of the SLPF, the SLA, and the 
SSD. Against the backdrop of an economic crisis that started in the mid-1980s, there had been 
growing dissatisfaction with the one party system (Keen 2005: 25-32). Stevens successor Momoh 
started a process of political opening in the early 1990s, but these policies came too late to 
prevent armed conflict. 
 
Civil War and Intervention 
In March 1991, the government’s claim to a monopoly on violence collapsed when the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started its campaign in eastern Sierra Leone (Hazen 2013: 76-
77). The rebels’ origins can be traced back into the 1980s. The likely reason for the rebellion can 
be found in the patrimonial structures formed by the APC one-party-rule. As long as the economy 
of Sierra Leone grew strongly, the state could pay the neopatrimonial network as well as food 
subsidies and public services. However, the economic downturn of the 1980s made the 
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neopatrimonial political system more exclusionary. While Momoh cut public spending, he kept 
paying political elites for their loyalty (Keen 2005: 25-32). In the rural areas, the chiefdom 
system with its strong regulation of land ownership and agriculture made it difficult for young 
man to become economically independent members of society (Peters and Richards 2011: 379-
380). As Richards (1996: 161) argues, “[..] the war in Sierra Leone is best understood as a drama 
of social exclusion. The rebel leaders are energetic, determined people who feel strongly about 
being excluded from the networks of patrimonial support under the APC one-party regime”. 
Hence, at the end of the 1980s, disgruntled Sierra Leonean students living in exile in Liberia, 
started to form an oppositional organization. These developments eventually led to the formation 
of the RUF. 
 The RUF was led by what could be considered a charismatic leader, Foday Sankoh. When 
the rebels started the war, they expected a quick victory and thus were ill-prepared to fund a 
sustained guerilla war. In the first years, the group relied on looting, weapons it captured from the 
SLA and direct support by Charles Taylor (Hazen 2013: 79-80). Only gradually did the 
organization shift its funding towards diamond smuggling. In 1995, it gained full access to 
important diamond mines for the first time (Hazen 2013: 94-95). It sold the diamonds from Sierra 
Leone to Liberian or Burkinabe traders who would then sell these diamonds on the world market. 
The RUF gained further strength through equipment captured after the 1997 coup, and further 
diamond mines captured in 1998 (Hazen 2013: 80). In general, “[the] RUF shared the same 
suppliers and supply routes as Charles Taylor’s NPFL. Arms purchases were arranged from 
Eastern Europe by Libya, shipped to, and then through, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 
before reaching the RUF” (Holtom 2007: 7-8). 
When the RUF started its campaign against the government of Sierra Leone in March 
1991, it was not taken seriously by political elites. At the time when the civil war started, the 
government controlled only a small army of about 2,000 - 3,000 soldiers (Gberie 2005: 60). Once 
the threat to the regime became more obvious, the Momoh administration rapidly expanded the 
army to 6,100 soldiers. However, the army leadership became increasingly frustrated due to a 
perceived lack of political support for the armed forces (Kabia 2009: 109). This led to a military 
coup in April 1992, through which the 25-year old Captain Valentine Strasser became President 
of Sierra Leone (Gberie 2005: 67-69). The new National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) 
used diamond exports to pay for new military personnel. The army was quickly inflated from 
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about 6,000 to 15,000 soldiers. This was almost a sevenfold increase compared to the size the 
armed forces had at the time the war began. Quick recruitment necessitated extremely low 
requirements for new recruits, and, therefore, many illiterates or criminals were enlisted. The 
command and control structures were outpaced by the military build-up (Hazen 2013: 93).  
 An important strategy of the government to regain control over the country was the 
deployment of local militias. Local hunters, in particular the ‘Kamajors’ of the south east, 
defended their local communities as early as 1992. The government made an effort to train and 
equip these militias, and several hundred of Kamajor fighters were deployed by the government 
in 1994 (Gberie 2005: 83-85). While they proved effective in keeping the RUF out of certain 
areas, they were also extremely hard to control for the government. In 1996, the local militias 24 
were brought under a nation-wide institution called ‘Civil Defence Councils’ (CDFs) and 
formally acknowledged by the government in 1998 (Wlodarczyk 2009: 203-204). 
 Another strategy to monopolize the use of force was to resort to mercenaries. When a 
greatly expanded army and local militias failed to deliver the expected results, the NPRC hired a 
private military contractor from South Africa in 1995. The company Executive Outcomes (EO) 
had two main tasks: On the one hand, it was supposed to directly confront the RUF with its heavy 
weaponry, especially with attack helicopters and EO’s ability to take full advantage of modern 
combined arms. On the other hand, EO trained the armed forces and the Kamajors militias. 
Although the EO offensive forced the RUF to the negotiation table, it did not achieve a lasting 
defeat of the rebel organization. Later experiments with PMCs (notably Sandhurst) did not reach 
the efficacy of the deal with Executive Outcomes (Hazen 2013: 95-96). 
Additionally to rebels, militias, PMCs and the Sierra Leonean government, regional states 
entered the conflict. Under the leadership of Nigeria, several ECOWAS member states deployed 
the ECOWAS Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention force. The troops were 
sent directly from Liberia, where they supported the government against the NPFL uprising 
(SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 3, 40). In response to the AFRC/RUF coup in 1997, ECOWAS 
increased its military presence and started offensive operations in order to regain control over 
Freetown. Although ECOMOG could keep the RUF from controlling the country, it never 
                                                             
24 While the Kamajors were the largest hunter society, other groups, notably Donsos, Kapras, Gbethis, and 
Tamaboro, also participated (Wlodarzcyk 2009: 203-204). 
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succeeded in re-establishing a monopoly on violence. ECOWAS, and Nigeria in particular, 
increased their troop levels step-wise to 13,000 soldiers in 1999 (Olonisakin 2008: 41-42). 
Overall, the ECOMOG intervention can hardly be described as a state-building mission, since it 
almost exclusively entailed fighting the RUF. 
The control over government changed several times during the conflict. While the war 
started under the one-party-state rule of the APC, President Momoh was replaced through a 
military coup in 1992. Under the name National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the military 
regime drastically expanded the armed forces in order to defeat the RUF. After another coup (led 
by General Bio) in 1996, elections were held and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) won a 
majority. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became the new President, but was ousted by yet another coup in 
in 1997. The new established Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) created a power-
sharing agreement with the RUF, but this constellation was abolished by an ECOMOG 
intervention which reinstated Kabbah. At the time of the UNAMSIL intervention, the country 
was thus divided into the parts controlled by Kabbah and ECOMOG on the one side, and those 
controlled by the RUF and AFRC remnants on the other side (Gberie 2005: 94-95). 
Similar to other interventions such as the one in Afghanistan, the intervention in Sierra 
Leone was initially very modest. It followed a logic of steady escalation from careful attempts to 
monitor a peace agreement to a 17,500 troops-strong mission that aimed at transforming a whole 
society. When the UN began to deploy peacekeepers to Sierra Leone, it did so against the 
backdrop of an ongoing intervention by the regional ECOWAS group. Nigeria, Ghana and 
Guinea had deployed about 13,000 troops under the label of ECOMOG (Olonisakin 2008: 41-
42). This force supported the Sierra Leonean government in its fight against the RUF and, later, 
against parts of the armed forces. However, it was rather a plain combat mission did not seriously 
engage in building state institutions. 
 In July 1998, the UN dispatched a group of 30 military observers (UNOMSIL) to Sierra 
Leone as a reaction to the AFRC coup and the subsequent re-instatement of the Kabbah regime 
through ECOMOG in March 1998 (Olonisakin 2008: 24-25). The situation is well described by 
Olonisakin (2008: 25) who writes that “[..] in Sierra Leone, the UN had now joined the 
interesting mix of actors on the ground, but it was watching from the sidelines as regional troops, 
remnants of the Sierra Leone Army, and civil militias battled it out with the rebel alliance – RUF 
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and AFRC fighters – in different locations in the hinterland”. The international community was 
caught off guard by a major RUF offensive on the capital Freetown in January 1999, which left 
over 7,000 soldiers and civilians dead (HRW 1999: IV). Only the counter-offensive by Nigerian 
forces prevented the RUF from ‘capturing’ a state in which an UN observer mission was taking 
place. The resulting stalemate led to renewed negotiations and, eventually, to the conclusion of 
the Lomé Peace Agreement which contained far-reaching concessions to the RUF (Hazen 2013: 
96-97).  
Compared to other peace agreements brokered by the UN, the Lomé Accord was highly 
inclusive. It envisioned that theoretically all former RUF rebels, CDF fighters and army 
personnel were allowed to join the newly established Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
(RSLAF) after a basic screening procedure which only focused on criminal record but excluded 
human rights violations (Nilsson and Kovacs 2013: 4-5). This high degree of inclusivity was 
arguably driven less by the idea that the rebels have legitimate political goals, but was rather a 
concession to the military strength of the RUF. However, this power constellation meant that the 
RUF had little incentive to actually disarm, which in turn created a security environment in which 
the CDFs would also refuse their participation in DDR.  
When the UN finally transformed its mission into a liberal statebuilding itnervention, there 
was little left of the Sierra Leonean state apparatus. The government did not have the 
organizational capacities to control the country, and it also lacked the political control over the 
armed forces. The SLA was widely discredited due to its inability to stop the insurgency and its 
later collaboration with the RUF. The vastly expanded army could neither be controlled nor was 
it properly paid and supplied (Rashid 2013: 98). This created strong incentives for soldiers to 
steal from the civilian population or work for the rebels at night. Among the population, these 
soldiers were also called ‘sobels’ (soldier at day, rebel at night). The police was seen as corrupt 
and more as a threat than a provider of public order. Furthermore, its area of operation was 
mostly confined to Freetown (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 33-35).  
To sum up, Sierra Leone had a very short history of state formation that did not lead to a 
strong central government. The coercive apparatus was then destroyed by the war of the 1990s, 
which also led to a drastic diffusion of the means of violence to rebels, militias and other private 
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actors. By the late 1990s, the country was economically and politically devastated. In short, 
Sierra Leone was unlikely to become a statebuilding success.   
 
5.2. Statebuilding Intervention and Large-Scale Violence Regulation 
 
The statebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone lasted only about five years (2000-2005). 
Nevertheless, the interveners succeeded in ending the civil war, disarmed non-state armed 
groups, built a sustainable army and created a democratic institutional framework that stabilized 
the monopoly on large-scale violence. As pointed out in the last section, this success occurred 
despite the fact that Sierra Leone displayed many unfavorable conditions. The argument of this 
section is that the regional cooperation mechanism laid out in chapter three can explain the 
puzzling outcome of UNAMSIL. Before engaging with the causal mechanism, I provide a brief 
overview over the statebuilding intervention’s design. 
The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was created in October 1999 as 
part of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Initially mandated with a troop limit of 6,000, this number 
was quickly tripled to 17,500 by March 2001 (UNSC 1999b: 3 ; 2001c: 1). Among other issues, 
UNAMSIL’s initial mandate was to help in the conduct of democratic elections, and to foster the 
implementation of the peace treaty which already included the (re-)establishment of a monopoly 
on violence. However, the mission only received a robust chapter VII mandate in February 2000, 
thereby enabling it to actively monopolize the means of large-scale violence (UNSC 2000d: 3). 
The DDR process was delineated in Art. XVI of the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 (UNSC 1999a: 
20), and the restructuring of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces was delineated in Art. XVII of the 
Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 (UNSC 1999a: 20-21). UNAMSIL’s tasks were summarized by the 
UN Secretary General as “[..] to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its 
authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire 
country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free 
and fair elections" (UNSC 2001a: §58). Thus, UNAMSIL can clearly be classified as a liberal 
statebuilding intervention. 
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At the beginning of the UN intervention, ECOMOG still played a crucial role. It protected 
the UN force against the RUF while the international intervention slowly grew and took shape. 
At the time UNAMSIL was established, ECOMOG had about 13,000 troops deployed in Sierra 
Leone (Olonisakin 2008: 41-42). UNAMSIL was designed planned to be complementary to 
ECOMOG. The idea was to share the burden of warfare by splitting the military tasks between 
Nigeria and the UN contingent. However, due to mounting domestic pressure on the newly 
elected Nigerian government to end the decade-long intervention in Sierra Leone, Nigeria 
announced the end of ECOMOG in December 1999 (Kabia 2009: 126-127). Against this 
backdrop, the UNSC decided to strengthen UNAMSIL’s mandate by increasing the envisioned 
troop level to 11,000 (Olonisakin 2008: 48). However, when all 13,000 Nigerian ECOMOG 
soldiers had left the country by May 2000, UNAMSIL had reached a troop level of only 9,000 
soldiers. Nevertheless, Nigeria (and other regional states) continued to contribute troops to 
UNAMSIL. In mid-May 2000, UNAMSIL had a strength of 9,178, of which were 3,217 ‘re-
hatted’ Nigerians, 776 Ghanaians and 776 Guineans (UNSC 2000b: 18).  
 For the RUF, the ECOMOG withdrawal meant a significant change in the balance of 
power. Up until May 2000, the RUF had tried to circumvent disarmament mostly in a passive 
fashion. Once ECOMOG was dissolved and troops had left the country, the RUF changed its 
tactics from passive denial to offensive actions against the UN. At the beginning of May 2000, 
RUF fighters attacked a central pillar of the UNAMSIL plan: The DDR camps where fighters 
were meant to be disarmed and handed over their reintegration packages. Rebels attacked the 
DDR camps in Magburaka and Makeni (Olonisakin 2008: 55). Days later, the RUF managed to 
publicly embarrass UNAMSIL by taking about 500 Zambian UN soldiers as hostages (Kabia 
2009: 127). Rumors emerged that the RUF planned to attack the capital, Freetown. The events of 
May 2000 quickly turned into one of the biggest crises for UN peacebuilding. RUF forces 
controlled about 2/3 of the territory, and the kidnapping of large numbers of peacekeepers as well 
as the large-scale theft of UN weapons by rebels completely undermined the public confidence in 
UNAMSIL (Olonisakin 2008: 58-60).  
In reaction to the May 2000 crisis, about 1,200 British troops intervened in order to 
stabilize UNAMSIL and defend Freetown (Olonisakin 2008: 63-64). In the face of the RUF 
offensive, the interveners adjusted its goals for SSR. Instead of disarming the Sierra Leonean 
Army the decision was made to simply reform it, thereby creating a greater institutional 
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continuity between the old and the new armed forces (Nilsson and Kovacs 2013: 6). Despite this, 
the remnants of the SLA did not offer much of an institutional foundation. The term security 
sector reform is somewhat misleading in cases where the security sector had virtually collapsed. 
SSR in Sierra Leone had to deal with the fact that there was not much left of the security forces, 
and therefore it “[..] occurred at a very basic level of state-building and peacemaking-cum-
building in support of one of the primary markers of sovereignty: the monopoly of the means of 
violence” (Albrecht 2010: 19). 
 In sum, by early 2000 UNAMSIL had transformed into a liberal statebuilding intervention 
that aimed for the establishment of a state monopoly on large-scale violence. However, despite a 
formal peace agreement the RUF chose to resist these monopolization efforts. 
 
The Regional Cooperation Mechanism 
The statebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone had to create a monopoly on large-scale violence 
against the backdrop of long-term conflict, state failure, poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and armed 
resistance by the RUF. Nevertheless, UNAMSIL succeeded to build a sustainable monopoly on 
warfare and could withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone after less than six years. This section 
applies the regional cooperation mechanism to the case of Sierra Leone, arguing that the 
surprising outcome can only be explained by taking the wider regional context into account.  
 
 
Figure 16: Regional Cooperation Mechanism. 
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In the case of Sierra Leone, the statebuilding intervention was supported by the most powerful 
regional actors, Nigeria and Ghana. Furthermore, neighboring Guinea supported the UNAMSIL 
as well as several actors in Liberia. This regional cooperation triggered the regional cooperation 
mechanism: 
(1) Territorialization: As the statebuilding intervention expanded in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS 
and the UN increased the pressure on the Liberian Taylor regime, thereby weakening the 
RUF’s main ally. At the same time, the RUF’s access to the Liberian border region was 
cut off by Guinean support for Liberian rebels. Eventually, the RUF lost its access to 
transnational markets and sanctuaries.  
(2) Monopolization: The ability of the RUF to challenge the statebuilding intervention was 
dependent on its (tacit and active) support from Liberia (and Charles Taylor in particular). 
Without its supply networks in Liberia, the RUF could not recover from military defeats 
and eventually accepted the UN’S DDR scheme. 
(3) Consolidation: The statebuilding intervention supported the government in reforming its 
security sector and building a professional, sustainably sized army. As a consequence, the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces are comparably small and their political control 
has been greatly increased.  
The result is a state monopoly on large-scale violence. The UN could withdraw its forces in 2005, 
and since then, Sierra Leone has been stable and democratic. The following sections will process-
trace the case in detail, starting with the regional cooperation that caused the successful 
monopolization of the means of warfare. 
 
Cause: Regional Cooperation 
The statebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone enjoyed strong regional support. It was supported 
by the major powers of West Africa as well as the neighboring Guinea. In Liberia, political elites 
were split: While the Taylor administration supported the RUF, LURD was an ally of Guinea.   
Sierra Leone is situated in Western Africa, a poor and instable region. Consisting of about 
two dozen rather small countries, Nigeria is by far the largest nation and dominates regional 
politics. With a population of about 170 million, Nigeria is more than six times as big as the 
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second country to the region (Ghana). Its dominance renders West Africa a unipolar regional 
system. The region has been the stage for several civil wars since the end of the Cold War. Major 
armed conflicts occurred in Guinea Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002)25 Additionally, there are recurring crises due to coups or electoral disputes 
in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau Ivory Coast, Niger, and Nigeria (Powell and Thyne 2011). Many of the 
civil wars were strongly inter-related. Rebels used territories of neighboring states as sanctuaries 
or were materially supported by neighboring states. In addition, arms, money or contraband 
crossed the porous borders and enabled rebels and governments to fight on. In terms of economic 
development, the region is generally very poor but also shows great disparities across states as 
well as within states. The GDP per capita of Liberia ($324), the region’s poorest country, is only 
a tenth of that of the richest one (Cape Verde, $3,345 ) (WorldBank 2013b). Despite instability 
and poverty, West Africa has seen some success in democratization efforts during the 2000s 26. 
The key regional states for Sierra Leone are its direct neighbors, Guinea and Liberia, and the 
most powerful state in the region, Nigeria. 
                                                             
25 Data set last updated in 2009. 
26 For example, on the 21-point PolityIV scale (-10 full autocracy, +10 full democracy) for 2010, nine out 
of sixteen ECOWAS states score +5 or higher. The most autocratic states are Gambia (-5), Mauretania and 
Togo (both -2) (Marshall et al. 2013). 
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Figure 17: Map of Sierra Leone and the wider West African region (Google 2014). 
 
Guinea 
Guinea is a small country of about ten million inhabitants. It surrounds all of Sierra Leone except 
for the Liberian border and the sea. Its population is one of the poorest in the world and the UN 
counts it as a least developed country. Guinea was a French colony and declared its independence 
in 1958. It has been strongly shaped by its long-term President, Lansana Conté, who gained 
power through a military coup and would stay in office until his death in December 2008 (BTI 
2014b: 3-4). The civil war in Sierra Leone as well as the UNAMSIL intervention took place 
during Conté’s reign.  
 Guinea’s military capacities are small in international comparison. Nevertheless, the 
government has a functioning military of about 10,000 soldiers at its command. Guinea’s armed 
forces have long been politicized by the ruling elites and are thus difficul t to control for any 
elected government. During the last two decades, the government used the army several times to 
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crush protest movements. Among other atrocities, this resulted in the killing of over 150 people 
in September 2009. The state lacks a coherent national strategy, so that it is difficult for outsiders 
to understand the priorities of Guinea (ICG 2010b: 23). However, it is possible to derive some of 
these security priorities from Guinea’s recent history of state formation. Next to defending the 
country against other states, its national interest can broadly be described in terms of regional 
stability and a strengthening of friendly governments in neighboring states. Consequently, 
Guinea’s main interest in Sierra Leone’s civil war was to restore government control over the 
country and prevent the RUF rebellion from spilling over to its own fragile polity. It thus 
contributed troops to ECOMOG during the 1990s. 
 
Liberia 
Liberia is the other direct neighbor. Founded by former US slaves and independent since 1847, it 
is one of the oldest sovereign states in Africa. Originally conceptualized as a land in which black 
people could finally live free and in self-determination, tensions between the settlers and the 
native inhabitants of Liberia quickly emerged (Gerdes 2013b: 16-19). As in many colonial 
African states, early Liberian state-building was shaped by conflict between indigenous groups in 
the hinterland and the urban (or colonial) elites in coastal regions that had access to the world 
market. For most of its history, Liberian politics were dominated by the ‘Americo-Liberian’ elite. 
This changed with a coup in 1980, in which allegedly pro-indigenous forces came to power 
(Gerdes 2013b: 39-40).  
 Liberia descended into civil war in 1989, when the NPFL under Charles Taylor started a 
guerilla war against the Monrovia government. Taylor became the dominant figure of Liberian 
politics both as a rebel leader and, from 1997 on, as its President (ICG 2002a: 1-2). Even before 
he became President, he supported the RUF. Hazen (2013: 87) argues that “Taylor supported the 
RUF to punish Sierra Leone for providing a base for the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and to 
relieve the military pressure on his own rebellion in Liberia, not to support the RUF’s political 
aims”. Taylor’s regime became the major political and economic patron of the RUF, and he used 
it to further his geopolitical interests in the region (Hazen 2013: 86-87). Taylor (at times 
supported by Burkina Faso) pursued an aggressive, revisionist foreign policy and supported rebel 
groups in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (Gerdes 2013a: 161-165).  However, the 
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emerging rebel groups in Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 
and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) opposed not only Taylor, but also accepted 
the regional status quo and cooperated with Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and the ECOWAS/UN 
intervention later on. 
 
Nigeria 
Nigeria, the regional hegemon, is plagued by the same problems as its smaller neighbor states. 
Although the country has seen economic growth during the last decades, not least due to its oil 
revenues, large parts of its huge population are still very poor. During the time of the Sierra 
Leonean civil war, Nigeria faced great regime instability. Following a period of military 
dictatorship, elections were held in 1993 but the new government was quickly overturned by a 
military coup. In 1999, a new constitution and elections eventually resulted in a period of 
prolonged democratization, although many democratic deficits remain (BTI 2014d: 3-4). 
Nigeria’s foreign policy is marked by a contrast between its relative position in the region and its 
absolute strength. On the one hand, Nigeria is by far the strongest state in the region in terms of 
demography, economy and military, and it has taken up a leadership position in ECOWAS. Since 
the 1980s, it defined its national interest in terms of ‘concentric circles’ around its territory. Thus, 
Nigeria is openly seeking a hegemonic role in the region (Alli 2012: 11-14). On the other hand, 
Nigeria is itself a fragile state that struggles with internal violence (especially the Boko Haram 
insurgency) and often lacks the means to effectively project power across the region. Although 
Nigeria lacks a coherent national security strategy (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008) most Nigerian 
governments have seen regional integration as central to their national security (Kabia 2009: 59-
60). During the 1990s, Nigeria sent troops to civil war afflicted countries in the region, especially 
to Liberia and Sierra Leone. These interventions were mostly aimed at stabilizing governments 
and reducing the risks of transnationally spreading conflict (ICG 2002a: 2). Moreover, Nigeria 
was credibly committed to restore democracy in Sierra Leone, even while it was governed itself 
by a military dictatorship at home (Olonisakin 2008: 30). 
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Regional Integration 
Western Africa displays a high degree of regional integration. The international organization 
through which this integration is fostered is the Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS). ECOWAS was founded in 1975 as an economic union, and its goal was to increase 
intra-regional economic trade by lowering barriers to trade. At the same time, one major impetus 
for increased regional integration was Nigeria’s desire to deepen its ties with neighboring 
countries and, thereby, reduce French influence in West Africa. Due to its colonial history, West 
Africa is traditionally divided into Francophone and Anglophone countries. In the early post-
independence years, France tried to keep up its influence over the region and, among other 
policies, supported the Biafra rebellion in Nigeria (Kabia 2009: 57-59). Hence, “[as] the country 
is literally surrounded by Francophone neighbours, Nigeria’s post-civil war foreign policy was 
geared towards strengthening economic and political ties with its neighbours so as to prevent 
them supporting any future secessionists” (Kabia 2009: 59).  In 1978, ECOWAS was expanded 
by including a non-aggression treaty. While this was the first time that security-relevant aspects 
entered the treaty, it did not exceed the scope of the general international norm of non-aggression 
that all UN members are supposed to subscribe to (Kabia 2009: 66-67). However, the experience 
of wide-spread civil wars and political instability during the 1990s led to a transformation of 
ECOWAS into a security community. The ECOWAS treaties now include a commitment to 
interventionism and good governance (Rashid 2013: 6-8). Thereby, ECOWAS exceeds the scope 
of the vast majority of regional organizations. However, economic integration is still lagging 
behind and the member states have not achieved what was aimed for in the ECOWAS 
agreements. Nevertheless, the union has become a key player in regional security.  
To sum up, Western Africa is characterized by instability and poverty as well as strong 
regional integration. Key regional states shared the interest of the UN and the UK in building a 
liberal state in Sierra Leone. As the next section will show, the cooperative regional setting made 
it possible to deny the RUF access to its Liberian sanctuary during the statebuilding intervention. 
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Step One: Territorialization 
By mid-2000, UNAMSIL and the UK had committed themselves to a full-scale statebuilding 
intervention in Sierra Leone. Regional cooperation with UNAMSIL allowed for the 
territorialization of the conflict. Due to the pressure that the regional actors put on Liberia’s 
Charles Taylor, it was possible to seal off the border and cut off the RUF from its access to 
transnational spaces. 
Amid the deep crisis and the transformation of the UN mission in mid-May 2000, the UK 
decided to intervene in Sierra Leone. It had positioned forces at the coast and started a military 
operation with the initial goal of rescuing British citizens from Freetown. However, the operation 
developed a dynamic of its own. The British send 1,200 troops and secured the strategically 
important Lungi Airport (Olonisakin 2008: 63-64). This allowed UNAMSIL troops to shift their 
emphasis to the city and its surroundings. While the British intervention certainly signaled the 
rebels that the international community was determined to field more firepower, the UK did not 
bring much territory under control or directly engaged the RUF (Olonisakin 2008: 63-64). 
Instead, it was an operation that provided UNAMSIL with relief and a possibility to regain the 
initiative. The UN Security Council met in May and again in July, raising the troop level to about 
12,500. Due to the rapidly growing size of the UN mission and the UK relief operations, 
UNAMSIL switched to a strategy of ‘progressive deployment’, i.e. it started offensive operations 
against the RUF. Throughout the summer of 2000, the UN expanded its presence throughout the 
territory of Sierra Leone and closer to the Liberian border (Olonisakin 2008: 93-94 ; UNSC 
2000a: 4-5).  
At the same time that the UN increased the military pressure on the RUF, Guinea started 
equipping LURD rebels that planned to oust Charles Taylor in Liberia. In July 2000, the Conté 
administration allowed LURD to attack Liberia from Guinean territory (ICG 2002a: 4). The 
LURD offensive hit the Liberian armed forces exactly in those western areas that are close to the 
border with Sierra Leone and hosted crucial supply lines of the RUF (Hazen 2013: 99-101). 
Taylor reacted by ordering parts of the RUF to attack Guinea in September 2000. Instead of 
pushing back LURD in the Sierra Leonean border region, Taylor convinced the RUF leadership 
to attack Guinea from western Sierra Leone in order to threaten Guinea’s capital, Conakry. In 
addition to RUF forces, local dissidents were mobilized and the offensive showed initial success 
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(ICG 2002a: 4-5). These gains convinced the government of Guinea to take the threat more 
seriously. The Conté administration acquired started a broad, conventional military offensive 
against the RUF and also supported CDFs in Sierra Leone. As a result, by January 2001 the RUF 
had been pushed out of Guinea (Gberie 2005: 172-173). Against the backdrop of the heavy 
fighting, there were fears that the RUF in Sierra Leone might re-mobilize in order to conduct 
attacks against Guinea. Thus, the governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea began to coordinate 
their efforts against the RUF (UNSC 2001a: 4).  
By November 2000, the RUF resorted to its proven tactic of signing a peace agreement 
when under pressure. Yet despite the Abuja Agreement, which contained a clear commitment to 
DDR, the RUF still tried to keep UNAMSIL out of its zones of control (Olonisakin 2008: 101-
102). Nevertheless, the UN started deploying the first 1,800 troops in the border region of 
Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in December 2000 (UNSC 2001a: 4-5). Simultaneously, 
Guinea increased its efforts to support LURD. This occurred without approval from the Kabbah 
administration which feared a backlash should Taylor win the fight against the rebel organization 
(ICG 2002a: 4). After receiving training and equipment from Guinea, Donso and Kamajor 
militias entered Liberian territory in mid-November 2000 in an effort to support the LURD 
offensive. This increased the military pressure on Liberia’s armed forces further and left little 
room for Taylor to support the RUF in Sierra Leone. The fighting lasted throughout 2001, and in 
April 2002 LURD had established firm control over the border region with Sierra Leone (Hazen 
2013: 130).  
At the international level, the UN combined its military actions with an effort to stop the 
trade in Sierra Leonean diamonds, which were the main funding source of the RUF. Prior efforts 
to let ECOMOG impose an arms embargo against the RUF had been ineffective (Holtom 2007: 
14-15). In July 2000, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1306 which banned the 
worldwide trade in diamonds from Sierra Leone. This was a crucial first step to disrupt the 
money inflow that enabled the RUF to conduct its war. However, this was not fully effective 
because many the diamonds were smuggled through neighboring countries and sold under false 
claims of origin (UNSC 2000c: 18-19). In December 2000, the UN provided its report on the 
diamond trading network in Western Africa. The report suggested that the RUF has made 
somewhere between 25 and 125 million dollars per year through selling diamonds (UNSC 2000c: 
17). It singled out Liberia as the key trading route, from where diamonds were either sold on the 
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world market or smuggled further to the Gambia (UNSC 2000c: 17-19). The report argued that 
“[..] there is sufficient evidence to prove that this trade cannot be conducted in Liberia without 
the permission and the involvement of government officials at the highest level” (UNSC 2000c: 
19). This was a very important claim, because it showed that the RUF’s supply network was not 
just the result of weak statehood and porous borders. Instead, Taylor enabled the RUF’s war by 
granting it a trading route. After the report was published, the UN Security Council decided to 
impose a diamond export embargo on Liberia in March 2001. Since Liberia lacked a route 
through which to sell the diamonds on the world market, its diamond exports collapsed (UNSC 
2001b: 76). Thus, by mid-2001, through the combined effect of LURD operations and the 
international diamond ban, the RUF could not rely on its Liberian network anymore. 
It is important to point out that the territorialization of the conflict was not one-off event 
but part of a broader pattern of regional efforts to stabilize Sierra Leone and, eventually, Liberia. 
Between 2000 and 2003, while the Kabbah administration was trying to build and consolidate a 
monopoly on violence, LURD and MODEL conquered ever greater swaths of Liberian territory.  
In order to prevent a rebel victory and to build a stable, peaceful state in Liberia, ECOWAS 
deployed thousands of troops to Monrovia in September 2003. The force was transformed into 
UNMIL in October 2003. Thus, ECOWAS eventually supported those Liberian actors who 
accepted the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors. Consequently, cooperation between Sierra 
Leone and Liberia has steadily increased since the wars came to an end. Indicators of this 
cooperation are the re-opening of the common border (AFP 2007) in 2007 as well as the re-
activation of the Mano River Union27, a small sub-regional IO that “[..] aims to strengthen the 
capacity of Member States to integrate their economies and coordinate development programs in 
the areas of peace building [..]” (MRU 2014) in 2008.   
 Overall, in the short-term regional cooperation helped to cut off the RUF from supply 
routes and sanctuaries. In the long run, it fostered a regional system in which the sovereignty of 
Sierra Leone is respected and transnational insurgencies have become unlikely. 
 
 
                                                             
27 The Mano River Union consists of Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 
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Step Two: Monopolization 
By mid-2001, the RUF could neither sell diamonds on the global market nor could it acquire 
resupplies for its fighters. As a consequence, the armed group lacked the organizational capacities 
to resist UNAMSIL’s efforts to monopolize the means of large-scale violence. The RUF was 
disarmed during 2001 and UNAMSIL could expand its control over the whole territory of Sierra 
Leone. By 2002, the government and UNAMSIL exclusively controlled the means of large-scale 
violence. 
Due to its loss of access to Liberian territory, the RUF’s capacity to continue fighting 
declined and the leadership became willing to negotiate with the government and UNAMSIL  
(Olonisakin 2008: 103-104). Since the RUF had always negotiated when it was weak only to re-
group and continue its war (Hazen 2013: 75), the process of monopolization had to combine 
political negotiations with sustained military pressure. Hence, UNAMSIL continued its troop 
buildup and sought to expand its territorial reach. On the political side, the UN was willing to re-
open negotiations with the rebels. Half a year after they had agreed to the November 2000 Abuja 
Agreement, the RUF was weakened to such an extent that it approached UNAMSIL to for new 
talks. At a May 2001 meeting of the so-called Joint Committee, the UN, the government of Sierra 
Leone, the RUF and ECOWAS met again in Abuja (UNSC 2001d: 1-2). The resulting Abuja 
Agreement II can be seen as the first peace deal the RUF leadership honestly accepted, because in 
the following months its military units were incrementally disarmed. All sides of the treaty 
agreed on the so-called ‘Kambia formula’ (Olonisakin 2008: 103-104). In the case of the Kambia 
district, the RUF had agreed to let fighters who had fled from Guinea’s offensive participate in 
the DDR program. In return, the local CDF militias had to disarm simultaneously. Furthermore,  
RSLAF units were deployed to the district to re-gain government control over the some of its 
border with Guinea (UNSC 2001d: 1-2).  
Nevertheless, the monopolization process always retained its military component. Given 
Sierra Leone’s recent history of broken peace treaties, military pressure had to be sustained in 
order to prevent the RUF from opting out of the DDR process. It took until  November 2001 for 
UNAMSIL to finally meet its 17,500 troop level target. Of these, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria still 
contributed almost 5,000 troops. Bangladesh and Pakistan were the other major troop 
contributors, with each having more than 4,000 soldiers deployed to Sierra Leone (UNSC 2001e: 
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14).  Since the RSLAF were still weak, the government as well as UNAMSIL relied to a great 
extent on the CDF militias to fight the RUF. In the eastern Kono district, CDF forces conquered 
large parts of the district and marched toward the capital Koido by May 2001. Facing defeat,  the 
RUF let its local units surrender and they were subsequently disarmed simultaneously with the 
local CDFs (UNSC 2001d: 3). Throughout the year, the RUF tried to keep the mining areas under 
its control so that clashes with CDFs continued (UNSC 2001e: 2). Until late 2001, RUF forces 
were able to hold on to a few areas of the border region from where they supported Liberian 
forces fighting LURD. Against the backdrop of political pressure from Guinea, Kabbah deployed 
RSLAF troops to Kailahun and thereby secured the last swaths of the border region (ICG 2002a: 
6). Thus, by early 2002 the state had regained control over almost all of the territory and, most 
importantly, controlled its borders. This combination of political and military measures proved 
highly effective in an environment where the RUF was unable to either escape the pressure or at 
least resupply its forces. Confronted with the possibility of being militari ly defeated, the RUF 
chose to join the DDR process. During 2001 almost all former RUF combatants were disarmed, 
except for a minority that joined Taylor in his fight in Liberia. “By January 2002, 72,490 
combatants, both RUF and CDF, had been disarmed and a total of 42,000 weapons and 1.2 
million rounds of ammunition collected” (Gberie 2005: 171).  
Overall, the territorialization of the conflict proved crucial to the monopolization of the 
means of large-scale violence by the international statebuilders. The RUF was able to resist a host 
of actors over a decade: The Sierra Leonean Army, the CDF militias, several powerful private 
military companies, ECOMOG and, for a certain period of time, the UN itself. Without the 
ongoing conflict, the statebuilding intervention could support the government in consolidating the 
hard-won monopoly on large-scale violence. 
 
Step Three: Consolidation 
The defeat of the RUF allowed the interveners to consolidate the monopoly on large-scale 
violence. Without ongoing conflict, the government and its external supporters could build a new 
army that was smaller in size, more professional and politically controlled. Democratic 
institutions were strengthened in order to regulate access to and control over the means of large-
scale violence. 
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In order to understand the importance and difficulty of the consolidation phase, it is 
necessary to recall the state of the armed forces at the beginning of the statebuilding intervention. 
After the SLPP re-gained control over the government in 1998 with the help of ECOMOG, it was 
deprived of almost all means to govern. Due to the 1997 coup, the army was seen as unreliable 
and part of the army (i.e. the AFRC) had joined forces with the RUF. The rest of the armed forces 
was dissolved and the goal was to rebuild a more reliable army. In the short-term, the 
government’s most potent means of coercion was its lose control over CDF militias (Kabia 2009: 
133-134). However, the CDFs were too decentralized and now long-term alternative to a proper 
army. Hence, the ‘security sector reform’ turned into an effort to build a new security sector from 
scratch. ECOMOG, on which the government was heavily dependent, completely failed at 
conducting DDR or SSR in Sierra Leone (Kabia 2009: 131-133).  
In 1999, the UK and the government considered re-building Sierra Leone as a state 
without an army. This option was discarded, not least because of the RUF’s Freetown offensive 
and strong political pressure from ECOMOG. Hence, in December 1999, the decision was made 
to re-build the army (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 22-23). During the next 2-3 years, the 
government would expand the new army rapidly from about two battalions in 1999 to about 
12,000 at the end of the civil war (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 23-24 ; Nilsson and Kovacs 2013: 
7). While this was probably a necessity given the limited amount of troops deployed by 
UNAMSIL and the UK, it risked repeating the mistakes of the 1990s when a massive recruitment 
de-professionalized the army and led to two military coups (Rashid 2009: 95-96).  
While DDR and SSR were already delineated in the Lomé Agreement in 1999 (UNSC 
1999a: 20-21), the security sector reform did start only slowly. In mid-1999, the UK sent a small 
group of experts to assess the state of the security sector in Sierra Leone and advice the 
government. The administrative capacities of the government were so degraded that the MoD 
consisted of a few dozen of employees which mostly distributed resources to the CDFs and 
ECOMOG (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 46). In June 2000, the UK intensified its support for SSR 
by creating its International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT), which was tasked with 
oversight of the internal reform of the armed forces. While there was an overall 
professionalization of the armed forces, IMATT could not prevent the SLPP from recruiting a 
number of loyal individuals into leadership positions at the MoD (Nelson-Williams 2009: 124-
125). Nevertheless, “[by] 2001, the MoD was regarded as leading the way in public service 
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reform, setting standards and providing a role model for other ministries in terms of running 
effectively” (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 49). 
During 2001, the accelerating retreat and dissolution of RUF forces allowed the 
government to deploy RSLAF troops across the country. For the first time since the start of the 
war, the army could be deployed to take control over cleared areas instead of being sent directly 
into an ongoing guerilla war. Starting in May 2001 with the Kambia district at the Western border 
to Guinea (UNSC 2001d: 1-2), the government took control over its territory in slow but 
consecutive steps. By the end of 2001, the army controlled “[..] key areas on the borders with 
Guinea and Liberia, including in the Kono, Koinadugu and Pujehun districts” (UNSC 2001e: 2). 
At the beginning of 2002, after Kabbah declared the end of the civil war, the Ministry of Defense 
was inaugurated. This was an important step in institutionalizing the monopoly on the use of 
force because the MoD is the administrative structure through which the government can control 
its armed forces. At the same time, the different branches of the military were bundled under a 
uniform structure and re-named to Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). Active 
leadership of the SRR gradually shifted towards the Sierra Leonean government. For example, in 
2003 the MoD published its first White Paper and outlined a clear strategic vision of the further 
reform process (Gbla 2006: 84-85). 
Although the goal of SSR was to create a small, reliable and professional army, the 
Military Reintegration Program (MRP) first led to a further increase in the number of soldiers, 
while the inclusion of rebels and CDF members further decreased the RSLAF’s coherence  
(Nilsson and Kovacs 2013: 6). 
In Sierra Leone, all former ex-combatants who participated in the renewed disarmament 
and demobilization process were briefed on the existence of the MRP and given the option 
to seek entry into the armed forces. However, only a small minority of all ex-combatants, 
about 2,500, of which about two-thirds came from the RUF and the rest from the CDF, 
decided to do so. At this time, the size of the existing army – consisting of former SLA 
soldiers, some of whom had only been recruited after Kabbah’s return to power in 1998, 
and former AFRC junta soldiers – was about 12,000. Following the implementation of the 
MRP, the RSLAF thus expanded to about 14,500. (Nilsson and Kovacs 2013: 7) 
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Over the following years, the size of the armed forces was drastically reduced. From its peak of 
14,500 troops in 2002, the army has been downsized to 8,500 troops in 2010, a reduction in 
personnel of about 40%. With the downsizing process completed, the recruitment process has 
become very competitive. Without an ongoing conflict, recruitment and training can focus on 
professionalism instead of simply training ‘trigger-pullers’. The government aims at recruiting its 
soldiers proportionally from all four major provinces in order to avoid ethnic imbalances (Nilsson 
and Kovacs 2013: 7-9). In terms of fiscal sustainability, Sierra Leone is a very poor country, and 
a decade after the war’s end, the government budget still depends on external aid inflows. The 
statebuilding intervention and external aid have allowed the Sierra Leonean state to sustain armed 
forces without making cuts in other areas of the budget. Nevertheless the major downsizing of the 
armed forces has greatly reduced the government expenses for defense. Therefore, Sierra Leone 
was on a path to become financially independent in the foreseeable future28.  
 
Figure 18: Military expenditures of the Sierra Leonean state (WorldBank 2014). 
 
As World Bank data shows, the government in Freetown has managed to significantly reduce its 
defense spending as well as its dependence on development assistance. 
                                                             
28 At the time of writing, a large Ebola epidemic in Western Africa poses a major challenge for the 
budgets as well as the political stability of all affected countries.  
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Figure 19: Official development assistance for Sierra Leone in relation to government expenses (WorldBank 
2014). 
 
In May 2002, Kabbah’s SLPP government could win the first post-war elections. These elections 
under peace conditions legitimized and strengthened the consolidation process. Due to the 
progress made by the Sierra Leonean government, the withdrawal of external troops could start 
early. Already in 2000, the UK pulled out all but 200 soldiers who stayed in the country in order 
to provide further training and guidance for SSR. UNAMSIL also started to draw down its 
military component after the end of hostilities. By the fall of 2003, it had reduced its troop level 
from 17,800 to 12,000. At the end of 2004, only 4,100 troops were left in Sierra Leone. The 
withdrawal was completed at the end of 2005 (Bah 2012: 110-112). The follow-up UN mission, 
UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), took place between 2006 and 2008. It 
supported Sierra Leone in establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Council and in holding the 
2007 elections (Bah 2012: 113-114). 
To sum up, the Sierra Leonean state’s monopoly on large-scale violence could be 
consolidated through the statebuilding intervention. After the RUF was defeated, the country’s 
democratic institutions were successfully revived and the government was able to build 
professional armed forces. 
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Outcome: State Monopoly on Large-Scale Violence 
By 2005, the Sierra Leonean state had acquired a full monopoly on large-scale violence. The 
international troops had been withdrawn, all groups capable of challenging the government’s 
claim to the monopoly on violence were disarmed and had lost their power (RUF and CDFs), and 
a reliable army had been created. As the successful change of government through elections in 
2007 has demonstrated, the monopoly on large-scale violence is well institutionalized: It is not 
‘owned’ by one person or party, but is passed on from one elected government to the next. The 
RSLAF accepted that control over them was handed over from an SLPP administration to an 
APC-led government.  The two major political actors, the APC and the SLPP, seem 
committed to the institutionalized monopoly on violence. Neither of them has attempted to re-
politicize the security forces. Furthermore, the regional political setting has developed favorably 
for the Sierra Leonean government’s monopoly on the use of force. Key political actors in the 
region cooperate with Sierra Leone, and this cooperation has been further institutionalized 
through ECOWAS. Both Guinea and Liberia acknowledge Sierra Leone’s sovereignty and are 
committed to control their borders. 
 The organizational capacities of the Sierra Leonean government have greatly improved. 
Unlike in the pre-war era, the RSLAF are well-equipped and professionally organized. They are 
led by a modernized ministry which assures civilian oversight. Unlike in former times, the Sierra 
Leonean army is almost exclusively focused on external defense, although it can still assist the 
SLP if requested. A separation between defense and policing has been mostly established, even 
though there might still be a certain amount of distrust between the army and the police 
(Wikileaks 2009). A major weakness is the fact that the government is not able to fund its 
security forces and, thus, is still depended on ODA. However, as the last section has shown, the 
fiscal situation of the Sierra Leonean state has constantly improved, and the expenses for the 
military were significantly reduced. Thus, a development towards independent funding within 
this decade (2010-2020) is conceivable. Given the success in monopolizing the means of large-
scale violence, the conditions for the establishment of a state monopoly on small-scale violence 
regulation were favorable. The next section will analyze why the intervention failed nonetheless 
to replace self-help communities with state institutions in Sierra Leone. 
 
163 
 
5.3. Statebuilding Intervention and Small-Scale Violence Regulation 
 
Despite the great success in ending the civil war and building an army, the statebuilding 
intervention in Sierra Leone failed to create a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. 
Unlike in Afghanistan, many institutional structures in Sierra Leone were created before the UN 
and the UK started their statebuilding mission. Since the country was nominally a parliamentary 
democracy, the statebuilders did not foster the writing of a new constitution but instead supported 
the government in restoring statehood and embark on reforms. In order to create a state monopoly 
on small-scale violence regulation, the statebuilders wanted to dismantle the CDFs, create 
democratically elected local governments, democratize the chiefdom system, and build a 
professional police force. In 2000, far-reaching DDR and SSR programs were launched, and 
elections were held in 2002. Legitimized by its re-election, the SLPP-led government under 
Kabbah received strong support from the interveners. In the early phase of external assistance 
when the war was still ongoing, the British Department for International Development (DFID) 
supported the Kabbah administration in rebuilding the chiefdom system. After the 2002 elections, 
the external actors (DFID, UNDP and the World Bank) shifted to a creation of liberal institutions 
at the local (Thomson 2007: 22-23). 
The police was initially planned as a lightly armed force that should operate according to 
a Local Needs Policing (LNP) approach. LNP is a different label for community-based policing 
in which there is meant to be a focus on a non-coercive, consensual policing style tailored to the 
needs of individual communities. The immense violence and destruction of the January 1999 
attack on Freetown led to a general shift of the police reform to one in which enforcement 
capabilities play a bigger role. In particular, the SSD was not abandoned but instead re-named 
Operational Support Division (OSD). It was meant to become the armed wing of the new police 
(Krogstad 2012: 272-273). Nevertheless, community-based policing had profound impact on the 
SLP because it changed its organizational culture. SLP officers outside the OSD are generally 
unarmed (Baker 2008: 139-140). The SLP was transformed from a highly centralized 
organization to one that delegated important decision-making powers. “The policy put policing 
decisions down to the local level, but at the same time ensured that policing was carried out in 
accordance with national standards and guidelines” (Horn et al. 2006: 116). 
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In April 1999, the UK re-launched police-building under the Common Wealth Police 
Development Task Force, which was re-named into Commonwealth Community Safety and 
Security Program (CCSSP) in 2000. Baker (2010: 4) argues that at this point, the goal of the 
‘police reform’ was mainly to recruit officers, to provide equipment and to make the organization 
functional. In November 1999, it came to an agreement with the government that a British police 
officer should temporarily head the SLP (Fakondo 2010: 161). The idea was to have a strong and 
neutral police leadership that is not part of Sierra Leone’s patrimonial social structure. Keith 
Biddle, a former British police officer, became new Inspector General Police (IGP) and reformed 
the organization along Western lines, in particular by introducing strictly meritocratic principles 
in the police rank and file (Charley and M'Cormack 2011: 18-19).  
 
The Weak State Legacy Mechanism 
Statebuilding in Sierra Leone failed to create a state monopoly on small-scale violence 
regulation. A long history of weak statehood triggered the weak state legacy mechanism. This 
failure came about despite the successful monopolization of large-scale violence, a committed 
SSR program and the UK’s well-designed police-building mission. As the analysis makes clear, 
neither the creation of a 9,300-strong police force nor the introduction of elected local 
governments could weaken the Sierra Leonean chieftaincy system. Hence, at the end of 
intervention Sierra Leone was a para state marked by the co-existence of self-help communities 
and state institutions. 
 
Figure 20: Weak State Legacy Mechanism. 
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As in the case of Afghanistan, the cause of the failure to monopolize small-scale violence 
regulation is Sierra Leone’s history of weak statehood. The state always had to rely on the 
chiefdoms as self-help communities and never managed to replace these institutions with formal 
local government and state policing. Hence, when the civil war began, Sierra Leone was a para 
state with police forces in the large cities and self-help communities spread across its territory.  
 
(1) Self-Help Community Resilience: The Sierra Leonean civil war began in 1991. Over 
the following decade, most of the state police force collapsed. In contrast, the 
chiefdoms showed great resilience during the conflict.  
 
(2) Government Dependence on Local Elites: When the statebuilding intervention began, 
both interveners and the central government relied on the support of the chiefs and 
local militias. In return for their support, the chiefdom system and local government 
structures remained untouched in the early statebuilding phase. 
 
(3) Capacity-Building without Monopolization: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 
was implemented early on, and the UK took the lead in training a new police force. At 
the same time, institutions were reformed in order to create formal democratic 
institutions at the local level. However, chiefdoms remained in place and their role 
was even acknowledged by the state. 
 
The result is a constellation in which state police and justice co-exist with self-help communities. 
The Sierra Leone is a para state that has no monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. In 
contrast to Afghanistan, the constellation in Sierra Leone is more institutionalized as the relation 
between state and chiefdoms has been formalized. Nevertheless, the continued authority of chiefs 
limits the ability of the state to implement reforms and tax the population. 
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Cause: History of Weak Statehood 
The state of Sierra Leone has never acquired a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. 
Tracing the creation of state policing back to the beginning of the 19 th century, this section shows 
that the colonial rulers had little interest in establishing a state monopoly on of small -scale 
violence regulation. Instead they relied on local elites as stabilizers of their rule. After 
independence, the Sierra Leonean government continued this type of para statehood. Under both 
regimes, the police was not a tool of direct rule but one to punish unruly self-help communities. 
Britain’s main interest was to keep the region stable in order to ensure free commercial 
activity and trade. During most of the 19th century, British rule was focused on Freetown and the 
policy towards the chiefs of the hinterland was one of mutual acceptance. Freetown had 
concluded dozens of treaties with chiefs in order to enhance commerce in the colony (Reno 1995: 
32). These modest goals were slowly replaced at the end of the 19 th century, when Britain started 
to expand its control over a greater territory. In 1896, the hinterland was declared a British 
protectorate (Reno 1995). This massive expansion of political control was driven mainly by Great 
Power competition with France. It changed the relation between most of the elites in the colony 
and the British from a relation among (formally) equals to one in which chiefs had to subordinate 
to the colonial masters (Reno 1995: 29-30). The British concluded treaties with kings and other 
political leaders, which were consequently given the title of ‘Paramount Chiefs’. These chiefs 
could be replaced by the central government at any time, but also received privileges for their 
loyalty. Chiefdoms became local institutions with their own sets of rules (customary law) and 
their own enforcement mechanisms (chiefdom policy, access to land, etc). These self-help 
communities were ruled by chiefs who had to be descendants from noble families. Their status 
was enshrined in a series of laws under colonial rules (Tribal Authorities Ordinance 1938, 
Chiefdom Treasuries Act 1938) as well as in the post-colonial order (Tribal Authorities 
(Amendment) Act 1964) (Jackson 2007: 98-99).  
The first police force in Sierra Leone was created in the early colonial period. In order to 
establish and uphold social order, the Sierra Leone Frontier Police was created in 1808 (Baker 
2008: 132). “[..] in 1901 the Governor approved a system of chief-run police (Court Messengers) 
charged with preserving law and order. These forces, armed with British weapons, strengthened 
favored chiefs against rivals in the name of the state” (Reno 1995: 37). In the 1920s, the Sierra 
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Leone Police Force was created through a merger of the Court Messenger Forces and the Frontier 
Force. As the colonial rule draw to a close the British embarked on several reforms to prepare 
Sierra Leone for independence. The police forces of the colony were expanded rapidly during the 
final decades of colonialism, so that “[between] 1939 and 1960, the size of the police force 
increased almost tenfold from 290 to 2,019” (Krogstad 2012: 267-268).  
Institutionalization of policing progressed in the 1960s, when the duties of the police were 
specified and oversight of the force by the Ministry of Interior was further formalized in the 1964 
Sierra Leone Police Act (Charley and M'Cormack 2011: 10). These early attempts to build a 
modern police force were retracted by the one-party-state beginning in 1978. Instead of 
regulating life at the community level, the police became increasingly politicized (Charley and 
M'Cormack 2011: 10-11). As Baker (2008: 132) argues, “[..] the police were never simply a 
crime prevention and crime fighting force. As the coercive arm of the colonial state they had a 
political role as well [..]”. The regular police was complemented by the SSD in 1979. As 
discussed above, the SSD was located somewhere in between an army and a police force, and it 
could best be described as a type of paramilitary police or gendarmerie (Krogstad 2012: 274). 
Overall, the police was not meant to replace the chiefs with formal government arrangements as 
“[..] the costs of imposing direct rule ensured that this alternative intermediary system would not 
be scrapped” (Reno 1995: 29). Instead, its task was to keep potential challengers of the central 
government in check. The government had to rely on the chiefs to stabilize the countryside, to 
police local communities, and to generate some revenues through taxing the population 
(Acemoğlu et al. 2013: 9-12). Accordingly, the Stevens regime ran a patronage network that 
connected the center to the local elites (ICG 2008: 6-7). 
 In sum, Sierra Leone was a para state in which the small-scale violence regulation was 
controlled by chiefs in large parts of the country. The state police was mostly tasked with 
protecting the regime and balancing the power of non-state elites. 
 
Step One: Self-Help Community Resilience 
As discussed in the last section, chiefdoms, Sierra Leone’s local institutions of small -scale 
violence regulation, have developed over centuries and proved stable during several political 
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transitions. Hence, they can clearly be classified as self-help communities that provided rules and 
rule enforcement for the population and were largely accepted a legitimate. This section shows 
that due to these strong local roots, chiefdoms survived the decade of civil war despite being 
targeted by the RUF. 
Traditional ‘hunters’ opposed the RUF as early as 1991(SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 4, 
289). In the early days of the conflict, local chiefdoms sporadically organized resistance against 
the RUF rebels. The groups who fought against the armed group consisted usually of young men 
from the local area who were members of so called secret societies. These men were deeply 
rooted in their communities and could be described as hunters who, in addition, often had 
knowledge of herbs and medicine (SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 3, 574). The local groups were 
very similar in their setup, although they had different names depending on which ethnic group 
they belonged to. Hence, the militias were called Tamaboros (Koinadugu District), Gbethes and 
Kapras (Bombali, Port Loko, Tonkolili), Donsos (Kono) and Kamajors (South and East of Sierra 
Leone) (SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 4, 289). By 1996, the central government (assisted by 
Executive Outcomes) had realized the great potential of organizing the hunter militia at the level 
of large-scale violence. The government created a unified national framework in which the 
militias should be coordinated. Thus, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) were established and put 
under the command of Sam Hinga Norman. A chief from the Southeast, Hinga Norman became 
Deputy Minister of Defense and, by controlling the CDFs, evolved into the real military leader of  
Sierra Leone. Chiefs were tasked with the recruitment of the fighters (Wlodarczyk 2009: 203-
204).  
Understanding the role of self-help communities during the war necessitates a discussion 
of the relation between CDFs and chiefs. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra 
Leone has summarized their relation as follows: 
The establishment of the civil defence units in the communities had been on the initiative 
of the chiefs. In the early days, the chiefs selected able-bodied young men from their 
communities and sent them for "training". With institutionalisation of the movement and 
the massive numbers that subsequently joined, it became impossible for the chiefs to 
control the membership. Furthermore, while the chiefs' retained symbolic authority in the 
communities, the control of men in arms created new levers of power in the communities. 
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The CDF was organised both as a military and an administrative entity. Each district and 
town had administrators who were in charge. The function of the administrator was to 
ensure the maintenance of law and order, settle disputes among people and encourage the 
people to continue with their daily lives. The administrators had supplanted the 
government appointed administrative officers. Increasingly the administrators supplanted 
the chiefs as points of authority and contact. (SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 4, 302) 
In short, the chiefs retained their legitimacy (‘symbolic authority’) while the CDFs had acquired 
the means of violence that allowed them to enforce rules. This led to an uneasy relationship 
between the two institutions, but collaboration between CDFs and the chiefs was important for 
the legitimization of the militia system. Hence, the RUF did not only fight the CDF forces but 
also systematically targeted chief families in order to undermine the powerbase of the CDFs 
(Bellows and Miguel 2009: 1150). 
At the end of the war, the question was whether the CDFs would agree to disarmament, 
and whether the many local militias would give up their powerful position and let the state or the 
chiefs retake control over communities. Research on the standing of CDFs indicates that over the 
course of the war, the militias had departed from their local roots and had developed more into an 
armed group (i.e. an actor of large-scale violence). The mass mobilization of militias after 1996 
had little to do with the initial hunter militias who had to go through traditional initiation 
ceremonies. Furthermore, CDFs had committed many atrocities against the populations they were 
supposed to protect (SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 4, 294-295). Hence, they had lost much of their 
early legitimacy. The quick dismantling of the CDFs after the war indicates that in Sierra Leone, 
tradition trumped the war-time prowess of the militias. Once the government and UNAMSIL had 
become powerful enough to disarm both the RUF and the CDF, the Civil Defense Forces quickly 
lost their violence-based war-time power in the chiefdoms. By 2001, the chiefs were engaged i n 
the DDR process and thereby de-militarized small-scale violence regulation at their level of 
governance. CDF fighters acknowledged the authority of the chiefs. For example, in Kono 
district they did not disarm on the orders of the central government, but only when their local 
chiefs instructed them to lay down arms (UN 2001b). Consequently, the CDFs did not only lose 
their capacity to wage large-scale violence but they also disappeared as regulators of small-scale 
violence (Baker 2008: 153-154).  
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On the side of the state, the police force had mostly vanished from Sierra Leone. The remains of 
the force were unprofessional and suffered from weak moral (Fakondo 2010: 161). Where police 
forces were still in place, they often had to accept the CDF as superiors. According to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone: 
The CDF became a law unto themselves in all the districts and communities they 
controlled. While there were police stations in some of the districts, the police officers 
were hamstrung and could do nothing in the face of the overwhelming powers of the 
CDF. Police officers were summarily beaten for not obeying the orders of the Kamajors . 
(SLTRC 2004: Vol. 3A, Ch. 4, 304) 
However, this subordination of the police to non-state actors was of little relevance for most of 
the country as the police had mostly ceased to exist outside of Freetown. Even in the capital, the 
SLP had little capacity to police the community. By 1999, the whole Sierra Leone Police had 
twelve vehicles left in service (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 34-35). “In some areas, where state 
presence was limited, the SLP had never been present, and people were only familiar with 
traditional forms of authority; some areas of the country had been under RUF control for years, 
while in other communities CDF fighters had taken over the provision of security, and the 
imposition of law and  order” (Charley and M'Cormack 2011: 25-26). 
 
To sum up, during the civil war power in the chiefdoms shifted to the CDFs. The CDF started out 
as chiefdom fighters but were hard to control during the war. However, chiefs continued to be 
seen as the legitimate local elites and could quickly regain control over small -scale violence 
regulation in their communities once the war ended. In contrast, the state police forces had 
largely dissolved as a result of the war. As the next section shows, this constellation gave chiefs a 
powerful position in the early days of the statebuilding intervention. 
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Step Two: Government Dependence on Local Elites 
When the statebuilding intervention began in 2000, the central government of Sierra Leone had 
lost most of its army and police forces. Given its weakness, the state had to rely on the chiefs to 
stabilize the country. As a result, the self-help communities were acknowledged by the state and 
chiefs were granted great autonomy.  
Dependence on the chiefs was the result of a weak state, strong militias and widely 
accepted local institutions. Early efforts to conduct SSR and rebuild the police date back to 1999. 
Due to its historical (post-colonial) relationship, the UK was the main actor to train the Sierra 
Leonean police. Before being ousted by the AFRC, President Kabbah sought cooperation with 
the British Department for International Development (Charley and M'Cormack 2011: 14). This 
cooperation was re-established after the SLPP was reinstated by Nigerian forces, but quickly 
interrupted when the British advisors had to leave the country due to the January 1999 RUF 
offensive (Albrecht and Jackson 2009).  
Lacking both an army and a police force, and seeking to disarm the CDF militias after the 
war, the government had no capacity to govern Sierra Leone. It thus turned to the chiefs to re-
establish control over the population. Already in 1996 newly elected President Kabbah 
announced that he would re-build the chiefdom system (Labonte 2012: 10). Given that the chiefs 
and CDFs were his major allies in the civil war, a strong position in the new Sierra Leone was the 
price for their support. Although many chiefs had been killed or expelled by the RUF, a return to 
the chiefdom system was possible because the institution with its rules, hierarchies and 
enforcement mechanisms was accepted by the (rural) population. The chiefs provided cheap and 
effective order on the local level. “The traditional justice and governance systems, though highly 
imperfect, are relatively familiar and accessible to the average community members they are 
meant to serve, most of whom are poor, illiterate, and largely disconnected from both the capital 
Freetown and the decentralized state institutions located in provincial and district headquarters” 
(Manning 2009: 2). As self-help communities that provided structure to the local population, the 
chiefdoms were also able to absorb young men who fought for the CDFs and were now expected 
to reintegrated into civilian life (Baker 2010: 11). Furthermore, since the administrative 
capacities of the Sierra Leonean state were very weak the state lacked tax revenues. In their 
traditional role as tax collectors, the chiefs provided the government with a way to create tax 
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revenues without having a strong local administration in place (Jackson 2005: 53-54). Hence, the 
chiefdoms regulated small-scale violence in a country devastated by civil war, and in return local 
elites enjoyed great autonomy. 
As a result, “[r]estoring paramount chiefs became an important part of the strategy for 
regaining control in the countryside and encouraging the return of refugees” (Thomson 2007: 7). 
“Between 2000 and 2002 [..] 149 paramount chiefs were reinstalled throughout the country” 
(Labonte 2012: 10). In the re-established chieftaincy system, the paramount chief is the highest 
‘traditional’ authority. Paramount chiefs are elected for life time by a Tribal Authority (see next 
section), govern underneath the district level and control their own staff. Additionally, they 
controlled the local court system. Within the paramount chiefdom, petty chiefs govern smaller 
towns and villages (Manning 2009: 3-6). Chiefs were able to build their patronage network into 
national politics as they are often members of the two main parties (APC and SLPP). Many 
members of parliament depend in the support of the chief of their constituency. Due to their land 
rights, many chiefs control diamond mining and have thus great resources to influence national 
politics (Jackson 2007: 101-102).  
In the period between the Lomé Agreement (1999) and the end of the civil war (2002), the 
chiefdom system became again a major pillar of the state. Chiefdoms worked as self-help 
communities because they were well institutionalized and could regulate small-scale violence. 
The statebuilding intervention as well as the government had to rely on the chiefs in order to 
stabilize the country. Therefore, the chiefs were in a strong position when external actors started 
their effort to create a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation in 2002. 
 
Step Three: Capacity-Building without Monopolization 
Efforts to monopolize the regulation of small-scale violence began in earnest in 2002 after the 
statebuilding intervention had defeated the RUF. It entailed the creation of formal institutions, but 
its main focus was on the training of a professional police force. This section shows that while 
the statebuilders endowed the state with greatly enhanced capacities, the chiefs successfully 
defended their self-help communities.  
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The expansion of formal state institutions to the local level has shown some progress. 
However, despite international support for the creation of liberal institutions, chiefs had great 
influence on the institutional architecture of post-war Sierra Leone. A major step of increasing 
the government’s reach was the enactment of the Local Government Act in 2004. For the first 
time since the local administration was abandoned by Stevens in 1972, Sierra Leone created state 
institutions at the local level (Labonte 2012: 13-14). Local government thereby became 
democratically legitimized. Furthermore, local councils have also received the right to tax their 
constituency. However, the reform was watered down by the Kabbah administration in order to 
please the chiefs that had supported the SLPP. Since the local councils depend on the chiefs to 
collect taxes, they de facto depend on the traditional authorities (Thomson 2007: 23). At the same 
time the law formalized the duality between traditional and state authorities, thereby further 
institutionalizing the authority of the chiefs (Jackson 2005: 51-52). While the local government 
reform created democratic local institutions, it did little to enhance the democratic accountability 
of chiefs. Access to chiefly offices is restricted to few noble families as “[..] paramount chiefs 
rule for life, and are elected by vote of the ‘Tribal Authority’, a group comprising the members of 
the chiefdom elite” (Acemoğlu et al. 2013: 9). Hence, local elites had great discretion and were 
not democratically accountable to their constituent communities. During the intervention, the 
chiefs also kept their important role in nominating chairmen for the local court system. The legal 
foundation for these powers dates back to the 1963 Local Courts Act (Manning 2009: 5). Overall, 
the formal institutions created by the Sierra Leonean parliament under international supervision 
have created a form of institutionalized legal pluralism. 
While the formal institutional framework has devised roles and powers to the different 
actors, the external police-building mission has endowed the central government with the 
organizational capacities to actually enforce political decisions. At the end of the war, the police 
force consisted of about 6,500 officers who were ill-equipped, ill-trained and confined to the 
capital; it could be considered one of the war’s many militias rather than a proper police force. 
Nevertheless, police men were reinserted step by step into the districts that had been brought 
under army control in late 2001 (UNSC 2001e: 4). However, only in 2002, after the conflict was 
officially declared over, was the government able to field a substantial number of police units in 
cities outside Freetown. However, the number of police personnel was still the same, and 
recruitment of qualified individuals remained a problem.  “By 2004 police barracks had been 
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built and more than 700 vehicles had been provided to the police. Yet at 6,000 officers (2,400 of 
whom were part of the armed wing, the Operational Support Division – OSD) the SLP was still 
too small to handle a situation where: there were still hostile armed groups present in the 
countryside; there were combatants yet to be disarmed and reintegrated; and in addition there 
were rising levels of reported crime and potential political public disorder” (Baker 2010: 4). 
Nevertheless, over the following three years the police was continuously expanded until it 
reached its full strength of 9,300 officers in 2005 (Baker 2008: 140). 
 Internally, the police has become more professional but still struggles with corruption. In 
a country that is one of the poorest in the world, and in which the government struggles to fund 
its operations independently of external aid, it is difficult to pay competitive wages to police 
officers. Regarding this issue, IGP Biddle himself showed some understanding for the SLP in 
2001: "There’s a certain amount of sympathy from some of the populace to give the policeman 
200, 300, 500 leones when he puts his hand out. [..] So it’s a question then, is this corruption, 
begging, or is it really people supplementing a policeman’s wages? It’s very difficult" (Andersen 
2001). In addition, the court system is seen as slow, expensive and inefficient (Baker 2008: 138-
139). Thus, even when the SLP works properly, people cannot be sure that their claims will be 
dealt with by the courts in a fair and timely manner.  
As a result of the simultaneous existence of state institutions and self-help communities, 
the relation of police and chiefs was often tense. Police officers had to deal with a complex 
distribution of responsibilities and powers. As one Sierra Leonean police officer recalls,  
At meetings with stakeholders and key decision-makers, I witnessed first-hand how much 
the locals trusted the Kamajors, which contrasted heavily with my experience of our 
police station, which was generally avoided. I was able to ascertain that the issue was 
mostly down to trust: the Kamajors were trusted, the police were not. Years of police 
corruption had left our reputation in tatters and bolstered that of the Kamajors. This did 
not change the fact that the Kamajors were not the legitimate body to administer justice 
but it did show that we needed to work with them. (quoted in Charley and M'Cormack 
2011: 26) 
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Thus, he describes the process of re-introducing the police to rural communities as a highly 
delicate endeavor, because the aspiration of the government to enforce national law had to be 
reconciled with the presence of strong local institutions (Charley and M'Cormack 2011: 26-27). 
Despite the careful approach of the police, chiefs have felt that the SLP is trying to 
disempower them. Denney (2013: 11) cites paramount chiefs who argue that they are the 
‘backbone’ of security in local communities, but who feel that the SLP is increasingly interfering 
in areas that should be ruled through traditional mechanisms. This shows that the biggest 
challenge for a monopolization of small-scale violence regulation in Sierra Leone is not a lack of 
organizational capacities on side of the SLP, but the political backlash that any move towards 
monopolization could produce. Although (or because) their power does not rest on liberal 
principles such as democracy or equality, field research shows that the chiefs still enjoy a very 
high degree of legitimacy among the population (Denney 2013: 7-8). For the SLP, the existence 
of these local institutions creates a bottom-up problem. Individuals who have become victims of 
crime often times do not turn to the state police. Instead, they seek justice from traditional 
authorities whom they might see as more trustworthy or efficient. The SLP is approached only in 
cases of severe crimes (Baker 2008: 141-142). 
 The bottom line is that the formal institutions and state policing have strongly improved, 
but they have not replaced the non-state institutions. Instead, chiefs are powerful enough to retain 
their self-help communities. As a result, a the Sierra Leonean state has both a strong police force 
and liberal institutions, but is not powerful enough to directly challenge the chief’s autonomy.  
 
Outcome: Para State 
As a result of the statebuilding intervention, Sierra Leone is a para state that combines state 
institutions of small-scale violence regulation with self-help communities. In a strict sense, this 
outcome is a failure of liberal statebuilding because the chiefdoms effectively block the 
development of a bureaucratic state that could make laws and enforce them without local elite 
interference. However, the intervention has created a set of institutions that could enable the state 
to hollow out chiefdoms in the long run. 
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The SLP has made progress since the end of the war. Its organizational capacities have 
been greatly improved, especially given that there was not much left of the police when the 
intervention started. The personnel target has been met, and the SLP is comparatively well 
equipped. Furthermore, a stronger emphasis on meritocracy has entered into the organizational 
culture of the SLP. The police are seen much more favorable than it has been the case in the past.  
Nevertheless, police officers are still not paid well and corruption remains wide-spread. In terms 
of institutions, the introduction of elected local councils could put pressure on chiefs to address 
the needs of their communities. Due to the effective parliamentary democracy of Sierra Leone, 
the electorate could also demand institutional changes from the central government if chiefs do 
not fulfill their expectations or even drift back to their abusive rule of the pre-war era. Since the 
end of the intervention, the government has made small steps towards increased control over the 
local level. Most importantly, the role of chiefs in formal justice has been reduced. The 2011 
Local Courts Act has abandoned the chief privilege of nominating the chairmen of local courts 
(Denney 2013: 10-11). Election procedures for paramount chiefs have also been modestly 
reformed. The 2009 Chieftaincy Act stipulates that the Chiefdom Council should include “[..] 
Councilors, each representing every twenty taxpayers in the chiefdom [..]” (SL 2009: II, 4, (2)). 
“Still, however, the Tribal Authority comprises mostly members of the rural elite; they are not 
elected by these taxpayers and neither is the paramount chief” (Acemoğlu et al. 2013: 10). 
Furthermore, participation is greatly restricted as many women and poor people are not taxpayers 
(Jackson 2007: 98). 
Despite these incremental steps, the available data provides strong evidence that the 
chieftaincy system enjoys popular support. A representative survey conducted between 2010 and 
2012 shows that the police have been rehabilitated since the civil war, but also that it is still far 
from being the sole enforcer of the law (Afrobarometer 2013: 9). Asked whom they turn to if 
they become victim of a crime, the majority (51%) of Sierra Leoneans name the police (see fig. 
21). However, 34% of respondents still prefer traditional institutions over the official police 
force. The picture changes further if one compares urban and rural areas. Whereas the urban 
population has clearly favors the police (67% v. 16% traditional), people living in rural areas still 
have more confidence in traditional institutions (45% v. 41% police). This constellation 
corresponds to the fact that during the war, the SLP was present only in larger cities and, later on, 
only in Freetown. Given that still about 60% of Sierra Leoneans live in the countryside, this poll 
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shows that even after ten years of peace and capacity building, the state is far from wielding 
strong infrastructural power.  
 
Figure 21: Demand for institutions of small-scale violence regulation in Sierra Leone (Afrobarometer 2013). 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
The statebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone has failed to build a state monopoly on violence, 
yet it has succeeded in bringing peace to the West African country. While it has achieved a 
monopoly on large-scale violence, small-scale violence regulation remains in part with self-help 
communities. However, the case of Sierra Leone offers some important insights regarding the 
monopolization of the use of force. With regard to large-scale violence regulation, the case 
highlights the central importance of regional politics for statebuilding interventions. The 
combination of a UN statebuilding intervention and regional cooperation proved sufficient for a 
successful monopolization of large-scale violence. Prior to UNAMSIL, the regional intervention 
into the civil war failed to defeat the RUF as it lacked both the means (equipment, qualified 
troops, etc.) and the strategy (DDR, SSR). When the UN intervened decisively, it took about a 
year to cut off the RUF from its Liberian sanctuary. Subsequently, the armed group collapsed 
quickly and the statebuilders could create a new, reliable army. The consolidation phase offers a 
marked difference to the Afghan case, where the armed forces have been inflated to an absolutely 
If you were a victim of crime in this country, who, if 
anyone, would you go to first for assistance? 
The Police
Traditional Leader /
Tradition Court
Family/Friends
Others/None
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unsustainable size. In contrast, Sierra Leone’s cooperative neighborhood enables the government 
to rule the country with a small professional force. The case of Sierra Leone also illuminates the 
old debate over the timing of democratization and monopolization. Civil war, poverty, ethnic 
heterogeneity, and the presence of resources are usually seen as detrimental to democracy. 
However, the successful institutionalization of large-scale violence regulation has paved the way 
for an electoral democracy which has proven robust after the intervention. The RUF transformed 
into a political party and was defeated at the ballot box.  
 However, the chapter also offers a stark reminder of the gap between large-scale violence 
and small-scale violence regulation. Despite the achievements at the macro level, Sierra Leone 
remains a para state in which small-scale violence is regulated both by state and non-state 
institutions. While the well-coordinated police-building program and the introduction of local 
government have clearly increased the state’s capacities, the deeply rooted authority of chiefdoms 
has led to an early (local) elite capture of the statebuilding process. Although they share the same 
outcome, the relation of state and self-help communities differs greatly in the cases of Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan. Whereas Afghanistan has no officially recognized self-help 
communities, the relation between Sierra Leone’s chiefs and the government are well 
institutionalized. As a result, Afghanistan’s local government institutions are controlled by 
strongmen, whereas Sierra Leone experiences a strong dualism between its formal, democratic 
institutions and its illiberal chiefdoms. Despite being well regulated, the negative consequences 
of para statehood are also felt by the Sierra Leonean state. The reliance on chiefdom structures 
for tax collection and the limited reach of the police negatively affect the central government’s 
ability to effectively tax the population (the so-called ‘extractive capability’). This is reflected by 
the meager tax-to-GDP ratio and especially it’s weak development since the end of the war, given 
that “[..] Sierra Leone’s revenue to GDP ratio fell from 12.3 percent in 2003 to 11.9 percent in 
2005 and to 11.7 percent in 2009” (Davies and Dessy 2012: 7). Furthermore, the state is often 
unable to properly deliver public goods in rural areas. 
 Overall, the statebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone has achieved a lot in terms of 
peacebuilding. The case shows that even a partial monopolization of violence can greatly 
improve the quality of life in a given country. It remains to be seen whether UNAMSIL will 
become the foundation for long-term state formation or whether its achievements will prove 
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unsustainable, leaving Sierra Leone with the preconditions for weak statehood and the next civil 
war. 
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6. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
The international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was conducted to end the gravest violence 
in Europe since the end of the Second World War. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which 
began in 1991, the Balkan region was politically destabilized. The Bosnian War was the worst 
outcome of this process of state dissolution and state formation. Whereas Slovenia and Croatia 
emerged relatively peaceful as new states, Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced a war between its 
major ethnic groups: Muslim Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. As in most other 
cases, the intervention escalated slowly from a peacekeeping mission in 1992 to large-scale 
statebuilding effort in 1995. In 2007, the size of EUFOR was drastically reduced to only 1,600 
troops, thereby de facto seizing to be a statebuilding intervention. However, twenty years after 
the intervention had begun the international community still has veto power over political 
decisions in the country. However, and in contrast to most analyses of the case at hand, this 
chapter argues that the statebuilding intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a success in terms 
of regulating violence: Statebuilding intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in a full 
state monopoly on violence. 
 When the intervention began, large-scale violence was the prime issue. Through a 
combination of military coercion and political bargaining, the parties of the conflict co uld be 
forced to sign a peace treaty which subsequently became the constitution of the new state. Until 
2000, however, there was little to suggest that a monopolization of large-scale violence could be 
possible. Both the former government (Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the defecting Serb 
polity (Republika Srpska) had created monopolies of violence in their respective parts of the 
country. However, the regional structure changed in the case of Bosnia from a competitive to a 
cooperative environment. Especially since 2000, Croatia and Serbia have begun to cooperate with 
the EU and NATO. In this context, the international intervention resulted in the unification of the 
armies into the new Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005. Thus, while the country 
still suffers from ethnic divisions and institutional blockades, the government has achieved a 
monopoly on large-scale violence. 
 With regard to the regulation of small-scale violence, the intervention can also be 
considered a success. Before the war, small-scale violence regulation was monopolized by the 
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state, albeit by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the conflict, the socialist 
police state was increasingly politicized, fractured along ethnic lines, and became a tool for 
ethnic cleansing. Simultaneously, a large number of local militias emerged and was coopted by 
the armed groups to defend communities or commit atrocities. However, unlike in Afghanistan or 
Sierra Leone, these militias did not evolve into deeply rooted self-help communities during the 
short period of civil war. Instead, the population had been socialized into state rule for decades,  
and expectations were centered on state agencies controlling small-scale violence. Given the lack 
of self-help communities, it was possible for the statebuilding intervention to re-build the state’s 
police force. The outcome was a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. 
 
While Bosnia is a major case of peacebuilding research, little focus has been put on questions 
relating the regulation of violence. The most likely reason for the lack of explanations is the fact 
that the intervention was a success with respect to violence: There was little inter-personal 
violence after the war, and no more collective violence between the enti ties. One of the few 
scholars who tried to explained the positive outcome are Berdal et al. (2012: 76-77), who argue 
that there are two reasons for the absence of wide-spread post-conflict violence: The intervention 
accepted the gains of the warring parties, and it deployed an overwhelming military force. 
However, these explanations are not convincing. With regard to the entities, it is true that the 
intervention approach was very careful in its effort to monopolize large-scale violence. 
Nevertheless, it integrated all three armed forces into one national army without any armed 
resistance. Given the degree of military organization of the factions, especially in Republika 
Srpska, the non-violent disarmament of war-time actors is rather surprising. In contrast, the 
argument that the size of the intervention force was the decisive factor does not hold in 
comparative perspective. After all, UNAMSIL succeed in Sierra Leone although it was rather 
small compared to either IFOR or to the failed statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there has been disagreement not only over specific 
explanations but also over whether the intervention could be considered a success or a failure 
with regard to the regulation of violence. In terms of small-scale violence regulation, the failure 
of the EU to centralize the police force and re-order its districts has been interpreted by some as a 
major failure of international police-building (Ahić 2007: 376-377 ; Muehlmann 2008: 14) . 
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Critics are right to point out that the fragmented structure is disproportionally expensive and 
makes inter- and intra-entity police cooperation more difficult (Ahić 2007: 377 ; ICG 2005: 2 ; 
Juncos 2011). However, it seems highly questionable to define success in terms of centralization 
as many OECD member state have decentralized police forces that are controlled by communities 
or federal states29. Another major issue is the high level of corruption in the Bosnian police force 
(UNODC 2011: 23-27). While this certainly points to a failure in establishing the rule of law, it 
does not constitute a failure of monopolizing small-scale violence regulation in the hands of the 
state. The role of the state police in maintaining order in Bosnia-Herzegovina is undisputed. As 
this chapter will show, the most important aspect of policebuilding is that there is no non-state 
competitor to the state’s law enforcement system: The state has a monopoly on small -scale 
violence regulation. 
With regard to large-scale violence regulation, there have been suspicions that Bosnia’s 
armed forces are only formally unified. Some authors have argued that the structure of the armed 
forces is still based de facto on the ethnic armed groups it has replaced (Berg 2014: 158). The 
regiments as well as infantry battalions that are based on ethnic principles, i.e. they are ethnically 
homogenous. In case of increased inter-ethnic conflict, it is conceivable that these structures are 
used to re-ethno-nationalize the armed forces. However, in practice this does not seem to play an 
important role for the armed forces. The regimental structure is symbolic only, and the most 
important operational unit, the brigades, is of multi-ethnic composition. Most importantly, in 
contrast to the army of the FBiH there is only one chain of command in the unified army 
(Maxwell 2014). Therefore, despite some remaining weaknesses it seems appropriate to classify 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state with a monopoly on large-scale violence.  
The chapter will briefly discuss the broader context of state formation and civil war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It then proceeds by analyzing the processes of monopolization during the 
statebuilding intervention by presenting a causal mechanism for each type of violence regulation.  
 
 
                                                             
29 Examples include the community-based policing approach in Great Britain, and the Länder-based police 
in Germany in which police forces are controlled by the state governments, not by the federal government. 
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6.1. State Formation and Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
When NATO intervened in Bosnia-Herzegovina and set out to build a liberal state, it did so in a 
country that had experienced centuries of state formation. Since the long history of state 
formation distinguishes BiH from the great majority of intervention cases, it is important to 
provide this context for the analysis of statebuilding through NATO and the EU. Given that BiH 
was not a sovereign state since the Middle Ages, the fact that it nevertheless experienced the 
development of strong state institutions can easily be overlooked. The formation of the Bosnian 
state has been largely shaped by two political orders. From the Middle Ages to the First World 
War, it has been part of imperial orders. Since the early 20 th century, it was part of Yugoslavia 
until its breakup in the early 1990s. Compared to most other cases of statebuilding intervention, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of a comparably strong state with a developed economy. However, 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the declaration of independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina 
resulted in a civil war that shattered much of the existing order. Eventually, the current polity was 
shaped by the statebuilding intervention that ended the war in 1995. 
 
Historical State Formation 
Compared to typical intervention cases, Bosnia-Herzegovina has existed as an entity for a very 
long time. After a brief period of independence in the 14 th and 15th century, BiH’s social order 
was strongly shaped by five centuries of Ottoman rule. After a few decades of Austro-Hungarian 
occupation, the country became part of Yugoslav states for almost another century. 
The polity that would become Bosnia-Herzegovina later on can be traced back to the 12th 
century when Bosnia declared itself an independent kingdom. In 1326, Bosnia conquered 
Herzegovina, and until the 15th century, the kingdom successfully resisted attempts of its 
neighbors to bring it under their control. However, in 1463, Bosnia was conquered by the 
Ottoman Empire (and Herzegovina followed in 1483) (Lampe 2000: 18-20). As a result, a great 
portion of the population converted from Christianity to Islam. Later on this improved Bosnia’s 
and Hercegovina’s position within the Empire because the main geopolitical competitor in the 
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region was the Catholic Austrian Habsburg dynasty (Oschlies 2004: 745). Already in this early 
period, statebuilding took place through the Ottoman Empire. “The Ottomans successfully 
imposed a centrally controlled regime of land tenure, tax collection, and native religious rights 
that in practice approached the responsible local government that the medieval South Slav states 
had failed to establish” (Lampe 2000: 20). With the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the declining 
Ottoman Empire had to hand over Bosnia to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which annexed 
Bosnia-Herzegovina officially in 1908 (Lampe 2000: 83-84). While the empires provided the 
region with an institutional setting that brought stability and modest wealth, they also hampered 
the endogenous development of Bosnian institutions. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina remained a 
decentralized agricultural society during the 19th century that consisted of a small landowning 
elite (mostly Muslim) and a large peasantry (mostly Serb) that lived in a quasi-feudal 
arrangement. Apart from sporadic peasant revolts and conflicts between landowners and the 
central authorities, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not experience the type of large-scale wars that 
boosted Western European state formation (Malešević 2012: 309-310).  
State formation on the Balkans, as well as in Eastern Europe as a whole, was greatly 
accelerated by the collapse of empires. The imperial era in Bosnia ended with a series of wars in 
the early 20th century. In the First Balkan War 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia 
defeated the Ottoman Empire and pushed it out of most of Southeastern Europe. In the second 
Balkan War 1913, Bulgaria turned on its allies and suffered a defeat in which the Ottomans 
captured back some of the lost territory (Hösch 2008: 182-184). The two Balkan Wars of 1912 
and 1913 marked a new quality of organized violence for the region and Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
led to the death of several hundred thousand people (Malešević 2012: 311). The outcome of the 
wars put Serbia into a powerful position in which it would ultimately be the ‘lead nation’ of the 
future Yugoslav state. Thus while BiH was not actively involved, these wars set the stage for the 
destruction of the century old order in the region and the unification of the South Slav people.  
The defeat of the Austria-Hungary as well as Turkey in the First World opened the path 
towards state formation in the Balkans. Serbia, after suffering huge losses during the war, became 
the strongest military player and therefore the leader of statebuilding. Consequently, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became part of the first South Slave state: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (Glenny 2012: 365-366). The negotiations for a common constitution lasted from 1918 
to 1921. Based on a French model of statehood, the kingdom was highly centralized and for a 
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brief period, it was governed democratically. Bosnia-Herzegovina had the status of a province, 
and in 1928 the first provincial elections were held. However, democracy collapsed in 1929 when 
the king installed a more authoritarian regime at the center of the state. From 1929 to 1941, the 
government sought to further centralized and bureaucratize the state through reforms that affected 
among others administrative structures, the legal system, taxation, and education (Lampe 2000: 
164-168). The first Yugoslav state ceased to exist when the Axis powers conquered the Balkans. 
While the Second World War was a highly destructive catastrophe for Yugoslavia, it also 
triggered another boost to state formation. Formed through the partisan warfare against the 
Germans, Yugoslavia was re-established in 1945 under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The 
rule of the Socialist Federal Republic from 1945 to 1991 should become the strongest period of 
state expansion for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez 
komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ) embarked on an ambitious statebuilding endeavor. All means of 
coercion were directly answerable to the party, which used these tools to defend its rule both 
against other states and any internal competitor (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 172-174). 
Nevertheless, the SKJ did not centralized power as strongly as socialist parties in the Warsaw 
Pact or East Asia did. Hence, during the 1960s and 1970s, the party was decentralized and the 
federal states were strengthened. An integral part of the communist rule in Yugoslavia was the 
charismatic leadership of Tito, who remained a focal point of Yugoslav identity until his death in 
the 1980s. 
In the SFR Yugoslavia, the armed forces played a central role in ruling society. They were 
divided into the regular Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, JNA) and the 
Territorial Defense (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO) forces. The large size of the JNA was sustained 
through conscription. Its generals were selected according to a quota to represent the ethnic 
groups which made up the Yugoslav population. While the army was controlled by the central 
government, other parts of the defense system were rather decentralized. Under the impression of 
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Territorial Defense system was introduced at the 
end of the 1960s. There was no strict separation between the military and society, but a high 
degree of societal militarization. Although Yugoslavia was a socialist state, the main reason for 
the strong militarization was the fear of a Soviet invasion. The system of ‘people’s defense’ was 
meant to raise the prospect costs of any attempts to seize parts of Yugoslavia’s territory. 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 172-177). 
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To sum up, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a republic in a highly militarized socialist state. The 
central government of the SFRY had a strong monopoly on violence. It controlled the means of 
large-scale violence, which in the Yugoslav case consisted of a strong army that was a pillar of 
the one party system. The state intensively policed the population through regular and secret 
police, and there was no non-state institution that regulated small-scale violence. The population 
was socialized into a society that was completely dominated by the state.  Despite these strong 
institutions, the state eventually dissolved and civil war ensued. 
 
Civil War 
NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina aimed at ending a civil war that had developed into 
the most deadly conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The civil war was a direct 
consequence of the breakup of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Since the death of 
Tito in 1980, the political elites of the republics were increasingly polarized. With the end of the 
Cold War, the centrifugal tendencies accelerated and eventually led to the declarations of 
independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005: 192-193). The 
rise of ethno-nationalist actors was problematic for states such as Croatia that hosted ethnic 
minorities within their state borders; for an ethnically divided republic like Bosnia it was a 
disaster. While the Bosniak majority, representing the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
fought for unity, Croats and Serbs fought either for secession or irredentism.  
In the aftermath of Tito’s death in 1980, constitutional reforms increasingly devolved 
power to the level of the states. Reacting to these centrifugal tendencies, Serb elites tried to 
counteract the fragmentation of power by increasing their control over the Yugoslav institutions. 
The subsequent split of the communist party and the victories of nationalist parties in most of the 
federal republics in 1990 opened up the gates for the eventual disintegration of the state (Hösch 
2008: 274-277). The SFRY’s monopoly on violence fractured; its armed forces were increasingly 
controlled by the Serbs under Milošević, while other parts of the federation build their own 
military forces and eventually declared independence in 1991 (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia) and 
1992 (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005: 192-193). The result was a collapse of 
the SFRY, and the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which was later 
renamed to Serbia and Montenegro. 
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The dissolution of Yugoslavia was accompanied by a homogenization of its armed forces. 
Against the backdrop of Slovenian and Croat demands for independence, the SFRY’s elected 
President Slobodan Milošević began to release all military leaders who were non-Serb. Thus, by 
1991 the army had been turned into a Serb-dominated institution. The monopoly on violence in 
Yugoslavia (and BiH) was increasingly controlled by one ethnic group. This only added to the 
existing tensions between the ethnic parties on the one hand, and BiH and its neighboring states 
on the other hand. Against this backdrop, all involved actors began to prepare for war during 
1992 (Burg and Shoup 1999: 119).  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the central government was dominated by Bosniaks and Croats. 
After contentious debates between Bosniaks and Serbs over the question whether BiH should 
remain with Yugoslavia or become a sovereign state, President Itzetbegovic opted officially for 
independence. While he had support of a great majority of Bosniaks and Croats, Serb elites 
opposed the move towards independent statehood. They preferred BiH to stay a part of 
Yugoslavia. However, for Izetbegovic and many of his followers, the rest of Yugoslavia was 
nothing more than a Greater Serbia. A referendum in February 1992 indicated a majority for 
independence (62.7%), and on March 3 1992, in the absence of Serb parliamentarians, the 
parliament voted for independence (Burg and Shoup 1999: 117-118). 
In response, the Serbs began para-military operations and a campaign of ethnic cleansing 
in order to foster control over their territories. The armed forces of the Republika Srpksa (VRS) 
were a product of the retreat of the JNA. Those units of the JNA that were stationed in RS were 
handed over to the newly found republic, giving it a head start vis-à-vis the Croat and Bosnian 
polities. As a result, the VRS controlled up to 80,000 troops as well as “[..] an estimated 330 
tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers, 40 fighter jets, 30 helicopters, and a wide array of artillery 
in use by mechanized, mountain, and regular infantry brigades” (Christia 2012: 160). Bosniak 
forces were only created in late 1992. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ARBiH) was initially disorganized, ill-equipped, and consisted of up to 60,000 soldiers. Croats 
organized in the Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (HVO) and were well organized, but they only 
commanded 45,000 troops which lacked offensive capabilities (Christia 2012: 153-154). Bosniak 
and Croat forces were partly built upon the foundation provided by the Territorial Defense 
system that had prepared Yugoslavia to counter a Soviet invasion (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 
179-180). Within days after the declaration of independence, the state monopoly on violence had 
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collapsed and it was replaced by a market of violence. The Bosnian war had a strong ethno-
nationalist component. In 1991, police units first resorted to tactics of ethnic cleansing in order to 
expel members of other ethnic groups from their territory. To varying degrees, all sides sought to 
ethnically homogenize their polities by expelling other ethnicities from their territories  through 
intimidation or mass-killings.  
 
International intervention began during the civil war. As in most other cases, the intervention was 
not conceptualized as statebuilding from the very beginning, but displayed the familiar pattern of 
slow escalation. In 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to 
BiH in order to guarantee the delivery and protection of aid to the civilian population. The 
mandate was expanded in 1993, when the UN started to designate safe areas to directly protect 
civilians. Although they lacked a robust mandate, UN troops deployed to those areas where 
violence against civilians was the starkest (Costalli 2014: 13-15). In 1994, UNPROFOR turned 
into an actual peacekeeping force in that it now monitored the peace agreement between Croats 
and Bosniaks. The same year, NATO first got entangled into the war when it enforced the UN 
flight zone. Increasingly, the UN relied on NATO to protect its safe areas through airs trikes 
against Serbian forces. Despite initial successes by the well-organized Serbian forces, by early 
1994 the war took a turn in favor of their opponents. After all sides had to varying degrees 
switched alliances, Croatians and Bosniaks signed a ceasefire and subsequently a peace treaty 
(Washington Agreement), effectively joining forces against the Republika Srpska. This alliance 
resulted in the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, today’s second entity. 
The newly created armed forces were further emboldened by the lifting of the arms embargo 
through the US. By mid-1995, the Federation forces had gained momentum and could force the 
VRS into a stalemate (Christia 2012: 162-164). 
It can be argued that the culmination point of the war was the occupation of Srebrenica by 
VRS forces in July 1995. Despite being designated a safe area by the UN, the Serbs could 
conquer the city and subsequently killed about 8,000 civilians. This genocidal act shamed NATO 
into action. With the war in a stalemate and Serbian forces committing a string of massacres in 
contested areas, NATO intervened in August 1995 with an aerial bombardment campaign that 
eventually forced the RS to the negotiation table (Burg and Shoup 1999: 342-344). The result 
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was the Dayton Agreement of November 1995, which paved the way for the statebuilding 
mission IFOR. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the deadliest conflict in Europe since the 
Second World War. Recent estimates of war-related deaths in the Bosnian civil war count a 
minimum of about 100,000 war-related deaths (BBC 2007; Zwierzchowski and Tabeau 2010: 15-
16). In addition, tens of thousands of women were raped, and the war turned over a million 
civilians into refugees (Burg and Shoup 1999: 169-171). 
The following two sections analyze how the international statebuilding intervention affected 
the regulation of large-scale and small-scale violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the next 
section shows that cooperative regional actors enabled the intervention to succeed in establishing 
a state monopoly on large-scale violence, the section thereafter explains how a long-term state 
formation in the Balkans cause the intervention to successfully monopolized the regulation of 
small-scale violence. 
 
6.2. Statebuilding Intervention and Large-Scale Violence Regulation 
 
Statebuilding intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina not only ended a civil war, but it resulted in the 
establishment of a state monopoly on large-scale violence. This section shows that the cause of 
successful monopolization was the cooperative behavior of key regional actors. Before presenting 
the causal mechanism in detail, it will briefly describe the policies with which the statebuilding 
intervention embarked on monopolizing the means of large-scale violence. 
The statebuilding intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina initially aimed at ending open large-
scale violence, and then increasingly sought to institutionalize its regulation. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA) was the basis for statebuilding in Bosnia. Following the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1031, IFOR began the deployment of its 60,000 troops to Bosnia in December 1995. 
“The IFOR mission included ensuring compliance with the cease-fire, ensuring the withdrawal 
and separation of forces, ensuring the relocation of all heavy weapons and military forces to 
cantonment areas or barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces, and controlling 
Bosnian air space” (Burg and Shoup 1999: 377). When the intervention began, there were more 
than 400,000 Bosnian under arms. Coercive means had diffused to different organizational forms 
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and levels: Entity militaries, special forces, police, and larger militias (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2009: 186-187). Since the DPA had not been signed by the elites of the Republika Srpska but by 
the Serbian government, it was unclear how cooperative one of the three warring factions would 
act.  
Compared to most armed groups that operate under conditions of international intervention, 
the entities (and especially Republika Srpska) had very strong military capabilities. The resulting 
weaker bargaining position of the international community is reflected in the Dayton agreement. 
Entities were given the right to entertain their own international relations and they were obliged 
to “[..] provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions [..]” 
(UN 1995: 64). The matter of violence is the major contradiction of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. On the one hand, the DPA and the international intervention were committed to 
saving a unified state Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the stated goals were the (re-)establishment of 
a central government (with the authority to conduct foreign policy), democracy, and the rule of 
law. On the other hand, the monopolization of the means of large-scale violence was left out of 
the DPA. Instead, NATO became the major actor of large-scale violence, keeping in check the 
two armed factions and brokering institutional arrangements to ease tensions between the entities 
(Vetschera and Damian 2006: 30-31). In 1997, the agreement on the Bonn Powers for the Office 
of the High Representative made it clear that statebuilding was the central goal of the 
interventionists. Eventually, in 1999 the creation of the Common Security Policy Working Group 
marked the beginning of external attempts to create a monopol y on large-scale violence 
(Vetschera and Damian 2006: 31).   
In summary, the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina developed only slowly into a full 
statebuilding operation. The creation of a monopoly on large-scale violence was seen as a highly 
contentious issue. Given the military strength of the RS, the goal of unifying the armed factions 
was only announced after the international community had integrated the Bosniak and Croatian 
forces. 
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The Regional Cooperation Mechanism 
The statebuilding intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the longest lasting in history. 
With an initial deployment of 60,000 troops and a highly intrusive intervention style both by 
NATO and the EU, it has also been one of the most ambitious. The outcome was a monopoly on 
large-scale violence, although many problems remain. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a perfectly 
sovereign state: As of 2014, there was still a residual force of 600 EU troops deployed. More 
importantly, the High Representative is still endowed with the Bonn Powers that allow him to 
veto Bosnian policymaking. Nevertheless, BiH has a unified army and a national Ministry of 
Defense, and there are no other national actors who control the means of large-scale violence. As 
in the case of Sierra Leone, this outcome can be explained only by taking into account the 
regional context in which the statebuilding efforts took place. Integrating the armed forces of the 
AFBiH and the VRS became possible because the neighboring states, Croatia and Serbia, proved 
willing to cooperate with the interveners. Hence, the regional cooperation mechanism can explain 
the monopolization of large-scale violence in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Regional cooperation mechanism. 
 
The mechanism was triggered in Bosnia-Herzegovina by increasingly cooperative behavior of 
key regional actors. First, Croatia turned towards the EU and eventually became a member state 
in 2013. Later, Serbia also opened itself for Europeanization and now actively seeks EU 
membership. Both states are pivotal for the state formation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and have 
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experienced a significant transition of their relationships. While in the mid-1990s, both countries 
saw their environment as hostile and viewed their proxies in Bosnia as necessary tools to enhance 
their national security, both states experienced dramatic changes beginning in 2000 that 
eventually redefined their national interest. This change to cooperation made a monopolization of 
large-scale violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina possible: 
(1) Territorialization: The first step of the mechanism entails the territorialization of the 
conflict. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the cooperative turn of Croatia and Serbia 
was accompanied by their official acknowledgment of the borders of BiH. Accordingly, 
they incrementally reduced their support for the former warring factions of the FBiH and 
the RS. 
(2) Monopolization: In step two, the means of large-scale violence are monopolized through 
the statebuilding mission. Without the external support of the neighboring patrons, first 
the Croats and many years later Republika Srpska are bargained into accepting a unified 
army.  
(3) Consolidation: With the help of the intervener, the government creates a national 
Ministry of Defense, and eventually builds the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The army is developed as a professional, affordable force with the main mission of 
conducting peacekeeping operations. 
The outcome of this process was a monopoly on large-scale violence. By 2014, only a small 
supporting international troop contingent was deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The central  
government, while weak when it comes to policymaking, controls the unified armed forces of 
BiH.  
 
Cause: Regional Cooperation 
This section argues that the key regional actors in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina cooperated 
with the statebuilding intervention of NATO and the EU. The regional environment of the 
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina has undergone a stark transformation. There are two major 
dimensions that define the regional context of Bosnia’s state formation, civil war, and 
intervention: First, the Balkans is the close neighborhood of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Second, the 
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Balkans itself is embedded into the wider European context. Initially, Bosnia’s neighbors Croatia 
and Serbia found themselves in a competitive constellation and undermined the statebuilding 
efforts. However, due to changes both in Bosnia’s close neighborhood as well as in wider 
Europe, the regional constellation transformed towards a cooperative environment during the 
years after civil war. This section will briefly discuss the key regional actors, their preferences 
and policies. 
 
Figure 23: Map of the Western Balkans and its European neighborhood (Google 2014). 
 
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, BiH had borders with only two neighboring states, Croatia 
and Serbia-Montenegro. Montenegro eventually seceded from Serbia in 2006. The breakup of 
SFRY and the subsequent formation of new states meant that the regional constellation changed 
dramatically. Until 2000, the regional context of the statebuilding effort was informed by the 
enmity between the former warring factions and states. In order to strengthen their relative 
positions within the regional constellation, Serbia (FRY) supported the Republika Srpska, while 
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Croatia supported Croatian Bosnians. In order to understand the conflictual setting, it is necessary 
to have a closer look at the positions of the two neighboring states.  
The instant international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina made it difficult for Serbia to 
integrate the Republika Srpska into a ‘Serb Yugoslavia’ as this could have been interpreted as an 
act of inter-state war. Over time, the gap between the RS elites and the Milošević regime 
widened. The Serbian leadership had two major goals once it became clear that it could not hold 
together the old Yugoslav order: Protect its territorial integrity, and protect Serbians across 
Yugoslavia. Thus, Serbia became heir to Yugoslavia in that it took over many institutions, but 
lost most of the territory and population to the newly emerging states. The speed with which the 
old order fell apart made it a priority for Serbian elites to safeguard their territory against any 
potential alliance against them. Nevertheless, there was a fear in the Serbian leadership that the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia was part of a Western conspiracy against the Communist regime. 
This constellation created a foreign policy that was characterized by distrust against Croatia, the 
EU and NATO (Stroh 2003: 356-357).  
Unlike Serbia, Croatia under Tuđman was not the defender of a crumbling order but 
president of a new state in the international system. From its very inception, Croatia had a closer 
relation to the European Union as states such as Germany were quick to recognize Croatian 
independence. In reaction to its secession, there was a brief war between Croatian forces and the 
JNA. Croatian elites saw the major security threat in attempts by Serbia to use the JNA to create a 
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or Greater Serbia. However, the JNA retreated from Croatia already 
in 1992. The fighting between Croat forces and the Serb minority that lived in the Krajina was 
more intense. Warfare in the region ended only in 1995 with a Croat victory (Hösch 2008: 281-
283). Consequently, Croatia was both wary of Serbia as well as the Serbs on its own territory and 
across the border in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Croatia was generally susceptible to being part 
of Europe, Tuđman was not willing to make the wide-ranging reforms that would have been 
necessary for further integration (Stroh 2003: 357-358).  
 
The conditions in the wider European setting were also not very conducive for statebuilding in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the onset of the conflict, the European Communities (later European 
Union) was still mostly confined to Western Europe. Nevertheless, it surrounded the conflict 
195 
 
zone through Austria in the North, Greece in the South, and Italy across the Adriatic Sea. As 
mentioned above, individual European countries have partly contributed to the wars by quickly 
recognizing the independence of the new Balkan states. This undermined the early formation of a 
unified European stance towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Starčević-Srkalović 2010: 
112). Initially, the EC made some efforts to mediate in the emerging conflict. However, during 
the civil war, the UN and NATO were the main international actors intervening in the conflict 
(Burg and Shoup 1999: 208-211). The crisis made it apparent that the EU lacked mechanisms to 
formulate common foreign policies and to solve violent conflicts in its neighborhood. 
Nevertheless, the EU was a signatory of the Dayton Peace Agreement and has since then adopted 
an ever greater role in the Balkans. Between the end of the war and 1999, the EU increased its 
footprint in the region through economic assistance, but still remained only a secondary actor in 
comparison to the US and NATO (Starčević-Srkalović 2010: 114-115). Overall, in the period 
from 1995 to 2000, Croatia and Serbia were caught in an adversarial relationship. Both states 
were ruled by war-time elites who viewed Bosnia as a buffer zone between them. While relations 
were ‘normalized’ to a certain extent, they would not become friendly in the short term. Instead, 
the brewing crisis in Kosovo increased tensions between both countries, and by 1998 they were 
frozen again. The European Union played only a limited role in the regional setup during the 
decade of war and intervention. 
Beginning in 2000, the regional constellation changed dramatically. Two factors were 
important: First, the war-time elites in both Croatia and Serbia lost their power due to domestic 
democratization processes. Second, the European Union adopted a new strategy for the Balkans 
that promised accession to states like Croatia and Serbia if they fulfilled the EU’s conditions.  In 
terms of democratization, the year 2000 was a pivotal moment for the Balkans region. Both in 
Croatia and Serbia, democratic revolutions led to a change in power. War time elites were 
replaced by elected officials. In Croatia, Tuđman’s death in 1999 was followed by national 
elections in 2000. The nationalist HVO suffered heavy losses, and a center-left coalition formed 
the new government. In Serbia, protests against Milošević in 2000 led to the formation of a new 
government (Willenberg 2007: 10). For Croatia, the change in government meant a re-orientation 
of its foreign relations. Under Tuđman, Croatia had often times adopted isolationist positions and 
attempted to be neither part of a European nor a Balkan integration process (Jović 2006: 90-92). 
After the elections, “[t]he new narrative was based on the notion that isolation was neither  
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desirable nor viable in the long term. In order to survive as a state, Croatia must join European 
institutions” (Jović 2006: 93). Serbia’s shift can be considered even more radical, as its foreign 
policy was based on the premise that the West is hostile to Serbian interests. …. , this meant a 
complete overhaul of Serbia’s foreign policy, possibly amounting even to a change in national 
identity. Beginning in 2000, Serbia actively sought participation in the international community 
and inched closer to the European Union (Stroh 2003: 365-366). Arguably the strongest symbolic 
act that documents the turn towards Europe was the extradition of former President Milošević to 
the ICTY. 
As a result of this re-orientation, the European Union’s power in the region grew 
significantly. In 2000, the European Union began to offer an accession perspective to the states of 
the Western Balkans (Stroh 2003: 363). On a broader regional level, the EU vastly expanded 
eastwards during the 2000s. After the accession of southern European states during the 1980s, the 
only expansion during the 1990s that had relevance for the Balkans was the accession of Austria. 
However, between 2004 and 2014, thirteen (mostly Eastern European) countries joined the 
European Union. Among them were two former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia (2004) and Croatia 
(2014). Furthermore, with Hungary (2004), Romania, and Bulgaria (2007), direct neighbor states 
of Serbia joined the union. As a consequence, today the former members of Yugoslavia have 
been completely drawn into the sphere of influence by the EU. The Balkans have become subject 
to the EU’s external governance mechanisms, particularly through the Stability and Association 
Process (SAP) which offers the long-term incentive of EU membership (Starčević-Srkalović 
2010: 114-116). All former Yugoslav republics are either in the accession process as candidates 
(Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) or potential candidates (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo), while 
two states already have acquired membership (Croatia, Slovenia) (EC 2014). While this indicates 
a growing leverage of the EU over Balkan sta tes’ internal affairs, it also implicates that the states 
of former Yugoslavia have reached a certain consensus about their mutual relations and their 
place in the regional system.  
All these aspects amount to a deep transformation of the regional constellation from a former 
war zone in which states saw each other as rivals, to a region that is on the verge of completely 
joining the European Union. The relations of the key regional actors in the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina have thus become pacified and are characterized by largely cooperative behavior. 
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Step One: Territorialization 
This section shows that the capability of the Bosnia-Croat and Bosnian-Serb forces to resist the 
monopolization of violence strongly depended on the support they received from their patrons, 
Croatia and Serbia. Once the two neighboring countries started cooperating with the external 
statebuilders and recognized the territorial integrity of the Bosnia central state, the opponents of 
monopolization lost their access to transnational spaces. This greatly reduced their bargaining 
power in relation to the external statebuilders.  
The main opponent of the monopolization of large-scale violence in post-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina was Republika Srpska. RS bargaining power resulted from it autonomy which was a 
direct consequence of Serbia’s (FRY’s) support: RS had access to the Serbian market, and the 
SDS nationalist leadership received political and financial support. The most important initial 
support was the de facto provision of a whole army to Republika Srpska, thereby kick-starting the 
state formation process (Andreas 2004: 34-35). With the help of the FRY it had access to a real 
military force early on. After the declaration of independence, the JNA released around 80,000 
Bosnian Serbs from its ranks. Additionally, these troops could keep most of their weaponry so 
that in fact, the FRY consigned the RS a whole army. They would form the core of the new VRS 
which grew to a force of 100,000 troops by 1994 (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 178-179). 
Financial support was one of the major dimensions of external assistance for the VRS. All of its 
officers were on the payroll of the Yugoslav armed forces so that personnel costs were extremely 
low for the RS (Zahar 2004: 36). The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in the RS acted as the de 
facto statebuilder during and after the war, controlling the state apparatus as well as the media 
(Zahar 2004: 39-41). It is difficult to determine how much autonomy the Republika Srpska had 
during the war. The ICTY went so far to argue that the FRY controlled the military campaign of 
the RS. “Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and other assistance and 
support, but also, and more importantly, in terms of participation in the general direction, 
coordination and supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS” (ICTY 1999: 69). 
However, after 1993 Republika Srpska has increasingly developed into an independent polity 
which was dependent on Serbia, but not completely controlled by it (Zahar 2004: 36).  
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The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 was the international recognition that 
both FBiH and the RS had acquired state-like qualities. They had now clearly demarcated 
territories in which each of them had a monopoly on large-scale violence. At the same time, the 
wording ‘entity’ made clear that there was no international recognition of their statehood, but a 
commitment to the state Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. Nevertheless, the entities were allowed 
to establish international relations. This meant that the de facto ties to their external patrons, 
Croatia and Serbia, were legalized. Serbia’s foreign policy under Milošević was guided by a 
strong desire for autonomy, the fear of territorial disintegration, and the belief in Western anti-
Serbian attitudes and policies. As a consequence, Serbia did not recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as a sovereign state (Willenberg 2007: 9-10). Besides the NATO occupation of BiH, the Serb 
elites had two major grievances with Sarajevo. The first was the fact that BiH was suing the FRY 
at the ICJ for its involvement in the war crimes committed during the civil war. Milošević wanted 
these charges to be dropped. The second point was a more general issue, namely the demand that 
BiH should accept that the FRY was the sole successor of the SFRY (Stroh 2003: 361-362). 
While keeping its distance to the central government in Sarajevo, the FRY entertained very close 
relationships with Republika Srpska. The strong ties with Yugoslavia allowed RS to trade freely 
with its close neighbor, thereby making it economically independent of the central state. Thus, by 
1999 “[..] 43% of all imports came from FRY, while 75% of all exports went into FRY” (ICG 
1999: 10). In addition, companies were part of a highly interdependent network across the border, 
and critical infrastructure such as power supplies were shared between RS and FRY (ICG 1999: 
10-11). Furthermore, FRY actively undermined the state of BiH by supporting radically 
nationalist forces in RS. This further contributed to the deadlock at the national level and secured 
FRY’s influence in RS (Stroh 2003: 362).  
The Bosnian Croats also depended on support by the Croat state, but they were militarily 
weaker and politically less radical than RS. Hence, they were the lesser obstacle to the 
monopolization of large-scale violence. At the beginning of the conflict, the government of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was ethnically mixed but militarily weak. During the course of the war the 
situation changed. Under Izebtbegovic’ leadership, the government side became almost purely 
Bosniak, while the loosening up of the international arms embargo improved the government’s 
military capacities (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 180). At the same time, Croatia was actively 
arming the Croat Bosnians. Furthermore, it was for several years an active participant in the 
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conflict (ICTY 1996). As a result, the Croat HVO could command up to 45,000 soldiers 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 179-180). After years of brutal fighting and ethnic cleansing 
between Bosniaks and Croats, the two sides decided to join forces due to political pressure by the 
US and military pressure by the RS. Therefore, by 1994 the war had reached a very symmetric 
constellation (Christia 2012: 162-164). The formation of the Federation of Bosnia-I Herzegovina 
turned the chaotic three-side-war into a more clearly structured conflict. Whereas the FBiH 
represented about 2/3 of the BiH population, the RS only represented 1/3 of it. However, the RS’s 
armed forces continued to be the most effective force in the conflict. At the same time, the 
international intervention increasingly supported the FBiH side, thereby allowing it to form better 
resourced armed forces (Christia 2012: 165). While Croatia had recognized BiH in 1992, it 
continued to undermine the central government by financially supporting its Croat proxies and, to 
some extent, the FBiH government. These relations were institutionalized in 1998 when Croatia 
signed a special relations agreement with the Federation (Stroh 2003: 360-361). The support of 
Serbia and Croatia thus strengthened the individual entities. While the FBiH, and especially the 
Bosniaks, had a great interest in stronger national integration and the creation of a monopoly on 
violence, the RS strongly opposed such effort.  
The change in the regional relations from competitive to cooperative had a great effect on 
the autonomy of the entities vis-à-vis the external actors. Directly after its revolution, Serbia 
(FRY) started formal relationships with BiH in 2000. It opened embassies and institutionalized 
cooperation, but it also went further by addressing sensitive issues. Most importantly, FRY’s 
foreign minister Svilanociv acknowledged the aggressive character of SFRY’s policy towards 
Croatia and BiH. The President followed in 2003 by apologizing to the Bosnian people for 
Serbia’s/SFRY’s actions during the war (Willenberg 2007: 10). Economic decoupling was 
greatly accelerated by the NATO war on Kosovo, in which important connections were disrupted.  
“NATO bombing has all but destroyed economic ties between the FRY and Republika Srpska” 
(Zahar 2004: 47). After 2000, these connections were not brought back to the state quo ante. The 
share of imports to the Republika Srpsa originating in Serbia has continually decreased over the 
recent two decades, and the RS’ trading relations have diversified (IRBRS 2014). This indicates a 
development away from a patron-client relation to one in which trade occurs with many states 
who have relations with the central government instead of the RS. Nevertheless, Serbia’s 
relationship with Bosnia did not change in an instant, and the process of recognition was 
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punctuated by periods of disengagement. In 2002, it signed a special relations agreement with the 
RS although Croatia had already cancelled its special relations to the FBiH in 2000 (Willenberg 
2007: 11). However, the long-term trend of Croatia and Serbia being increasingly integrated into 
the European Union makes a relapse into a conflict-prone regional constellation unlikely. In 
2014, Serbia’s new government has signaled that it deems the federal government of BiH the 
legitimate addressee of its foreign policy. Serbian PM Vucic chose Sarajevo as his first foreign 
destination, and he has clearly articulated Serbia’s commitment to a united Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Reuters 2014b).   
 Overall, BiH’s key neighbor states have developed a consensus on their foreign policy 
which includes the acceptance of a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina and a strong reduction in 
special relations to the individual entities. To a large extent, this process is driven by a desire of 
the political elites to join the European Union. 
 
Step Two: Monopolization 
Once the conflict had lost its transnational character, the statebuilding intervention could engage 
in a successful monopolization process. This section shows how first the Croat and Bosniak 
forces were integrated, and how eventually Republika Srpska was bargained into accepting a 
merger of the two entity armies. 
At the time the DPA was signed and SFOR took shape, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a 
completely militarized society. Although the country has a population of barely four million, over 
400,000 men were under arms in 1995. This included somewhere between 175,000 and 227,000 
regular soldiers in the three armies as well as militias across the country (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2009: 186). However, disarmament in BiH did not entail disarmament of entities in favor of a 
state monopoly on violence. Instead, the entities remained capable of waging large-scale 
violence, albeit with significantly reduced forces (UN 1995: 64). When the interveners began first 
to engage with the security sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation was very complex: “In 
1996, the concept of unifying the recently belligerent armies into a single command and control 
structure, radically shrinking the active-duty force to 10,000, and ending conscription was 
inconceivable” (Azinović et al. 2011: 31). 
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Beginning in 1996, the first step of monopolization in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a US program 
named Train and Equip. Under this program, the US and several allies pledged to invest 400 
Million Dollars in the strengthening of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
program had two major intentions: First, the US deemed it necessary to create a balance of power 
within BiH between the two entities in order to make offensive action on part of the RS less 
likely. Second, the armed forces of the federation were split into a Bosniak and a Croatian force. 
In order to build functioning institutions, FBiH was supposed to build Armed Forces of the 
Federation (Burg and Shoup 1999: 379-380). While the program succeeded in making the 
Bosniaks the militarily strongest group in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the integration of the HVO into 
the federation remained a formality. In practice, the armies continued to exist as separate forces 
with their own chains of command, even though a common ministry of defense was established 
(Pietz 2006: 161-162). HVO troops also kept the Croat areas under its control (Boyle 2014: 116). 
Nevertheless, the professionalization, resutructuring and equipping of the two forces reduced 
frictions and made eventual integration into a Bosnian army easier (Pietz 2006: 162). Hence, 
while efforts to integrate Bosnia-Croat and Bosniak forces did not fully succeed, they paved the 
way for a future unified army. 
With a lack of sponsoring from their external patrons, both the Croats and the Serbs found it 
increasingly difficult to fund their over-sized armed forces and patronage-networks that were 
supported through the military (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 195; 208-210). In RS, moderate 
elites became more influential as the war-time elites that had depended on Serb support had been 
weakened (Berg 2014: 156). At the same time, the European Union and NATO could offer 
rewards for Bosnian cooperation: The long-term prospect of EU accession as well as the short-
term establishment of a Partnership for Peace between BiH and NATO. Therefore, NATO 
formulated the creation of a national MoD and a unified armed force as a condition for entering 
the Partnership for Peace (Berg 2014: 156). The RS slowly softened up its position and agreed to 
the creation of a national MoD without a unified army in August 2002 (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2009: 208). However, an arms trade scandal in 2003 eventually created a window of opportunity 
for the external actors to exploit the split of the Bosnian-Serb elite (Morton 2012: 519-520). It 
had become public that military elites of the RS were selling weapons to Iraq amid the US 
preparations for war against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The following international outrage 
and the discrediting of the old security establishment strengthened were utilized by those political 
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actors in RS who preferred a centralization of armed forces. When Mirko Sarovic, head of the 
SDS party, had to resign in the wake of the arms scandal, his party colleague and President of the 
RS Dragan Cavic took his position and became one of the leading figures of the monopolization 
effort.  
In a dramatic speech to a special session of the RS National Assembly, Cavic accused senior 
army officers of greater loyalty to Belgrade than to Banja Luka, saying ‘it is time for the Serb 
Republic Army officers to realize that their fate is here in the Serb Republic’  (Berg 2014: 
156) 
In May 2003, the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) was created in order to organize 
the merger of the two armed forces present in BiH. Subsequently, the Bosnian parliament issued 
a law that established a national Ministry of Defense in late 2003, and the ministry began its work 
in 2004 (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 202). Finally, in 2005 the parties agreed to merge the 
armies on 1 January 2006 (NATO 2014). 
To sum up, once the minorities had lost their access to transnational support, nationalists were 
weakened. As a result, it was possible for the statebuilders to merge the armed forces of all three 
groups, an outcome that had seemed impossible during the 1990s.  
 
Step Three: Consolidation 
After the co-existing armed groups were merged into one national army, the consolidation of the 
monopoly could occur. In the process, the institutional structure of the monopoly on large-scale 
violence was created, the armed forces were professionalized and they were reduced to a 
sustainable size.  
The creation of a national Ministry of Defense and of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (AFBiH) was a milestone of the statebuilding effort. Whereas at the beginning of 
the 2000s it was seen as almost impossible to create unified national forces, during the bargaining 
process a ‘minimally centralized’ armed force was seen as a likely outcome. However, by 2006 
“[the] new AFBiH consisted of a Ministry of Defence with full authority in defense matters and a 
Joint Staff with full command of all military elements” (Maxwell 2014: 181). A national ministry 
was of great importance in order to ensure centralized political oversight over the army. Within 
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the army, and unlike in the case of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzeogvina, the AFBiH had no parallel command chains (Maxwell 2014: 188). 
Another center piece of the consolidation process was also the abolition of conscription, 
which so far had provided the entities with abundant personnel resources. Cancelling conscription 
made it possible to further reduce the armed forces of all sides and further professionalize the 
army: “The overall force for all entities has been reduced from a post-Dayton high of somewhere 
between 175,000–225,000 personnel to its current level around 10,000” (Morton 2012: 521). 
Reserve forces, which would have allowed a massive mobilization in case of open conflict, were 
reduced from 60,000 troops to a level of 5,000 (Maxwell 2014: 180). In order to ease inter-ethnic 
tensions and power politics within the armed forces, the recruitment procedures of the AFBiH are 
guided by ethnic quotas. In 2011, the armed forces consisted of 46% Bosniaks, 34% Serbis, and 
20% Croats (Azinović et al. 2011: 31).  
A major pillar of the consolidation of the monopoly on large-scale violence was giving 
the armed forces a new identity. It was problematic to build this identity around national defense, 
as BiH is surrounded by friendly neighboring states. Furthermore, the Balkan region enjoys a 
‘security umbrella’ because it is surrounded by EU and NATO members. Therefore, the new role 
of the army had to differ markedly from the former JNA as well as from those of the entity forces 
during the war. Thus, the focal point of the new identity became integration into NATO 
(Maxwell 2014: 198-190). The modern AFBiH are not meant to operate autonomously or protect 
BiH against its neighbors, but to strengthen inter-operability and to eventually fully integrate into 
NATO structures (Maxwell 2014: 189-190). The Bosnia government applied to NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace program in 2006, and has since pursued a full NATO membership. In 2010, 
the country joined the Membership Action Plan, and as of 2014 only few obstacles remain to 
becoming a NATO member. Specifically, the Repulika Srpska still controls army bases and other 
fixed military sites on its territory. NATO has made it a requirement for BiH’s accession that the 
central government has to have control over these sites (NATO 2014). Nevertheless, the AFBiH 
have been developed into a deployable force that has participated in peacekeeping missions  
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 214-217). The first operation of the newly established army was a 
mission to Iraq that began already in 2005, where Bosnian forces focused on clearing mines and 
guarding bases. In 2009, Bosnia-Herzegovina also deployed troops Afghanistan where the 
Bosnian also guarded allied bases (Brljavac 2012: 33-34). Although both missions only entailed 
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small units of a few dozen soldiers, they clearly signaled BiH’s commitment to becoming part of 
the Euro-Atlantic security community.  
Overall, the newly established monopoly on large-scale violence was consolidated 
through reforms both of the institutional frame and the inner workings of the armed forces. As in 
the case of Sierra Leone, the process could succeed because there was no violent resistance to the 
monopolization process. 
 
Outcome: State Monopoly on Large-Scale Violence Regulation 
The statebuilding intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina has succeeded in creating a monopoly on 
large-scale violence. The central government features a Ministry of Defense which oversees the 
unified Armed Forces of BiH, and there are no more armed groups on the state’s terr itory. The 
state is in the process of joining NATO, although some minor obstacles remain. Critics of the 
intervention will view this assessment with great skepticism, as Bosnia-Herzegovina is still not a 
sovereign state. The High Representative still has wide-ranging powers over Bosnian politics, 
although the role of international actors has become much less pronounced than in the early 
stages of intervention. A residual force of 600 EUFOR troops remains stationed in the country. 
 However, two aspects need to be considered: The first is the fact that a monopoly on 
large-scale violence is a minimal condition of statehood. It does not indicate that the whole 
statebuilding effort was successful, but only that one necessary condition for stable statehood has 
been established. Second, the creation of a unified army was seen as utopian in the early days of 
intervention. For four years, the armed faction had committed grave atrocities against each other 
and against civilians of different ethnicity. The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina today has a national 
army that participates in peacekeeping missions is a milestone on its way to lasting pacification. 
If the modest benchmark of regulating large-scale violence is applied, Bosnia must be seen as a 
successful case. 
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6.3. Statebuilding Intervention and Small-Scale Violence Regulation 
 
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statebuilding intervention succeeded in creating a state 
monopoly on the regulation of small scale violence. This section argues that this success can only 
be explained by taking into account the long-term state formation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Put 
differently, the cause for success far preceded the intervention. Before presenting the causal 
mechanism in detail, this section will first introduce the measures taken by the international 
statebuilders to build a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. 
In order to achieve their goal of establishing a liberal state in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
international actors needed to establish a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. Two 
main means to arrive at that end: First, the intervention shaped the formal institutional setting 
which was supposed to regulate small-scale violence, and second, the intervener supported the 
government materially through training and equipping the police force. 
At the broader institutional level, UN and NATO greatly shaped the post-conflict order by 
brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA has since worked as a constitution for 
Bosnia, and thus also included the basic structures according to which the regulation of small-
scale violence would occur in the post-war society. In article I, the document clearly states that 
the state “[..] shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections” (UN 
1995: 60). The entities were assigned the task of law enforcement: 
The Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their 
respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in 
accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for the 
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. (UN 1995: 64) 
 At the operational level, the intervention in BiH encompassed one of the most resource-
intensive policebuilding missions ever conducted in statebuilding missions. The International 
Police Task Force (IPTF) was established through the DPA in 1995 (UN 1995: Annex 11, Art. I-
III). Initially tasked with monitoring the native police force, it’s mandate was later expanded to 
include training, restructuring and vetting. IPTF encompassed the deployment of 1,721 
international police monitors who were deployed to 54 police sites across the Federation 
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(Dziedzic and Blair 1998: 272-273). In 1998, the program was expanded to Republika Srpska, 
and the mandate was strengthened. IPTF acquired the ability to ‘de-certify’ police officers who 
had been involved in human rights violations during the civil war, and the focus shifted to a 
promotion of democratic policing (ICG 2002a: 7). In 2003, the UN-led IPTF was replaced by the 
European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). EUPM had less personnel 
and a weaker mandate than IPTF. Instead of de-certifying Bosnian police officers it could only 
suggest individuals to the OHR who could then dismiss them from service. Its main focus was on 
the restructuring of the police organization in Bosnia Herzegovina (Muehlmann 2008: 4-6). 
 To sum up, the means of the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina to monopolize the 
regulation of small-scale violence were typical for liberal statebuilding. The next section applies 
the strong state legacy mechanism to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, arguing that the 
statebuilding success with regard to small-scale violence regulation can be explained by the 
country’s long-term state formation. 
 
The Strong State Legacy Mechanism 
The argument of this section is that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s history of strong statehood prior to the 
civil war has caused the statebuilding intervention to succeed in monopolizing the regulation of 
small-scale violence. This clearly distinguished Bosnia from post-colonial cases like Afghanistan 
or Sierra Leone. The UN and NATO were successful in re-establishing a state-centered order in 
which police and justice regulate small-scale violence. This outcome was made possible by the 
fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina has a history of strong statehood, even though it has not been an 
independent state prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Thus, despite the emergence of militias and 
the politicization of police forces, there were no more survival units in BiH. People had been 
socialized into a state-centered order during decades of socialist statebuilding. Consequently, 
state police did not encounter non-state competitors and could be reformed along the lines of 
democratic policing and the rule of law. 
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Figure 24: Strong State Legacy Mechanism. 
 
The causal mechanism is triggered by a remote cause, namely the long term state formation that 
had occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the 19th century. Both the Ottomans and the 
Habsburger have laid the foundation for a monopolization of small-scale violence regulation 
through their administrative reforms. After the incremental weakening of local elite throughout 
the long 19th century, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and later the Socialist Republic could expand 
state control to the local level across the territory. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a state 
monopoly on the regulation of small-scale violence prior to its declaration of independence and 
the beginning of the war. This remote cause triggered the causal chain that explains the outcome 
of the statebuilding intervention. 
(1) Resilience: The outbreak of the war led to a fragmentation of small-scale violence actors. 
Militias, local self-defense groups, hooligans, and criminal gangs proliferated throughout 
the country. However, state policing only fragmented along the lines of the major armed 
factions and stayed in place throughout the war. The only small-scale violence regulation 
that remained firmly institutionalized was the state-centered one (i.e. the Yugoslav legal 
order and formal policing). 
(2) Monopolization: Once the intervention began, the militias could quickly be disarmed. 
Since these small-scale violence actors were not part of self-help communities but rather 
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ad hoc groups, they had little legitimacy with the population and lost their purpose at the 
end of the war.  
(3) Consolidation: Without strong local non-state institutions, the interveners could conduct 
SSR measures and rebuild the state police forces according to principles of the rule of law 
and democratic policing. While rule-making occurs at all levels of governance, control 
over police forces remains at the entity level. 
The outcome is a state monopoly on the regulation of small-scale violence. There are no self-help 
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the expectation of the population is that the state should 
make and enforce rules. This is independent from the question of whether the state is Yugoslavia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina or one of the two entities. The strongly federalized policing system in BiH 
does not contradict the fact that only state institutions regulate small-scale violence. Beginning 
with a discussion of the evolution of small-scale violence regulation during state formation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following section wills process-trace the proposed mechanism in detail. 
 
Cause: History of Strong Statehood 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been a sovereign state since the Middle Ages, and only regained its 
independence in 1991. Nevertheless, it has been subjected to several centuries of state formation 
during Ottoman, Habsburg, and Socialist rule. In the process, self-help communities have been 
dissolved and local elites either disappeared or were incorporated into the state. As a result, the 
state was the only regulator of small-scale violence prior to the outbreak of the civil war. 
Until the mid-19th century, small-scale violence regulation on the Balkans outside the 
cities was in the hand of self-help communities. Whereas the Ottoman authorities controlled the 
cities, around 95% of the population worked in agriculture and were thus located in rural areas.  
Over several centuries, the Ottomans had sustained a feudal regime in which the ruling class of 
the Empire, Muslims, would be allowed to own land. These landowners were called Agas and 
Begs30, and they resembled the nobility of Western Europe. Agas and Begs controlled means of 
small-violence, and in some cases they could mobilize enough men to operate at the large-scale 
violence level (and thereby threatened central authorities) (Jelavich and Jelavich 2000: 13). The 
                                                             
30 The begs were superior to the agas. 
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regulation of small-scale violence was further localized by the fact that the (mostly) Christian 
peasants had their own chiefs. „The Serbs were organized in extended family units, the zadruga. 
A group of families would elect a representative to the knežina, a kind of district council that in 
turn elected the knez or chieftain. The knez dealt with the landlords and Ottoman administrators” 
(Glenny 2012: 7). These chiefdoms had some autonomy as their central obligation was to 
handover taxes to the Ottoman Muslim elite. 
As in current developing countries, the chiefs of Bosnia-Herzegovina managed from time 
to time to build coalitions and act on the level of large-scale violence. One example is the crisis 
that shook the Ottoman Balkans at the beginning of the 19 th century, during which the knez 
mobilized up to 30,000 fighters who first fought with and alter against the central authorities 
(Glenny 2012: 11-16). To sum up, small-scale violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was mostly 
regulated by local self-help communities until the mid-19th century. 
 
The decline of this decentralized form of small-scale violence regulation set in when the Ottoman 
Empire embarked on an ambitious set of reforms called Tanzimat. First announced in 1839, the 
Ottoman rulers tried to monopolize the regulation of small-scale violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
from 1850 on. The landowning Muslim elite saw this centralization as a direct threat, and the 
result were two years of civil war in which the Ottomans were eventually victorious. However, 
the reforms failed to establish a centralized system of taxation and a system of military 
conscription. Thus, shortly after the Ottoman commander Omer Paša left Bosnia, “[..] the tax 
farmers were back in the fields gathering their lucrative harvest while the chief families re -
established themselves and once more refused to send their contingents to the Bosnian army”  
(Glenny 2012: 83). Such pushes for bureaucratization implied a replacement of traditional elites 
with professionals who had received training and who would be selected on the base of merit.  
 After the revolts of 1875, Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied by Austria-Hungary in 
1878. “Habsburg rule shared one feature with the late Ottoman regime that provoked antagonism. 
Both empires sought to modernize tax collection, military service, and education by bringing 
them under central control” (Lampe 2000: 65). Bureaucratization was drastically accelerated after 
the resistance against centralization had been crushed by 268,000 Austrian troops (Glenny 2012: 
160-163). Subsequently, the Austrian Joint Minister of Finance for Bosnia, Benjámin von Kállay, 
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began to introduce a modern bureaucracy. The number of professional bureaucrats grew from 
around 100 to over 9,000 within three decades (Glenny 2012: 268). Furthermore, around 1900 
Bosnia also experienced a massive expansion of infrastructure and the spread of state schools 
(Malešević 2012: 311-312). The thrust for formalization, measurement and control affected all 
areas of society, but the Austrians did not dare to abolish the serfdom of the Serb peasants 
(Lampe 2000: 57). Overall, while the two Empires failed to overcome local self-help 
communities, they had severely weakened local elites through a century of constant 
monopolization efforts. The Empires had unwillingly laid the groundwork for the centralization 
in the future Yugoslav state. 
 
The next two critical junctures of state formation came in the form of two world wars. Both 
brought immense destruction for the Balkans, but their cataclysmic effects also created 
opportunities for political reform. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was officially 
constituted in 1921 embarked on several reforms that would increase state control over the 
regulation of small-scale vioelnce. Bosnia-Herzegovina was re-structured into four administrative 
units (oblasti) (Lampe 2000: 133). In a sweeping land reform, the rural elites were largely 
expropriated. They received compensations and mostly migrated into an urban bourgeois milieu 
(Allcock 2000: 179-181). 
As one of the previous sections has shown, state formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
accelerated during the rule of the Habsburg Empire and, later, Yugoslavia. For the direct effects 
of the civil war and the UN intervention, the experience of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was certainly the most relevant period. After the Germans were defeated, Tito 
officially installed a ‘people’s government’ in April 1945, and Bosnia became a republic of the 
new SFRY. The socialist statebuilding endeavor in Eastern Europe was strongly shaped by the 
state’s desire to completely monopolize any form of violence and to monitor the population in 
order to suppress dissent. Unlike many current autocratic regimes in the developing world, many 
socialist rulers were able to use their party apparatuses to build strong state institutions. 
  As in Western Europe since the 19th century, people were disciplined by several state 
institutions. An important tool to ‘create citizens’ who bought into a state-centered order was 
conscription. The conscripts would not only learn to defend their country against outside threats, 
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but also spend time with people of different ethnicity in varying areas of the republic. 
Furthermore, the strong Yugoslav state expanded the education system so that ever more citizens 
were socialized in state institutions (Hösch 2008: 260-261). At the same time, the last set of non-
state laws that had remained in society was abandoned by the state in 1946, when Sharia courts 
which regulated civil affairs in the Muslim population were banned (Krech 1997: 26). 
Under socialist rule, BiH experienced rapid urbanization. After being designated as an 
underdeveloped region by the central government in 1958, an emphasis was put on 
industrialization. Bosnia saw an increase especially in mining and basic metal processing during 
the post war era. Thus, from the 1970s on Bosnia “[..] has undergone significant industrialization; 
the urban population tripled, while the agricultural population declined from 60 to only 20 
percent” (Filice et al. 1994: 428). The movement of large portions of the population into cities 
has further increased the capability of the state to monitor its citizens and subject them to its 
institutions. 
Unlike in many Western democracies, policing in SFRY was a heavily top-down operation. 
While all police forces secure the ruling regime to a certain degree, this aspect was at the 
forefront of socialist policing. Additionally to regular police forces, the regime created a secret 
police, the State Security Administration (SDB). SDB centrally controlled six sub-organizations 
which were responsible for each of the federal republics. Secret polices allowed socialist states to 
detect and deter the emergence of armed organizations which could have developed into threats 
for the regime. As such, they were an integral part of the monopoly on violence. 
 State formation in the SFRY was not only driven by socialist ideology, but also through a 
competitive regional security complex. Surrounded by NATO and the USSR, Yugoslavia was a 
neutral state that feared attacks from both blocks. Especially after the Soviet Union cracked down 
on the uprising in Czechoslovakia, a state-making was fostered in order to strengthen the regimes 
ability to deter any potential aggressor. Yugoslavia built up its own arms industry in order to 
reduce external dependencies (Krech 1997: 25). Society was militarized through the principle of 
Territorial Defense, which envisioned a total (asymmetric) war against invading enemies 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 176-177).  
To sum up, the state was the only institution in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was able to make 
and enforce rules. There were no more self-help communities as in the cases of Afghanistan or 
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Sierra Leone. When the country declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and civil war 
erupted, these legacies of long-term state formation proved to be highly resilient.  
 
Step One: State Resilience 
As shown above, small-scale violence Bosnia-Herzegovina was exclusively regulated by the state 
at the outset of the civil war. While this order partly collapsed during the war, new small-scale 
violence actors failed to institutionalize self-help communities. Both the legal structures as well 
as formal policing showed strong resilience in the face of violent conflict. 
The onset of the civil war led to a proliferation of means of violence across the territory. 
Due to the militarization of society under Socialist rule, it was easy for the warring factions to set 
up militias at the local level. Militias also played a central role both in defending local 
communities as well as in offensive acts of ethnic cleansing. Across the territory of BiH, up to 
forty-five armed groups were actively engaged in the conflict (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 
180-182). Some of the local actors were able to provide peace among the local population. Local 
JNA commanders or members of the administration sometimes tried to save multi-ethnic 
communities from falling apart. However, these arrangements could rarely be sustained as 
violence would spread once a town was conquered by one of the major armed groups (Burg and 
Shoup 1999: 129-130). Furthermore, the major armed actors used ‘special units’ which could 
take the form of anything across the continuum from Special Forces to local militias. These 
special units such as the Croat HOS, the Muslim Black Swans, or the Serb Arkan’s Tigers were 
strongly involved in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. In Sarajevo, criminal gangs would organize 
early defenses against the Serb VRS until the government could build up its own capacities (Burg 
and Shoup 1999). Although militias played a central role during the conflict, they did not reach 
the status of self-help communities. Local communities did not redevelop the self-help 
communities that dominated the country until the beginning of the 20 th century. Instead, militias 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina were ad hoc groups that were mostly armed by the major conflict parties. 
They did not develop their own legal systems nor did they great autonomy vis-à-vis the large-
scale violence actors. 
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Despite this spread of militias, formal police forces remained active during the conflict. 
The two-tier structure of the Yugoslav police consisted of the municipal police and the Ministry 
of Interior Special Police (Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova, MUP). MUPs were paramilitary 
police forces that could best be characterized as organizations that the government could utilize 
as either large-scale or small-scale violence actors. This dual-use logic was also institutionally 
enshrined; for example, the Bosniak MUPs would be controlled by the MoI as long as they were 
supposed to maintain or restore public order, but they control would switch to the MoD when 
there was the need to mobilize troops (Dziedzic and Blair 1998: 263-265). Due to the top-down 
approach of policing in Yugoslavia where the police was integrated into military chains of 
command, the police forces could easily be used effectively as an offensive tool (Padurariu 2014: 
2). When the Yugoslav order collapsed, each of the ethnic groups maintained both their police 
forces and their MUPs (ICG 2005: 2). One effect of the ethnic conflict was a strong politicization 
of the police forces.  
Thus, they were often involved in ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses (ICG 
2005: 2). During the war, the number of police officers expanded drastically, and an overall trend 
of para-militarization could be observed. At the end of the war, the small country was divided 
among three factions that had amassed 44,750 formal police officers: 29,750 in the Bosniak-
controlled areas, 3,000 in Croat-controlled areas, and 12,000 in the Republika Srpska (Dziedzic 
and Blair 1998: 264). This trend of police expansion stands in stark contrast to the cases of 
Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, where formal policing was reduced to major cities or had ceased 
completely after years of civil war. Correspondingly, the legal system of the Yugoslav era 
remained in place not only during the war but also well into the intervention period (Dziedzic and 
Blair 1998: 290). This evidence shows that the state collapse in Bosnia-Herzegovina was first and 
foremost the collapse of the central state and its monopoly on large-scale violence. Where one of 
the ethnic factions controlled a territory, state law and state police continued to regulate small -
scale violence, although the spread of militias created new armed actors who could interfere with 
this order. 
In sum, despite a strong proliferation of militias across the country, the civil war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has not led to a spread of self-help communities. Instead, local groups were set up 
and armed in an ad hoc style, police forces remained in place across the territory, and the war 
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itself was too short to change the expectations of the population that the state is the only 
legitimate institution to regulate small-scale violence.  
 
Step Two: Monopolization 
The statebuilding intervention that ended the civil war also succeeded in monopolizing small -
scale violence regulation. Without the existence of self-help communities, armed non-state actors 
lacked the power base to resist monopolization efforts of the state. Thus, even without an orderly 
DDR scheme, the disarmament of local actors can be regarded as a quick success in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
The disarmament process in Bosnia-Herzegovina was initially mostly limited to small-
scale violence actors, because the entities were officially recognized by the DPA and were 
allowed to retain their armed forces (Morton 2012: 517). Since Bosnia’s society had been highly 
militarized before and throughout the war, SFOR’s task still amounted to a very challenging 
disarmament campaign. Hence, given the experiences with DDR programs in many weak states 
in Africa and Asia, one could have reasonably predicted that the proliferation of arms, a culture 
of violence, and the weakening of the state had created local actors that would successfully resist 
international statebuilding efforts. The fact that there was no sophisticated DDR program only 
adds to this expectation (Dziedzic and Blair 1998: 270-271). 
About half the up to 430,000 armed persons in the country were not regular soldiers of the 
armed factions. Instead, they were members of all kinds of groups that could be broadly 
summarized under header ‘militias’. Disarmament of the militias mostly occurred even without 
much input from the interveners, let alone an orderly DDR scheme. Instead, about 300,000 
combatants, both soldiers and militiamen, almost instantly laid down their weapons after the DPA 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 186-187). As NATO’s emphasis on statebuilding (as opposed to 
peacekeeping) grew, the disarmament effort was expanded. Disarmament increasingly did not 
only affect semi-autonomous local militias, but it also affected the small-scale violence capacities 
of the major conflict parties which still held on to their special police units. “For some 18 months, 
MUPs in the RS flouted Dayton by carrying long-barreled rifles, grenades, and other weapons 
and acting as a local enforcement arm of the RS government and the Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS) under the control of Radovan Karadzic” (Dziedzic and Blair 1998: 300). In 1997, SFOR 
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began to directly confront the paramilitary police force in Repbulika Srpska which numbered 
around 2,000 to 3,000 officers at the time (NYTimes 1997a). Among these police forces were not 
just those under the command of the RS government, but also contingents which were controlled 
by wartime leaders. For example, in the August of 1997 NATO troops seized several police 
stations in Banja Luka that were controlled by police units loyal to Radovan Karadžić who had 
resigned from his post as President of Republika Srpska one year earlier but still competed with 
his successor, Biljana Plavšić (NYTimes 1997b). Eventually, cooperation between SFOR and the 
new RS government led to the demise of the MUPs (Dziedzic and Blair 1998: 299-300). 
The disarmament of both militias and paramilitary police eliminated the two actors competing 
with regular police forces for the regulation of small-scale violence. Unlike in the cases where 
self-help communities existed, the local actors that controlled means of violence in the Bosnian 
civil war had no deeply rooted power base which would have supported their ongoing resistance 
against the statebuilding effort. The quick dissolution of the militias and local defense groups is 
exactly what we should expect based on the theory of small-scale violence regulation.  
 
Step Three: Consolidation 
The two entities have developed two very distinct approaches to policing. In Republika Srpska,  
the SDS has early on centralized control over police forces. RS has one Ministry of Interior that 
controls all of the police forces of the entity.  Given its ethnic divisions, the FBiH has developed a 
much more decentralized system of policing. Each of the ten cantons of the Federation has its 
own MoI and police force (Ahić 2007: 371). It was this institutional context in which the UN 
would commence its policebuilding mission. 
 With the DPA of 1995, the UN established the International Police Task Force (IPTF). 
IPTF was provided with 1,721 officers who were supposed to be stationed across 109 Bosnian 
police stations. However, in its early phase the task force had a weak mandate that did not go 
much further than monitoring police forces, and deploying the complete force took several years 
(ICG 2002b: 6). In a stepwise process, the entities agreed to major cuts in their police forces 
while IPTF’s mandate was broadened. In 1996, the Federation started cooperation with IPTF, and 
the Republika Srpska followed in 1998. In the same year, the mandate of IPTF was strengthened 
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so that it was able to dismiss officers that were involved in human rights abuses during the civil 
war (Padurariu 2014: 4). This de-certification process was an important step in depoliticizing and 
professionalizing the police forces. In line with the overall personnel reduction targets, 18,000 
police officers were screened, and 793 of them were eventually dismissed from services 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 191-192). From the first IPTF deployment in 1996 to the end of 
the mission in 2003, the entities reduced the numbers of their police forces from 44,000 to 
16,000. While that number was still seen as disproportionally large, it can be seen as a major 
achievement in de-militarizing policing in Bosnia (Perdan 2006: 193-194). Next to these 
reductions in the number of police forces, SFOR also collected 22,600 weapons from individuals, 
thereby strengthening the position of the police (Perdan 2006: 190). 
From 2000 on, the statebuilders shifted their attention from the individual police officers 
to organizational issues. In order to strengthen the role of the central government, several 
specialized police organizations were created at the national level. In 2000, a State Border Police 
(SBS) was established in order to centralize the monitoring of the borders. In order to improve 
the co-ordination between entities and cantons, especially regarding the fight against organized 
crime, the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) was created in 2002. Both of these 
institutions were set up against the will of Repulika Srpska through the High Representative 
(Padurariu 2014: 4-5). 
However, due to the still politicized nature of the police, attempts to reform broader 
organizational structures were often times blocked by the ethno-nationalist parties (Bliesemann 
de Guevara 2009: 196-197). In 2003, the UN passed policebuilding on to the EU. The Europeans 
deployed a greatly reduced force to policebuilding which also included 119 ex-IPTF personnel 
(Padurariu 2014: 6-7). EUPM had a less intrusive mandate, especially as it could not dismiss 
officers for human rights abuses. However, EUPM embarked on a highly ambitious effort to 
centralize the police system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While this project was unnecessary with 
respect to the monopoly on violence, the intention was to strengthen the power of the central 
government. The restructuring of police districts along non-ethnic lines in particular proved to be 
extremely contentious and the RS put all its political weight against the reform effort 
(Muehlmann 2008: 4-6). After two and a half years of intense struggles between the Office of the 
High Representative and the RS, EUPM had to accept a face-saving proposal that barely 
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concealed its political defeat (Muehlmann 2008: 9-11). The international policebuilding efforts 
ended in 2012 when EUPM officially closed down (Padurariu 2014: 7). 
Overall, the statebuilding missions has created a smaller, more professional and more 
accountable police force, and it has established central state institutions that complemented 
community policing.  
 
Outcome: State Monopoly on Small-Scale Violence Regulation 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. The highly 
federalized police structure does not outweigh the fact that there are no self-help communities. 
Bosnian small-scale violence is regulated by a unitary legal system. Legal pluralism does not 
exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as all laws are derived from the constitution and they are enforced 
by the police forces that have been trained by the international actors. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the constitution is an international peace treaty weakens its legitimacy, and there have been many 
calls for the creation of a real constitution. The Bosnian police forces are professional 
organizations that have been largely de-politicized and down-sized to a sustainable level.  
Furthermore, polls show that the system is widely accepted and trust in the institutions is on the 
rise, especially when compared to other Eastern European countries (EBRD 2010: 34). Given 
existing problems as the asymmetric federalism of police forces, it is easy to overlook the major 
success that SFOR and EUFOR have achieved. In 1995 when the intervention began, Bosnia-
Herzegovina was controlled by dozens of militias and armed groups. Even a few years later, 
NATO still had to use large-scale force to seize cities such as Banja Luka from paramilitary 
control. However, by 2005 when the EU embarked on its centralizing reforms, such  
What became clear in the case study is that the monopolization of small -scale violence 
was arguably not the major obstacles of the statebuilding intervention. Instead, the liberalization 
of state power and the establishment of a rule of law system were the real challenges. People did 
not doubt that the state is responsible for regulating violence, but they had different views over 
what such a state should look like (e.g. centralization v. ethno-federalism). It is important for 
future analyses of interventions to differentiate between these elements of (liberal) statehood in 
order to make more fine-grained judgments on success or failure of statebuilding. 
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6.4. Conclusion 
 
The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina offers several important insights regarding the monopolization 
of violence through international intervention. Since the UN and NATO got involved in the 
Bosnian conflict, there has been a lot of criticism for the highly intrusive style of intervention and 
the perception of disappointing outcomes. However, when the intervention began in 1995, Bosnia 
was devastated by civil war and fragmented into two entities that saw each other as enemies. Two 
decades later, the state has a monopoly on large-scale violence and small-scale violence 
regulation.  
This chapter has argued that the monopoly on large-scale violence could be achieved 
because Croatia and Serbia cooperated with the statebuilders. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
especially useful because it shows a within-case transition from a competitive into a cooperative 
regional environment. When Bosnia’s two neighbors transitioned to democracy and recalibrated 
their foreign policy towards EU integration, nationalist hardliners within BiH lost power vis-à-vis 
those who favored integration. Hence, whereas a unification of the wartime enemies seemed 
utopian during the 1990s, the creation of a monopoly on large-scale violence eventually 
succeeded in 2005. 
 The intervention also succeeded in monopolizing the regulation of small-scale violence in 
the hands of the state. Given the large number of small-scale violence actors during the civil war, 
this outcome could be seen as surprising. This chapter argued that it was the long-term state 
formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina that enabled the statebuilders to succeed. Generations of 
Bosnians had been socialized in an environment in which the state was the only source of law as 
well as the only agent who controls the means to enforce it. The deeply entrenched acceptance of 
a state-centered order of violence and a lack of self-help communities enabled the international 
intervention to succeed in re-establishing a state monopoly on small-scale violence.  
 The example of Bosnia and the Balkans strengthens the assumptions underlying this 
dissertation. In statebuilding interventions, the monopoly on large-scale violence can be created 
quickly if the regional context is favorable. In contrast, orders of violence are deeply ingrained 
into societies and will determine whether an interventions leads to a state-centered order of 
violence or a fragmented order of violence. However, the case also shows that a monopoly on 
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violence cannot be equated with ‘good governance’ or even stable statehood. Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s political divisions remain strong and the risk of a renewed breakup of the state has 
not vanished.  
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7. Conclusion: What Future for Statebuilding and State Formation? 
 
I started out by arguing that liberal statebuilding interventions always involve efforts to 
monopolize the means of violence because the widely accepted definition of an ideal typical state 
demands that the state has to have a monopoly on violence. The purpose of this dissertation was 
to explain why statebuilding interventions succeed or fail to establish a state monopoly on 
violence. In a first step, I examined the literature on state formation and re-conceptualized the 
‘monopoly on violence’. There are two types of violence that are typically regulated by 
institutions: Large-scale violence (i.e. organized violence or warfare) and small-scale violence 
(i.e. inter-personal violence). The distinction is important for statebuilding because different 
forms of violence require different institutions for their regulation. Only a state that has exclusive 
control over both types of violence regulation can be considered to have a monopoly on violence. 
Given these considerations, studying the conditions under which liberal statebuilding 
interventions succeed or fail to create a monopoly on violence needed to be split up into two 
separate questions: 
1. Under which conditions do statebuilding interventions fail or succeed to create a state 
monopoly on large-scale violence? 
2. Under which conditions do statebuilding interventions fail or succeed to create a state 
monopoly on small-scale violence regulation? 
First, I argued that statebuilding interventions are likely to succeed in creating a monopoly on 
large-scale violence when key regional actors support the intervention. Statebuilding 
interventions combine large military deployments with massive inflows of funding. Any armed 
actor that wants to resist such externally-led monopolization processes needs to be well-
organized, protect its leadership and re-supply its fighters. Without an effective 
transnationalization strategy, armed groups are unlikely to successfully resist disarmament  
because they cannot sustain the necessary organizational capacities. Whether they can make use 
of transnational spaces depends on the policy of regional powers and direct neighbor countries. 
When these key regional actors deny armed groups cross-border sanctuaries, statebuilding will 
succeed in building and consolidating a monopoly on large-scale violence. However, where key 
regional actors undermine the monopolization effort, statebuilding will eventually fail to disarm 
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armed groups and build reliable armed forces. Under these circumstances, armed groups will be 
able to sustain the organizational means of warfare. This survival strategy allows armed groups to 
withstand monopolization efforts and drive up the costs of statebuilding for the external actor. 
The combination of these high costs and the short-termism of external intervention will cause 
interventions to end before a monopoly on large-scale violence could be established. 
Second, I have argued that statebuilding interventions’ effect on small-scale violence 
regulation depends on the longue durée of state formation in a given society. Statebuilding 
interventions introduce liberal institutional frameworks (e.g. by drafting a new constitution or 
reforming existing institutions), and they support governments in building modern police forces. 
They are likely to succeed in creating a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation in 
countries with a history of strong statehood. In these societies, the state has assumed 
responsibility for rule making and rule enforcement a long time ago. The population has been 
socialized into a state-centric order for decades or centuries. Where these conditions apply, the 
expectations that the state should regulate small-scale violence are robust even throughout civil 
wars. Despite tendencies of militarized policing and the emergence of militias, no local 
constellation achieves the level of institutionalization that characterizes self-help communities 
(i.e. strong non-state institutions of small-scale violence regulation). Therefore, the externally-led 
effort to dissolve militias, de-militarize police forces and introduce liberal elements of democratic 
policing is accepted by the population and cannot be effectively countered by local non-state 
elites. In societies where there has never been a strong state, statebuilding interventions will fail 
to build a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation. In these states, self-help 
communities provide the population with rules and rule enforcement at the local level. Before 
crisis and intervention, these societies often had police presence in the cities while the rural areas 
were controlled by self-help communities; they were para states. Through civil war or regime 
change, state policing tends to collapse while the strong local institutions such as chiefdoms, 
village councils or tribal communities remain in place. At the beginning of statebuilding 
intervention local elites are in a powerful position as the government depends on them, and they 
are likely to capture the statebuilding project early on.  The replacement of self-help communities 
is a protracted long-term process of coercion, bargaining, and socialization. Thus, intervening 
actors will liberalize institutions and build police forces, but they will refrain from engaging in a 
true monopolization process. As a result, the outcome of intervention is a return to para 
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statehood: The state has no monopoly on small-scale violence regulation as state and non-state 
institutions of small-scale violence regulation co-exist. Overall, the two conditions were analyzed 
separately in order to increase analytical leverage. However, statebuilding interventions could 
only lead to a full monopoly on violence where both conditions were present. 
 In order to develop these causal mechanisms and test them, I conducted three case studies. 
By providing three detailed process-tracing analyses I sought to present evidence for my 
theoretical argument and discuss alternative explanations. Each case study first contextualized the 
intervention by providing a brief history of state formation, and then provided distinctive 
analyses for each of the two types of violence regulation. Overall, the cases provided strong 
evidence for my proposed explanation. The two young states with a history of colonization, 
Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, both had weak central governments throughout their histories. 
Despite the external actors’ great investments into liberal institutions and capable police forces, 
the existing social structures prevented a successful monopolization of small-scale violence. Self-
help communities proved too deeply rooted in society, and local elites who gained their power 
from these institutions continue to dominate the politics of the state. Although the two states have 
similar social structures, large-scale violence regulation has succeeded only in one of them.  
Whereas the second biggest liberal statebuilding intervention in history (in terms of troops 
deployed) has not prevented Afghanistan from entering its fourth decade of civil war, the 
intervention in Sierra Leone can be considered one of the most successful statebuilding missions. 
While neither the small differences in intervention-related factors nor domestic structures offered 
convincing explanations for the variation, there was strong evidence that the regional political 
constellation greatly influenced the ability of the statebuilders to monopolize the means of 
warfare. In Afghanistan, the major armed groups all operated across the border with Pakistan. 
Therefore, they could sustain a rebellion against NATO for over a decade. In contrast, the RUF in 
Sierra Leone collapsed quickly once a regional coalition and UN forces deprived it of its Liberian 
cross-border sanctuary. 
Compared to Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared to be an 
outlier. Despite never being a sovereign state until the 1990s, it had a history of strong statehood. 
The foundations for the successful monopolization of small-scale violence regulation reach back 
to the tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Thus, efforts of the 
statebuilders to monopolize small-scale violence regulation in the hands of the state were 
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successful as they amounted to a reconstruction of institutions that have been unrivalled in 
Bosnian society. However, as I have argued, when it comes to large-scale violence, Sierra Leone 
and Bosnia shared a favorable regional setting. Unlike in other regions of the world,  the 
interveners (NATO and EU) were so powerful in the Balkans that they could help transform the 
regional political context to a certain extent. Thereby, key regional actors changed their stance 
towards BiH during the statebuilding intervention. While the monopolization of violence in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was overall successful, the case has also shown that a stable state cannot 
rely solely on its control over means of coercion. Political divisions along ethnic and entity lines 
remain potential causes of instability. Nevertheless, political integration will be easier under the 
security umbrella that the state monopoly on violence provides. 
 
Does the theory work for other cases of liberal statebuilding intervention? 
In the beginning I decided to limit my universe of cases in order to control for several potential 
explanatory factors. Limiting the population should increase the likelihood that the findings of a 
small-n comparison are generalizable to other cases of the phenomenon. There is of course no 
room here for further case studies, but it might be useful to check the plausibility of my 
explanation for other cases. Hence, I will briefly discuss three major statebuilding endeavors in 
light of my findings: Liberia, Iraq, and Kosovo.  
 
Liberia 
As the case study on Sierra Leone has shown, the Sierra Leonean and the Liberian civil wars 
were deeply interwoven. Intervention in Liberia began in 2003, at a time when Sierra Leone was 
already pacified. The statebuilding intervention in Liberia has not yet resulted in a consolidated 
monopoly on large-scale violence although all armed groups have been disarmed. Hence, 
whether the state will eventually have exclusive control over the means of warfare is yet to be 
seen. In contrast, Liberia is a para state and there a few signs that the intervention could result in 
a state monopoly on small-scale violence regulation.  
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 In terms of large-scale violence regulation, the outcome of the intervention can best be 
described as a qualified success. There has been no more fighting in Liberia since the beginning 
of the intervention. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) succeeded in quickly disarming the 
three armed groups; by the end of 2004, over 100,000 combatants had been disarmed (Munive 
and Jakobsen 2012: 365). The creation of new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was undertaken 
by the US and began in 2005 with the dismantling of all old defense structures (Nilsson and 
Kovacs 2013: 6-8). Since 2006, US trainers have rebuilt a small professional army of about 2,000 
soldiers. Although the size of the force might raise concerns about its effectiveness, it makes the 
army much more affordable for a poor country like Liberia (Nilsson and Kovacs 2013: 11). 
Despite progress in the realms of DDR and SSR, UNMIL still has a substantial troop deployment 
in Liberia (about 7,000). Thus, it is too early for a conclusive assessment of the o utcome. 
However, it is possible to investigate whether we find evidence for the regional cooperation 
mechanism in Liberia. Liberia and Sierra Leone are neighbor states and hence are part of the 
same region. Therefore, many insights from the Sierra Leone case study also apply to Liberia. 
Major regional actors such as Nigeria and Liberia’s neighbors have supported the intervention. 
ECOWAS militarily intervened in Liberia, mainly with Nigerian troops. Neighboring Côte 
d’Ivoire and Guinea supported anti-Taylor forces, thereby forcing the government indirectly to 
agree to the peacekeeping mission (ICG 2003). Taylor’s National Patriot Front of Liberia 
received strong support from Cote d’Ivoire in the early stages of the First Liberian Civil War. In 
2003, the new Ivorian government had turned against Taylor and started supporting the armed 
group Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) (Hazen 2013: 131-133). By summer 2003, 
the rebel groups had surrounded the capital. Pressure by regional and international actors led to 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which included the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force (Gerdes 2013a: 165-168). Overall, there is some evidence that the regional 
cooperation mechanism is at work in Liberia, and that the country might be on a path towards a 
consolidated monopoly on large-scale violence. 
 At the level of small-scale violence, Liberia also shares many features with Sierra Leone.  
Although Liberia has never been a colony, it also never had a strong state. Liberia’s self-help 
communities in many respects resemble Sierra Leone’s chieftaincies, but they are more informal 
(and perhaps therefore, they are also less well researched). There are chiefs and elders at different 
levels of hierarchy, ranging from quarter chiefs to paramount chiefs  (Isser et al. 2009: 23). 
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Furthermore, different forms of watch groups or vigilante groups have formed (Kantor and 
Persson 2010: 21-22). Again, as predicted by the weak state legacy mechanism, self-help 
communities have existed prior to and after the civil war. As Isser et al. (Isser et al. 2009: 25) 
have pointed out, “[..] customary institutions and practices of justice have clearly survived 
Liberia’s devastating civil war and remain active in virtually all of Liberia’s rural communities”. 
In addition to these institutions, many communities were also controlled by local commanders 
during the war. When the state of Liberia was rebuilt after 2003, many local elites managed to tap 
into the new institutions and re-establish patrimonial networks between rural hinterlands and 
Monrovia (Reno 2008: 395-397). When the statebuilding intervention began in 2003, the state 
police force was in shambles. Since then, UNMIL has sought to rebuild the Liberia National 
Police (LNP). Compared to its neighbor country, the police-building process in Liberia has 
proven more difficult. Within its first ten years, the LNP failed to reach the personnel strength 
that was deemed necessary for the population size of Liberia and over thousand international 
police trainers are still deployed (Caparini 2014: 11-15). Therefore, the police-building efforts in 
Liberia were less effective than those in neighboring Sierra Leone (Kantor and Persson 2010: 16-
17). Overall, Liberia’s small-scale violence regulation is conducted both by a deficient police 
force and by self-help communities. Therefore, even if the monopolization of large-scale violence 
will eventually succeed, the intervention has not led to a full monopoly on violence. 
 
Iraq 
A major case of international statebuilding was the US mission Iraq Freedom. The Iraq War was 
no post-conflict peacebuilding mission, but a regime change intervention. Unlike many other 
cases where mission creep turned light foot print peacekeeping into complex statebuilding 
interventions, the war in Iraq was followed instantly by wide-ranging reforms that resembled the 
American occupation of Germany after World War II. Iraq was put under control of a Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) which governed the country and took drastic measures to build new 
security forces from scratch (Ricks 2007). Nevertheless, the statebuilding effort failed to 
monopolize both large-scale violence and small-scale violence regulation. There is some 
evidence that the same mechanisms were at work as in the three case studies of this dissertation.  
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Large-scale violence monopolization has largely failed. At the regional level, the US 
intervention in Iraq was opposed by all of Iraq’s neighboring countries except Kuwait. Regional 
powers had greatly diverging interests with regard to Iraq. Iran opposed Saddam Hussein’s 
regime as well as the US, and it responded to the invasion by supporting Shia parties and militias. 
Complementarily, Saudi-Arabia feared a strengthening of Shia Islam and Iran’s power in the 
region (Nasr and Takeyh 2008). Both Syria and Turkey opposed the American war. As a resul t, 
the three ethnic groups of Iraq were supported by different regional actors and were all able to 
sustain means of large-scale violence to varying degrees. The Sunni insurgency that was focused 
mainly on the Anbar province consisted of several elements. In its early phase, Baathists were 
crucial for setting up the rebellion. However, foreign fighters under the label of Al-Qaida in Iraq 
took control and became the major armed group of the region (Baram 2005). While there is no 
conclusive data on the Anbar insurgents, the rate of foreigners in the ranks of al -Qaida was 
extremely high. Many of the insurgents fighting in the Iraq war were ‘foreign fighters’ from the 
region (Guardian 2007b). Syria used its control over the border region as a policy tool by 
increasing and reducing the flow of resupplies (WashingtonPost 2005). At the height of the 
conflict, US officials estimated that up to 90% of foreign fighters entered Iraq via Syria 
(Guardian 2007a). Meanwhile, the Kurdish autonomous region could defend its quasi-statehood 
due to its military strength. Unlike in the case of al-Qaida in Iraq or the Shia militias, the 
statebuilders did refrain from disarming and integrating the Kurds. On the one hand, Kurdistan 
was very stable in comparison to other parts of the country. On the other hand, the costs of 
disarming the Kurds would have been immense for the US and the Iraqi government. After 
informal contacts with the Turkish intelligence apparatus were developed in 2005, Kurdistan has 
developed increasingly formal relations with Turkey which allowed it to sell oil and become 
fiscally more independent of Bagdad (Cagaptay and Evans 2012: 15-18). At the time of writing, 
the war between the armed group Islamic State and a wide range of regional actors underlines the 
importance of regionally accepted territoriality for the creation of stable monopolies on large-
scale violence. 
At the level of small-scale violence regulation, many have mistaken Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein for a modern state that could directly rule over its population. In fact, this was not the 
case as the regime greatly depended on its alliance with various tribes. Although there were 
attempts at monopolizing small-scale violence regulation at the height of Saddam Hussein’s  
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power, he had to resort to cooperation with the tribes after lost wars against Iran and the US 
weakened Iraq’s state (Baram 1997: 10-12). The Iraqi National Police remained a militarized and 
corrupt force with weak ties to local communities (Deflem and Sutphin 2006: 269). However, it 
took the US interveners several years to recognize the strength of self-help communities. Despite 
a massive expansion of the Iraqi police force, Sunni tribes remain important self-help 
communities. Arguably, the tribes have even become stronger since the National Police was used 
as a tool of ethnic cleansing by the Shia-dominated Ministry of Defense during the civil war of 
2006-2007 (Dodge 2012). The case of Iraq also highlights the interaction between self-help 
communities, armed groups and the state. Whereas the security forces were seen as Shia tools for 
ethnic cleansing, al-Qaida appeared to be the more bearable option. However, when the US 
assured the tribes that they would enjoy protection and a greater role in the new state, the tribal 
leaders joined the US offensive against al-Qaida. When it became clear that after the US 
withdrawal, the Iraqi government would once again exclude the Sunnis from policy-making, the 
tribes embraced an armed group that opposed the state (NYTimes 2014c). The example of 
Fallujah is instructive when it comes to small-scale violence regulation: Since the US invasion of 
Iraq, the city has been conquered by several armed actors including US forces, the Iraqi 
government, al-Qaida and the Islamic State. During this period, tribal sheiks have remained the 
dominant local elites and have constantly tried to secure the safety of their self-help communities 
by balancing and bandwagoning the large-scale violence actors (Green 2010: 594-598 ; 
WashingtonPost 2014) (Christia 2012: 236). The bottom line is that the exclusion of local elites 
from the statebuilding process makes it easier for armed groups with access to external assistance 
to expand their territorial control. 
 
Kosovo 
As in the case of Liberia, intervention in Kosovo is still ongoing. Similar to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
until 2005, the overall outcome of statebuilding in Kosovo can be described as a fragmented 
state: While small-scale violence regulation is completely bureaucratized, the central government 
has no monopoly on large-scale violence. In terms of large-scale violence, the intervention of 
NATO and the UN has so far failed because North Kosovo, which has a Serb majority, still 
resists the integration into a unified state. Although Kosovo is located in the same region as 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb government does not cooperate with the statebuilders because it 
views Kosovo as Serb territory (BTI 2014c: 5-6). Thus, political parties and nationalist hardliners 
have received strong political and monetary support by Serbia (ICG 2011: 3-5). Outside these 
territories, monopolization has succeeded by disarming the irregular Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and by creating of a 2,500-strong armed Kosovo Security Force (Baliqi 2012: 26-27). As 
in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is a chance that the EU eventually transforms the 
regional constellation. The long-term question for Kosovo’s monopolization of large-scale 
violence regulation will be whether Serbia values EU membership higher than its claims to 
Kosovo. 
However, in most parts of the country a state monopoly on small-scale violence has been 
achieved. Kosovo has experienced a state formation process that can be compared to Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s. It has been subject to the same set of tanzimat reforms as other Ottoman 
provinces, and since 1912 it has been subject to monopolization processes in Serbia and later 
Yugoslavia (Glenny 2012: 366-368). However, this process had been partly reversed after the 
Milosevic government began excluding non-Serbs from state institutions. Wilson (2006: 157) 
argues that in response, “[..], ethnic Albanians returned to using traditional alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms and reconciliation councils, essentially a form of arbitration overseen by 
village elders”. Nevertheless, these provisional justice mechanisms have arguably not achieved 
the degree of institutionalized small-scale violence regulation that can be observed in cases such 
as Afghanistan or East Timor. After the war the UN was involved in drafting a liberal 
constitution (ICG 2011: 2), and UNMIK International Civilian Police (CIVPOL) began to rebuild 
the police as a democratically accountable force of 4,000 police officers (Baliqi 2012: 27-28). 
Overall, the police and justice system have been rebuilt as a liberal order that provides public 
security (Wilson 2006: 167-172). The case of Kosovo thus by and large corroborates my theory, 
although more research would be needed on the role of traditional justice in Kosovo prior to the 
intervention. 
 
In sum, the brief discussion of statebuilding intervention cases indicates that the explanation 
works fairly well for the general population (see table 1). However, the cases also show that the 
connection between armed groups and self-help communities might be of greater importance in 
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some cases than in those I have studied. Furthermore, the case of Kosovo prompts questions 
about the speed with which self-help communities can (re-)emerge during times when the state is 
absent as a regulator of small-scale violence. I will now conclude the dissertation by discussing 
the wider implications of my findings for scholars and policy-makers. 
 
Contributions and Future Research 
What implications do my findings have for peacebuilding research and related fields of study? In 
recent years, peacebuilding research has experience a so-called ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2013). Scholars have increasingly focused on the local level of conflict-ridden 
societies in order to explain the outcomes if interventions (Autessere 2010; Boege et al. 2008; 
Mac Ginty 2010a; Manning 2003; Richmond 2010; Schetter et al. 2006; Wallis 2012). These 
efforts were highly important as they have uncovered the hitherto hidden local social structures 
that had been neglected by the first wave of statebuilding research. My analysis of small-scale 
violence owes much to the theoretical and empirical insights that has been generated by this 
strand of research. However, there has been a tendency to increasingly depict ‘the local’ as a 
micro cosmos that is rather detached from national politics. As Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 
769) argue, “[a] local peace may be influenced by a formal peace accord, or national political 
dynamics, but it is designed locally and may buck national or international trends”. They criticize 
‘liberal’ approaches that emphasize the embeddednes of the local in wider state structures (Mac 
Ginty and Richmond 2013: 779-780). In contrast, my dissertation corroborates the arguments of 
scholars who see local actors as strongly interdependent with both the central government and 
intervening actors (Autessere 2010; Barnett and Zuercher 2009; De Waal 2009). My contribution 
to the latter school of thought is a more institutionalist perspective: So far, the existence of local 
elites (in the form of ‘strongmen’, ‘elders’, ‘warlords’, etc.) has often been taken for granted. A 
stronger focus on local institutions could illuminate local elites’ sources of power and authority, 
which in turn would improve our understanding of the relation between local elites and central 
governments. Therefore, an institutionalist approach to small-scale violence regulation will 
improve our understanding of current patterns of statebuilding and state formation in developing 
countries. 
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Whereas the local has received a lot of attention in recent years, the regional level has 
oddly been ignored. Despite growing interest in state formation, the centrality of the region for 
the emergence of modern states has been neglected by statebuilding scholars. To my knowledge, 
Haldén (2010, 2013) has so far been the only one who has taken the effects of regional social 
systems on statebuilding seriously. This is even more surprising given the fact that other fields 
have been debating the role of regional politics for over a decade. Since the introduction of the 
concept of regional security complexes in International Relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003), 
recent advances in the study of civil war (Gleditsch 2007; Pugh et al. 2003; Salehyan 2007) and 
democratization (Zuercher et al. 2013) have revealed the strong clustering of certain political 
phenomena in regions. My dissertation has shown that these insights are of great relevance for 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. However, my findings also have an implication for the study of 
civil war. The ‘bad neighborhood’ argument on which I partly based my argument is a useful but 
incomplete approach (Gleditsch 2007; Hazen 2013). While the findings from Afghanistan and the 
early phase of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina support the argument that armed groups 
benefit from cross-border support, the theory needs to be amended by including a ‘good 
neighborhood’ aspect: Statebuilding can be greatly accelerated by regional cooperation.  
Therefore, future research on interventions as well as on civil war has to place a much greater 
emphasis on the regional actors and institutions that could potentially affect the internal dynamics 
of statebuilding. Any study that focuses only on the national level runs the risk of omitting crucial 
variables. 
This dissertation aimed at providing a theoretical framework that allows researchers to 
analyze the relation of statebuilding interventions and violence regulation. It developed a theory 
and then put it to the test in three case studies. This approach has of course clear limitations. For 
one, the study could have benefited from data collected specifically for the analysis of violence 
regulation. However, systematic field work in three (former) conflict zones was beyond the scope 
of this doctoral project. Furthermore, the generalizability of my findings is limited by the small 
sample of cases. Finally, I have focused only on a very tightly defined population of cases. From 
these limitations follow two imperatives for future research. One option for further research is to 
build and test more generalizable theories based on my analytical framework. For example, 
expanding the population would make the theory more amenable to large-N studies. However, 
this would also require amending central concepts by strengthening their operationalization. Do 
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the general assumptions hold across all cases of peacekeeping interventions? Are there regions or 
types of states that work entirely differently than we would expect based on the theory proposed 
in this book?  
Second, detailed field work could improve or alter the causal mechanisms that have been 
explicated in this study. With regard to large-scale violence, there is still much to be learned 
about the organization of armed groups as well as about the politics that occur at a regional level. 
In settings where political elites do not produce as much formalized paperwork as EU leaders in 
Brussels do, tracing decision-making is much harder without access to the actors involved. Better 
data on these processes is hard to come by but would immensely improve our understanding of 
state formation and state collapse. With regard to small-scale violence, there has been very little 
research on what I have called self-help communities. There are many potential research 
questions that would require a combination of in-depth field work and comparative methods. 
What types of self-help communities exist? How do they regulate violence in practice, and what 
other functions do these institutions fulfill for their constituencies? What are the major sources of 
authority for local elites in different forms of self-help institutions? Apart from these micro-level 
issues, another important aspect is the connection between self-help institutions and large-scale 
violence dynamics. First steps in this area have been taken by scholars of militias in civil wars. 
As my discussion of these actors has shown, militias often operate at the intersection of micro 
and macro level violence. Some of them are just well armed self-help communities who defend 
their local area against a large-scale violence actor. Other militias are alliances of self-help 
communities and become themselves major actors in civil wars. Militia politics are only one 
example of the interactions between actors and institutions of micro-level and macro-level 
violence. Research in these areas is costly and often dangerous, but the field of study has great 
potential to improve and to alter our understanding of violence, war, and social order. 
 
Policy Implications and Outlook 
For policymakers and weak state societies, my dissertation provides three major practical 
conclusions with regard to limitations of interventions, conditions for successful statebuilding, 
and the flexibility of statebuilding. 
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First, there are clear limitations to what statebuilding interventions can achieve. I have 
argued that interveners cannot successfully monopolize the means of violence against the 
interests of states in the region (large-scale violence) or those of powerful local elites (small-scale 
violence). Whereas problem-solving scholars have suggested that statebuilding can succeed if 
only it applies the rights strategies, there appear to be limitations that are beyond external actors’ 
control. This finding implies that policymakers should avoid interventions in regions where 
powerful neighboring states are hostile to an external statebuilding mission. Furthermore, the 
importance of regional politics for the monopoly on large-scale violence suggests that 
intervention policies need to include regional states to a much greater extent. As the example of 
former Yugoslavia shows, powerful international actors might be able to facilitate cooperation in 
certain contexts. However, on a global scale there is reason for pessimism as the relative power 
of Western actors is in decline. Regional powers are increasingly able to position themselves 
against US or European interests, and the rise of a multipolar international system provides them 
with potential great power allies such as China or Russia. In contrast to regional states, any 
compromise with local elites will undermine the establishment of a monopoly on small-scale 
violence. The best outcome statebuilders could achieve under these circumstances is a well-
regulated para state in which the relation between central government and local elites is clearly 
specified. However, prospects for statebuilding interventions are not as gloomy as this first 
insight suggests.  
The second policy implication gives reason for optimism that statebuilding intervention 
can build monopolies on violence and thereby spare societies the fate of instability and civil war. 
In contrast to the general pessimism of both critical scholars and recent political sociology 
studies, statebuilding has proven to work well when specific conditions are met. Interveners have 
succeeded in creating stable states that control both the means large-scale violence and small-
scale violence regulation. Better analyses of the regional, local and historical context prior to 
intervention could reduce the number of military missions that fail to monopolize violence. Given 
how many people were killed in interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq, a reduction of the number 
of misguided statebuilding interventions could save a great number of lives. However, military 
interventions are often the result of political compromises in reaction to emergency situations. 
Therefore, the room for proper investigations into the social context of potential target countries 
is most likely very limited. 
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Third, the case studies suggest that a more flexible approach to statebuilding could be in 
the interest of both interveners and the affected societies. Some might interpret my findings as yet 
another nail in the coffin of liberal peacebuilding. Most countries that are prone to civil war and 
interventions are also likely to be dominated by strong self-help communities. It seems unrealistic 
to build a consolidated democracy or introduce the rule of law in a country governed by legal 
pluralism and neopatrimonial networks. However, the creation of a stable para state could be in 
the interest of both intervening and domestic actors. While one can certainly criticize the Sierra 
Leonean state in many respects, its combination of an electoral democracy with strong local 
chiefs has provided the population with stability and economic growth during the last decade. 
More generally speaking, the bottom line is that intervening actors have to re-learn the art of 
politics. Building a state is often a series of compromises, and in the realm of violence regulation 
these compromises can be necessary at all levels from the region to the village. Compromising on 
basic liberal values is a form of realpolitik that is seen as appalling by Western publics, but in 
some cases it might be the only way for external actors to help war-torn societies. Overall, the 
policy implications of my findings can be summarized in the formula: Intervene only where 
conditions are favorable, and adapt to local context. 
All of these insights would be redundant if the age of statebuilding interventions already 
over (Richmond 2014). So far, research on statebuilding has been the study of an ongoing 
political process. It is unclear whether liberal statebuilding interventions will stay with us or 
whether they were the expression of very specific historical circumstances. Western publics have 
grown tired of protracted interventions that lead to casualties and gruesome pictures of civil war 
violence. Nevertheless, there are signs that interventionism and statebuilding are here to stay. The 
most recent Western interventions in Lybia, the Sahel Zone and Iraq have been characterized less 
by statebuilding and more by military action against Islamists or unsolicited governments. 
However, this does not mean that liberal interventionism is dead, as UN-led missions in the 
Central African Republic, Mali, or South Sudan display the typical characteristics of liberal 
statebuilding interventions. Ironically, liberal statebuilding might have simply shifted away from 
liberal states to the UN and regional organizations such as the African Union. 
While it is possible that the age of statebuilding interventions is over, the possibility of a 
new era of isolationism seems implausible.  World society has become so highly inter-connected 
that the self-sufficient nation state is at the very least a historic phenomenon (if it has ever 
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existed). During the writing of this dissertation, whole regional state systems have collapsed in 
the Middle East and Northern Africa while the war in Ukraine has brought conflict and state 
fragmentation back to Europe. The more interdependent the world becomes, the more states will 
see their interests endangered by instability and conflict in distant places. State formation in the 
21st century is likely to be a highly globalized process. Therefore, it would not be surprising if 
statebuilding interventions, in one form or another, stay with us for the coming decades. 
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